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Abstract
‘Something persists iff it  exists at more than one time’ asserts Lewis. How things persist 
takes two forms: ‘something perdures iff it  persists by having different  temporal parts, or stages, 
at  different times’ whereas ‘it  endures iff it  persists by being wholly present  at more than one 
time. Lewis’ words show insight although some of their import  has been overlooked. The debate 
has been articulated mainly around the interplay between theories of time and persistence, 
oblivious of the evidence that Lewis’ definitions embed philosophically ubiquitous and crucial 
notions like existence (and identity) which deserves to be investigated. In addition, the inquiry 
has often moved from time to persistence: e.g. teasing out  the features that a specific view of 
time had which yielded a specific theory of persistence, whereas as it has recently been urged 
the relationship between views of time and persistence might be more relaxed: any theory of 
time could fit with any theory of persistence.
 This thesis is an exploration of persistence, time, and existence (and to a lesser extent 
identity) to make sense of whether and how the first  could affect  the others. The investigation is 
restricted to material objects (though little depends upon this), and to how and why the 
intuitions and common sense considerations in the background of perdurance, the theory of 
persistence I sympathise with, motivate a specific theory of time, i.e. eternalism; and finally 
how both afford a specific notion of existence, to wit a view of existence a là Quine, according 
to which existence is delimited by true uses of the existential quantifier. Thus, the direction of 
investigation will be from persistence, via time, to existence. The reason for this is that change 
is an undeniable datum of experience for which we have robust  intuitions and common sense 
considerations, whilst time, although pervasive, is so in an elusive way which is hard to pin 
down.
 The thesis is divided into three parts which mirror the three main topics spelt out above. 
In the first  part, a case of a persisting object  will be used to show that  our common sense 
thinking and intuitions harbour a predicament: it  appears plausible to believe that  there is a fact 
of the matter whether an object  is or is not one and the same although we may not  be able pin 
down the reason why. This will be clarified without  supposing these intuitions and common 
sense considerations to be inviolable. The focus will be on two main contenders, perdurance and 
endurance, and what  discriminates between them: the notion of temporal parts. Their centrality 
makes it decisive to understand what  temporal parts are and what they do. It  will be argued that 
whilst  the debate has reached a stalemate in attempting to define temporal parts, the notion rests 
upon a robust basis of intuitions and common sense considerations which draw upon our 
ordinary understanding of parts in space, and this is sufficient to give a working grasp of them 
as well as the potential for a definition which stands scrutiny. It has also been argued that 
temporal parts are decisive in solving some puzzling situations; therefore I will examine one of 
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these, the long-standing problem of change, and show that  there is a sense in which it might  not 
be a genuine metaphysical problem. Leibniz’s Law is a law of logic and it  is best  formulated 
accordingly; whereas the way it  is used to generate the problem of change is metaphysically 
loaded. The problem of change as a metaphysical problem is thus deflated but, it will be argued, 
there are better, more intuitive, ways of motivating perdurance.
 The intelligibility and possibility of temporal parts, and hence perdurantism, has been 
shown to rely on the thought that reality is four-dimensional, so that in addition to the three 
spatial dimensions in which reality uncontentiously extends, there is a fourth, time, along which 
similarly reality extends. In the second part  I shall consider if what philosophers have said about 
this stands scrutiny. Philosophers have argued that  space and time share some decisive features 
(the similarity thesis); it might  be hoped that investigating what  they have said will clarify 
whether and how time could be so considered. I will argue that such an investigation will leave 
the space/time analogy wanting, and therefore I shall endeavour to venture a tentative picture of 
time which could accommodate the similarity thesis as well as a view of time as extended. I will 
then take a brief look into the current  debate in the philosophy of time and tease out  what  the 
different  theories of time are really about, their basic assumptions which are supposed to make 
manifest  how each view sees time and what  they try to defend as basic features of it. I will make 
clear why perdurance’s four-dimensional view of reality is most  appealing if combined with an 
eternalist view of time according to which every time co-exists; both four-dimensionalism and 
eternalism sharing the assumption that time is a dimension through which things extend.
 In the third part, I unveil the nexus between perdurance, eternalism, and the notion of 
existence. I argue that  perdurance’s basic assumption that reality is four-dimensional which is 
shared by eternalism, motivates a view of existence a là Quine, since it  guarantees an 
existentially closed domain of existents, which is what perdurance and eternalism imply. The 
overall conclusion is that  once unpacked, perdurance, eternalism, and a view of existence a là 
Quine fit  together in a way in which each one motivates the others. Each has intuitions and 
assumptions that it tries to preserve and defend; intuitions and assumptions which might not be 
preserved if the theories are combined differently.
3
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An Analysis of Persistence
Introduction
 An Analysis of Persistence should be, by and large, as the title suggests, an 
attempt at a metaphysical analysis of persistence. In detail, for convenience’s sake, the 
investigation shall be limited to material objects, also known in the literature as 
‘moderate-sized specimens of dry goods’.1 It should also be, desirably, an exercise in 
systematic metaphysics. Within the breadth of the philosophical enquiry, metaphysics is 
to be understood as an autonomous discipline concerned with the fundamental structure 
of reality,2  and systematic insofar as it begins with an ontology, an account of what 
kinds of things there are and what their nature is. Ontology is to be considered as a 
taxonomy of what categories of being there are and how they relate each other, one 
which more often than not is conducive to an account of what the ultimate structure of 
reality  is.3  Metaphysics also deemed as the most  fundamental form of enquiry: 
something that is extremely  difficult to pursue, and which does not come on the cheap; 
to wit it does not  allow for piecemeal solutions or short-cuts. It is a holistic discipline 
which takes common sense as a starting point but which acknowledges that aspects of 
common sense will need to be revised or abandoned. It is a discipline which generally 
8
1  Austin, J.L. (1962). Sense and Sensibilia. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 9. See also Lowe, E.J. 
(2003). “In Defense of Moderate-Sized Specimens of Dry Goods”. Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 67: 704-10.
2 Lowe, E.J. (1998). The Possibility of Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Ch. 1; (2002) A 
Survey of Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Ch. 1.
3 Lowe, E.J. (2002).  A Survey of Metaphysics.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 13-6; Shaffer, J. (2009). 
“On What Grounds What”. In D. Chalmers, B. Manley & R. Wasserman (eds.) Metametaphysics.  Oxford 
347-380. Reprinted in K. Korman, & E. Sosa (eds.) Metaphysics: An Anthology, 2nd edition (2011). 
Blackwell, 73-96.
pursues its investigations a priori but, while resisting scientism, retains respect for 
science since the role of metaphysics is to enlighten features of reality  that the 
empirical/scientific enquiry inevitably presupposes.4
 Inevitably, this work shall form part of E.J. Lowe’s legacy and scholarship. His 
lesson and vision is of a metaphysics of the understanding rather than puzzle-solving: an 
approach guided by a constant sense of puzzlement, fascination and bewilderment at the 
existence and nature of reality; a relentless questioning of our assumptions devoid of 
the need to manipulate them.
As Wilfrid Sellars once put it:
“The aim of philosophy, abstractly formulated, is to understand  [my italic] how 
things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together [my italic] in the 
broadest possible sense of the term.”5
In this work, I shall endeavour to apply this elusive catchline to Lewis’ paramount 
characterisation of persistence as ‘[s]omething persists iff, somehow or other, it exists at 
various times’6. Thus, on a first general and abstract  level of enquiry, one of the issues I 
shall ideally be looking at is indeed what some of the notions nominally embedded in 
Lewis’ phrase - something, time, and persistence - stand for, and how one motivates the 
others.7  A great deal of effort has been put into the question of how things (in a very 
9
4  Lowe, E.J. (1998). The Possibility of Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3-8; (2002) A 
Survey of Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 5-7.
5  Sellars, W. (1962).  “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man”.  In R. Colodny (ed.) Frontiers of 
Science and Philosophy. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press: 35-78. Reprinted in (1963). 
Science, Perception and Reality. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.
6 Lewis, D. K. (1986). On The Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 202.
7 For the record, and because I am aware that there might be a slight sense in which I raise the reader’s 
expectations without fully meeting them, the enquiry into something will not be pursued in this thesis. 
The reason is mere convenience: something (or what I shall call a ‘subject of persistence’) is traditionally 
linked to theories of substance, in all the various ways in which substance is metaphysically understood. 
To include them into the project would certainly be rewarding but at the same time it would add to the 
project even a wider scope which might render it too ambitious, and consequently difficult to handle. The 
topic of theories of substance is worth by itself a doctorate project or two.
general sense of the term) do persist but less into understanding if and how those 
notions affect one another.8
 Curiously though, in addition to the notions highlighted above, Lewis’ 
characterisation of persistence contains three further philosophically significant 
concepts which I believe are as crucial as the previous ones in achieving an adequate 
understanding of persistence. These are notions which have been regrettably  overlooked 
in the literature: namely, those of existence, identity, and change. It  seems to be quite 
obvious that existence should be included in the investigation - recall Lewis’ phrase 
‘something persists iff, somehow or other, it exists at various times’: clearly, an entity 
must primarily exist at all if it  exists at one time, and then, allegedly, at  others. It might 
be less obvious that the notions of identity and change should be important in this 
investigation. But first, it must be recalled that an alternative, perhaps roundabout way, 
to talk of persistence is in terms of identity over (or across) time: after all, for something 
to genuinely persist is for it to exist at different times, as the one and the same thing. 
Had it been a different thing (in the sense of numerically different) at different times it 
would make very little sense to say  it persisted.9  How then the phrase ‘one and the 
same’ is cashed out in the literature is quite contentious, however this difficulty should 
not rule out identity  as a legitimate component of the definition. Lastly, despite the fact 
that change is an ubiquitous and familiar feature, it  may take some effort to spot it 
lurking underneath Lewis’ characterisation, therefore a small amount of philosophically 
harmless thinking-hard-enough-in-the-right-sort-of-way is required.
10
8 See for example: Chisholm, R. (1976). Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study. La Salle: Open Court 
Publishing Co.; Armstrong, D.M. (1980). “Identity Through Time”, in Peter van Inwagen, (ed.) Time and 
Cause: Essays Presented to Richard Taylor. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. pp. 67-78; Lewis, D.  K. (1986).  On 
The Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 202; Heller, M. (1990).  The Ontology of Physical 
Objects: Four Dimensional Hunks of Matter.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; van Inwagen, P. 
(1990). Material Beings. Ithaca: Cornel University Press; Oderberg, D. (1993). The Metaphysics of 
Identity over Time. New York: St Martin’s Press; Rea, M. (1997).  Material Constitution. Lanham: 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. Mellor, D.H. (1998). Real Time II.  London: Routledge; Gallois,  A. 
(1998). Occasions of Identity. Oxford: Clarendon Press; Hawley,  K. (2001). How Things Persist. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press; Sider, T. (2001). Four Dimensionalism. An Ontology of Persistence and Time. 
NewYork: Oxford University Press.
9 Although, as recently claimed by few people, this might turn out not to be the case. See Sider (2001), 
Four Dimensionalism. An Ontology of Persistence and Time. NewYork: Oxford University Press; (2000). 
“Recent Work on Identity Over Time”. Philosophical Books 41: 81-89; (1997). “Four Dimensionalism”. 
Philosophical Review 106: 197–231; (1996). “All the World’s a Stage”.  Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy 74: 433-53. Hawley, K. (2001). How Things Persist. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Varzi, 
A. (2003).  ‘Naming the Stages’,  Dialectica 57: 387-412. Though even these writers seemingly try to 
capture something of the notion of identity over time through, for example, making temporal parts the 
parts of a specific continuant.
 Something persists if and only if it exists at various times: there is a remarkable 
turnover in the features that  things exhibit over time, a piece of wax is soft and fluid at 
one time (when heated) but solidifies at a later time (upon cooling).10 For some reason, 
we talk as if the piece of wax were one and the same, therefore the piece of soft wax 
becoming solid changed from exhibiting a ‘soft’ feature (being soft) to exhibiting a 
‘hard’ one (being hard). Broadly  speaking, this is what we experience on a daily basis. 
Therefore, I believe a reader who is metaphysically  unsympathetic to change shall not 
charge me of inaccuracy or partiality, not at this stage anyway, and if possible not at 
later stages either. To conclude, for a thorough and hopefully sound understanding of 
the persistence of material objects, in addition to something, time, and persistence in 
Lewis’ definition, also existence, identity, and change are notions which seemingly 
deserve investigation.11
 In pursuing the investigation exposed above, as a guideline, I shall draw upon an 
article by Lowe which regrettably has somehow been overlooked.12 His thesis is quite 
clear:
“as far as metaphysics is concerned, questions concerning the nature of time are 
more fundamental [my italic] than, or at least prior [my italic] to, questions 
concerning the nature of persistence.”13
11
10  See Descartes’ wax example in the Second Meditation in Descartes,  R. (1911).  Meditations on First 
Philosophy. In E.S. Haldane (Trans.) The Philosophical Works of Descartes.  Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 16.
11 For convenience’s sake, what shall be pursued in the course of the thesis is mainly the relationships, if 
any, between theories of persistence and time and their branching into the notion of existence (remarks 
about identity will be made but to a lesser extent. There is also a sense in which change seems to be 
already investigated insofar as existence, identity, and time are).
12  Lowe, E.J. & McCall, S. (2006). “The 3D/4D controversy: a storm in a teacup”. Noûs 40: 570-8; 
(2006). “3D/4D equivalence, the twins paradox, and absolute time”.  Analysis 63: 114-23; Lowe, E.J. 
(1987). “Lewis on Perdurance Versus Endurance”. Analysis 47:152-4; (2006). “Endurantism versus 
perdurantism and the nature of time”. Rivista di Filosofia Neoscolastica 4: 713-27.
13  Lowe, E.J. (2006).  “Endurantism versus perdurantism and the nature of time”.  Rivista di Filosofia 
Neoscolastica 4: 715-6.
In conversation we agreed that in addition to this, perhaps questions about the nature of 
persistence and time could be further clarified through a careful understanding of very 
basic and ubiquitous notions like those of existence (and identity).14
 To claim that an adequate understanding of questions about the nature of 
existence (and identity) precedes the understanding of questions about persistence does 
not correspond to a reduction of the latter to the former; in other words I shall not claim 
that the whole of the debate about persistence comes down to an analysis of the notions 
of existence, identity, and their relations, although to some extent I agree with 
Wasserman’s claim that ‘One’s perspective on change is often determined by one’s 
position in the broader philosophical landscape.’15 Rather, I will contend that once we 
succeed in exposing the intuitions, implications, and commitments bolstering and 
entailed by a particular view on persistence and time, it might be possible to see that 
they  motivate (top-down approach) a particular view of existence; so that it could then 
be possible from a particular view of existence to predict, and to some extent  anticipate 
its bearings upon a view of time and persistence (bottom-up approach).16 Consequently, 
a commitment to a particular view on existence (and identity) could have theoretical 
constraints when it comes to deciding upon an account of time and persistence.
 Having said that, the general attitude by many metaphysicians towards 
ubiquitous notions such as existence, identity, and change has been traditionally  quite 
12
14  Surely, the understanding of persistence could be clarified further including into the investigation the 
‘subject of persistence’ or what Lewis calls ‘something’  (limited to material objects for the purposes of 
the thesis but that if required could be easily extended to embrace other kinds of things). It seems to make 
quite good sense, at least to me, to know at first what kind of thing a thing is, and then speculate about 
whether or how it persists retaining some sort of identity over time. Different kinds of things may well 
persist in different ways - what in jargon is known as persistence conditions - if they persist at all.  This 
however does not establish a preferential pattern in all similar cases; it may well be that sometimes 
knowing what the persistence conditions of a thing are could help to know what kind of thing that thing 
is. But as stated in footnote 6 and 11 I shall not pursue this topic further.
15 Wasserman, R. (2006). “The Problem of Change”. Philosophy Compass 1: 48.
16  As I shall maintain in the following, I am not particularly sympathetic with a bottom-up approach in 
metaphysics, although I understand the desire and somehow the necessity for synthesis of human subjects 
of experience/knowledge.
dismissive. To this extent, I shall briefly  recall how thinkers of the likes of Peter 
Unger17, David Lewis18, and others19 belittle their status20.
 Speaking of the Sorites arguments (which conclude that there are no ordinary 
things) Unger urges that:
“[t]he sorites argument  just  presented did not  involve the notion of identity in any 
interesting way; we never said, or cared, which heap was [my italic] present. 
Indeed, if that idea is involved at all, which I doubt, it  is only in the manner in 
which any terribly general idea may be presupposed by, and involved in, [my 
italic] any argument at all, or virtually any.”21
Along similar lines, Lewis maintains that:
“[...] we should not  suppose that  we have here any problem about identity. We 
never have. Identity is utterly simple and unproblematic. Everything is identical to 
itself; nothing is ever identical to anything else except itself. There is never any 
problem about  what makes something identical to itself; nothing can ever fail to be. 
And there is never any problem about  what makes two things identical; two things 
never can be identical.”22
And famously Quine on the topic of existence states that:
“Existence is what existential quantification expresses.There are things of kind F if 
and only if (∃x) Fx. This is unhelpful as it is undebatable, since it is how one 
13
17 Unger, P. (1979). “There Are No Ordinary Things”. Synthese, 41, 2, 117-154.
18 Lewis, D. K. (1986). On The Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, p. 192-3.
19  Quine, W.V.O. (1950), “Identity, Ostension, and Hyposthasis”. The Journal of Philosophy 47: 621. 
Quine, W.V.O. (1987). Quiddities: An Intermittently Philosophical Dictionary.  Cambridge,  MA: Harvard 
University Press. Armstrong, D.M. (1978). Universals and Scientific Realism, 2 vols.  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. Armstrong, D.M. (1989). Universals: An Opinionated Introduction. 
Westview Press. Armstrong, D.M. (1997). A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. Amstrong, D.M. (2004). Truth and Truthmakers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Baxter, 
D.L.M. (1988a). “Identity in the Loose and Popular Sense”.  Mind 97: 575-82.  Baxter, D.L.M. (1988b). 
“Many-One Identity”. Philosophical Papers 17: 193-216.  Baxter, D.L.M. (1989).  “Identity through time 
and the discernibility of the identicals”. Analysis 49: 125-131.  Baxter, D.L.M. (1999). “The Discernibility 
of the Identicals”. Journal of Philosophical Research 24: 37-55. Baxter, D.L.M. (2001a). “Loose Identity 
and Becoming Something Else”. Noûs 35: 592-601. Baxter, D.L.M. (2001b). “Instantiation as Partial 
Identity”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79: 449-464.
20  As for existence see Quine, W.V.O. (1948). “On What There Is,” Review of Metaphysics,  2: 21–38. 
Reprinted in his From a Logical Point of View,  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953; van 
Inwagen, P. (2003). “Existence,  Ontological Commitment, and Fictional Entities”. In Michael J. Loux & 
Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. 131-57; (1998). “Meta-Ontology”. 
Erkenntnis, 48, 233-50. Hirsh, E. (2011). Quantifier Variance and Realism: Essays in Metaontology. New 
York: Oxford University Press, xii; Sider, T. (2011). Writing the book of the world. Oxford University 
Press, 175.
21 Unger, P. (1979). “There Are No Ordinary Things”. Synthese, 41: 118.
22 Lewis, D.K. (1986). On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 192-3.
explains the symbolic notation of quantification to begin with. The fact is that it  is 
unreasonable to ask for an explanation of existence in simpler terms. We found an 
explication of singular existence, ‘a exists,’ as ‘(∃x) x=a’; but explication in turn of 
the existential quantifier itself, ‘there is,’ ‘there are,’ explication of general 
existence, is a forlorn cause.”23
It is philosophically interesting to contrast it with Lowe’s claim (in keeping with 
Bertrand Russell)24 that:
“[Philosophical Logic is] the philosophical elucidation of those notions that are 
indispensable [my italic] for the proper characterisation of rational thought and its 
contents. The notions in question are ones like those of reference, predication, 
identity [my italic], truth, negation, quantification, existence [my italic], necessity, 
definition and entailment. These and related notions are needed in order to give 
adequate accounts of the structure of thoughts—particularly as expressed in 
language—and of the relationships in which thoughts stand both to one another and 
to objects and states of affairs in the world.”25
It is interesting how one philosopher’s dismissive attitude towards ‘terribly general 
ideas’ becomes ‘notions that are indispensable’ for another. Perhaps just an instance of 
the idea that  one philosopher’s modus ponens is another’s modus tollens. In any case, I 
shall leave it to the reader to decide which party to join. I hold that, in keeping with 
Lowe and Russell, we should care for them. And this is one thing among others I shall 
attempt to argue for in this thesis.
 Persistence and time are paramount topics, as well as extraordinarily large, in 
metaphysics. This is evinced by the extensive literature on the topics, and their inclusion 
in many surveys or introductory books about metaphysics.26 Therefore, in order to form 
a project appropriate for a thesis, I shall limit the scope of my research narrowing the 
14
23 Quine, W.V.O. (1969). Ontological Relativity and Other Essays.  New York: Columbia University Press, 
97.
24 “Some kind of knowledge of logical forms, though with most people it is not explicit, is involved in all 
understanding of discourse. It is the business of philosophical logic to extract this knowledge from its 
concrete integuments, and to render it explicit and pure.” Russell,  B. (1914). Our Knowledge of the 
External World. London: George Allen and Unwin, 53.
25 Lowe, E.J. (2000). Philosophical Logic. Durham : Durham University Philosophy Department, 1.
26  See Lowe, E.J. (1998).  The Possibility of Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Ch. 4, 5; 
(2002) A Survey of Metaphysics.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, Ch. 2, 3, 4.  Loux, M.J.  (2013). 
Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction. Third edition. New York: Routledge, Ch. 6. van Inwagen, P. 
(2014). Metaphysics. Fourth edition. Westview Press; van Inwagen, P. & Zimmerman, D.W. (eds.) 
Metaphysics: The Big Questions. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1998, 67-220.
enquiry  down to addressing three main questions, each related to the other: one general, 
and two more specific. The general one, stemming from what has been said so far, is 
whether and how some of the notions embedded in Lewis’ definition of persistence - 
persistence, time, and existence - motivate one another. It  is worthwhile noting that 
embedded within the general question is also the important issue regarding the interplay, 
if any, between theories of persistence and time. It has been argued that nothing 
hampers any theory of persistence to combine with any theory of time.27 The thesis I 
shall argue for is instead that, after careful analysis it  appears that  there are some 
constraints which favour some combinations whilst hindering others; in particular, if the 
ontological implications of specific theories of persistence, time, and existence are 
teased out - that is, how they  see reality  - there is a sense in which one motivates the 
others. For example, there are aspects of perdurance that entail eternalism, an entailment 
not present between perdurance and presentism:28 more specifically, the intuitive grasp 
that we have on temporal parts as posited by perdurantism, relying on analogies 
between space and time, as it will be claimed later on; clearly motivates an eternalist 
outlook. A combination which in turn motivates a Quinean view of existence, once the 
ontological inplications of the three views are adequately unpacked.
 The first specific (or less general) question shall investigate in what ways, if any, 
theories of persistence motivate theories of time, and most importantly whether and how 
both motivate theories of existence.29 For the second specific question, I shall introduce 
15
27 Brogaard, B. (2000). “Presentist Four-Dimensionalism”. The Monist 83: 341-56. Sider, T. (2001). Four 
Dimensionalism. An Ontology of Persistence and Time. NewYork: Oxford University Press,  Ch. 4. See 
also Miller, K. (2005). “The Metaphysical Equivalence of Three and Four Dimensionalism”. Erkenntnis 
62: 91-117.  For a different approach more in keeping with mine see Lowe, E.J. (2006). “Endurantism 
versus Perdurantism and the Nature of Time”. Rivista di Filosofia Neoscolastica 4: 713-27.
28 See Brogaard, B. (2000). “Presentist Four-Dimensionalism”. The Monist 83: 341-56. Brogaard argues 
that “contrary to what is usually believed, four-dimensionalism does not entail a changeless world.” 
Brogaard’s paper, together with its cogent conclusion, brings up important as well as contentious issues 
regarding the status of theories of persistence,  time and their interplay. I believe that there is some 
confusion with metaphysical, epistemic, and linguistic issues, specifically between presentism and ‘taking 
tense seriously’. In the part of this thesis which concerns Time (Part II), I will argue that there is a sense 
in which a presentist four-dimensionalism betrays what presentism and four-dimensionalism convey and 
imply.
29  I suddenly dropped ‘identity’ since the main focus will be on existence; although I shall hint at 
‘identity’ very frequently throughout the thesis.  The reason why I decided to leave it behind is merely 
practical and to contain the breadth of the enquiry.
Lowe and McCall’s thesis 30  of the equivalence between a 3D or endurantist  view of 
reality, and a 4D or perdurantist:
“The thesis of 3D/4D equivalence states that objects of the physical world can be 
described using either 3-dimensional or 4-dimensional language, and that the 
descriptions are equivalent in the sense of intertranslatable. Furthermore, there is 
no ‘fact  of the matter’ in the world which makes one of the descriptions true and 
the other false.”31
And:
“For some purposes the 4D picture is more illuminating [...] and for others 
purposes the 3D picture is preferable. But ultimately it  makes no difference which 
ontological position we adopt. The intertranslatability of 3D and 4D descriptions of 
the world enables us to move from one ontological stance to the other with ease 
and confidence. The 3D/4D controversy is indeed a “storm in a teacup”.”32
It might well be the case that the 3D/4D controversy is not genuine.33 Disregarding for a 
moment Lowe & McCall’s argument, and going back to Lowe’s 2006 article quoted 
early on34, the idea is that the equivalence holds insofar as time is seen as extended, or a 
dimension in which reality  somehow extends.35 Therefore, the second specific question 
shall investigate, from a philosophical point of view, the idea that time is somehow 
extended; and examine how we could make sense of it. More specifically, perdurance as 
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30 Lowe, E.J. & McCall, S. (2006). “The 3D/4D controversy: a storm in a teacup”. Noûs 40: 570-8.  Lowe, 
E.J.  & McCall, S. (2003). “3D/4D equivalence, the twins paradox, and absolute time”. Analysis 63: 
114-23.
31 Lowe, E.J. & McCall, S. “3D/4D equivalence, the twins paradox, and absolute time”. Analysis 63: 118.
32  Lowe, E.J. & McCall, S. (2006). “The 3D/4D controversy: a storm in a teacup”. Noûs 40: 577. For 
completeness’ sake, I shall take 4D as a shortcut for the view according to which ordinary material things 
are extended in four dimensions, they take up time as they do with time. Conversely, I shall take 3D to 
mean the thesis according to which ordinary material things extends in the three dimensions of space 
only, that is they do not extend in time.
33See also Miller, K. (2005). “The Metaphysical Equivalence of Three and Four Dimensionalism”. 
Erkenntnis 62: 91-117. For a criticism to the equivalence thesis see Haslanger, S. (1994).  “Humean 
Supervenience and Enduring Things”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72: 339-59. For the record, I 
see McCalls & Lowe’s point (although I might disagree) but I struggle to understand Miller’s.
34  Lowe, E.J. (2006). “Endurantism versus Perdurantism and the Nature of Time”. Rivista di Filosofia 
Neoscolastica 4: 713-27.
35 Ibid. 716.  “[...] if one thinks of time as being a dimension, then the same underlying temporal reality 
supports, equally well, a description of persistence in terms of either ‘4D space-time worms’, ‘momentary 
3D stages’, or ‘enduring 3D objects’. [...] Fourth and most importantly, I believe that time should not in 
fact be thought of as being any kind of dimension and as a consequence of this believe that only certain 
variety of endurantism can be the correct account of persistence.” I shall not commit myself to Lowe’s 
fourth claim. I shall take advantages of Lowe’s framework but not of his conclusions since the purposes 
of this thesis are to understand rather than to establish.
a theory of persistence, with its commitment to a four-dimensional view of reality, 
seemingly entails such an extended view of reality; a view which in turn seems to 
motivate a picture of reality  similar to the one which eternalism as a theory of time 
suggests. But what exactly  do perdurantists and eternalists mean? How does one 
motivate the others? If they do, in virtue of what? Finally, how does the interplay 
between perdurance and eternalism motivates a specific view of existence?
 The three questions exposed above, which are distinct but intimately related as I 
have tried to make clear, shall correspond to three equally distinct but intimately related 
strands in the thesis. Although distinct, the three questions will not be addressed 
independently one by one; this I believe would defeat  the claim of their being intimately 
related. What I shall suggest instead is that one should see them as three different layers 
which interplay and overlap to a higher degree; so the endeavour will be to unpack them 
showing how intertwined they are and how they motivate one another. Admittedly, the 
strategy deployed in this thesis to achieve the pointers outlined above might look a little 
unconventional: investigating theories of persistence, time, and existence may sound 
too broad. What I shall offer is instead more substantial: how a specific theory of 
persistence, perdurance, motivates a specific theory of time, eternalism, and finally how 
the combination of perdurance and eternalism motivates a view of existence a là Quine.
 My own sympathy goes for perdurance despite finding it somehow wanting. I 
am a keen perdurantist since I think that such a doctrine is a paradigmatic example of a 
theory  which acknowledges two of what I take to be the most forceful styles of 
philosophising: empiricism and rationalism. Against traditional scholarship, I believe 
that the two are two indispensable ways to look at the same thing, to wit reality.
For instance, Lennon has it that:
“Empiricists seek to know the way the world is [...] in order to produce a 
description [of it]. By contrast, rationalists already know the way the world is. 
[They] instead seek to know why the world must be the way it  is. Their theories are 
thus prescriptive instead of descriptive.”36
“If the underlying impulse of rationalists, prior to all argument, is the visceral 
conviction that the world could not have been otherwise, the empiricists’ 
conviction is that the world inexplicably just  is the way it  is. Thus the defining 
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36 Lennon, T.M. (2005). “The Rationalist Conception of Substance”. In A. Nelson (ed.) A Companion to 
Rationalism. Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 12-30.
commitment  of empiricism to experience as the ultimate source of all knowledge is 
in fact  posterior to its initial impulse. Experience of the world is needed because 
reason does not tell, or is not told, why it must be as it is.”37
The different impulses seem to mirror how the two look at the world:
“[The] empiricist  conviction is that  the world is multiple, diverse, and complex. 
There are many things in the world, they differ in many ways, and it  is not clear 
how they relate to one another. [...] The rationalist  impulse is in response to a 
perceived unity, uniformity, and simplicity in the world; to rationalists, the world 
seems to hang together and form a coherent whole.”38
At first blush, reality looks heterogeneous, uneasy to be grasped, scattered, if not 
haphazard; but  from an alternative perspective it looks as if that sheer heterogeneity 
could be easily tamed; there seem to be connections between distinct things, multiplicity 
and complexity  seem to be able to be understood in terms of unity and simplicity. It just 
appears to me as a reasonable way  to look at things, and the subtlety  lies precisely in the 
precarious balance between the two. Of course, the dialectic between empiricists’ 
descriptions and rationalists’ prescriptions ought to be taken with a grain of salt, 
particularly if carried over to the contemporary debate. But this is something I shall put 
to one side now and keep for later on in the thesis.
 On the other hand, perdurance does seem to somehow resist my attempts to tame 
it, to present it as a well-grounded philosophical world view in general, and as a theory 
of persistence in particular. It  is said to settle brilliantly all sorts of puzzles, and 
philosophically difficult situations but ultimately there remains a sense in which when it 
comes to regimentating the intuitive grasp  we have on temporal parts and the analogy 
between space and time which lies in the background of the notion of temporal parts, 
perdurance does not seem to be able to fully withstand scrutiny. This though, as pointed 
out above, does not immediately  rule out perdurance from being a legitimate contender 
in the field of theories of persistence. 
 A further interesting question which has been looked into only en passant in the 
literature is how some of those concepts lined up above, to wit ‘persistence’, ‘time’, and 
‘existence’, square with common sense and intuitions - our assumptions as it were. 
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37 Ibid.
38 Ibid. 12-3.
(This question is particularly important given the conception of metaphysics outlined at 
the outset). Intuitions and common sense considerations are seemingly the raw materials 
we have before we begin any philosophical investigation. However, they should never 
have the last word when it comes to assessing the goodness of a piece of philosophy. An 
alleged agreement or disagreement between those philosophical concepts and our 
common sense and intuitions would rather be a promise or an indication whether the 
direction the enquiry is heading could be profitable. In fact, what I shall endeavour to 
show is that contrary to what detractors of temporal parts believe, there is in the 
background of the notion a solid core which draws upon intuitions and common sense 
considerations. Curiously, as I shall argue, such a core of intuitions and common sense 
considerations will end up motivating a specific view of time, and the combination of 
both a specific view of existence. Therefore, the reference to intuitions and common 
sense considerations (as a starting point) will be a recurring feature throughout the 
thesis.
 In relation to this, what will perhaps transpire from the thesis is, apart from the 
idea that  I might be an unconventional perdurantist, a profound sense of scepticism, 
specifically towards some of the themes and topics relevant to this enquiry. I employ the 
term ‘scepticism’ and the adjective ‘sceptical’ in the sense of a personal disposition 
towards doubt or incredulity  of the facts put forth, rather than as the doctrine that claims 
the impossibility of true knowledge of things or that all knowledge is uncertain. I am 
myself quite certain and confident that knowledge is possible, but I am unimpressed by 
the methodological attitude which, at present, seems to suggest that how we know 
(epistemology) branches directly into the way things are (metaphysics). If I am correct, 
the mainstream of contemporary analytic philosophy which I am alluding to makes a 
very good case in favour of my sceptical impulse.
	
 I shall now consider why this research project should be deemed interesting and 
therefore deserve credit. A strong case for it has been made so far outlining the three 
questions it purports to address; therefore the relevance, novelty and original 
contribution of this work should be clearer by now. However, it may be instructive to 
summarise it as follows: at first, in how ‘persistence’, ‘time’, and ‘existence’ motivate 
one another. Secondly, in how a specific theory of persistence, perdurance, motivates a 
specific view of time, eternalism; and how both motivate a Quinean view of ‘existence’. 
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Two issues which have been overlooked in the contemporary debate.39 My suspicion is 
that some of the nowadays’ fashionable theories of how material objects persist through 
time may not wear all their cost on their sleeve; e.g. entailing, as an unbecoming 
burden, a specific view of time, and of existence. This ought to be exposed so that we 
are aware beforehand what we would have to commit to if we decide to endorse one or 
another.
	
 Secondly, the trend that philosophical enquiry has followed in recent years is 
quite clear: setting aside the more or less contingent reasons why it happened, at least in 
philosophy, when it comes to the topics of investigation, the tendency has gone toward a 
very specific and restricted field of enquiry. Most if not all the big questions in 
philosophy are then put on hold (if not neglected) or allegedly broken down into smaller 
ones, easier to attain, so that they result more interesting and attractive. Surely, this 
approach sounds appealing as well as scientific. To mark off a narrow domain of 
enquiry and pursue it in detail. But philosophy, I maintain, is not science nor it should 
be (although in the recent past quite a few attempts have been made in that direction). 
Such a piecemeal approach to philosophical matters, which I already took issue with at 
the outset of this Introduction, although extremely successful for publishing purposes, 
may turn out less favourable when the goal is actually to tackle philosophical questions 
tout court, in particular composite and complex ones like persistence, time, substance, 
and the likes. What the allegedly scientific piecemeal approach inevitably loses is a 
proper grasp of the topic which only the wider outlook of traditional philosophy could 
guarantee. A broader stance which is crucial when the task to be accomplished is to 
individuate and clarify the ontolgical implications and connections between distinct 
objects of enquiry. Specifically, the connections between a view of persistence 
(perdurance), and time (eternalism) on the one hand; of our ordinary grasp of notions 
like change, the analogies between space and time (or the lack of it) on the other; and 
lastly the connections between the resulting combined theory of persistence and time 
and a view of existence as Quine’s.
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39 One of the few instances in which existence is brought in is Tallant, J.C. (2014). “Defining Existence 
Presentism”. Erkenntnis 79: 479-501. See also Merricks,  T. (2007). Truth and ontology.  Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 123-5; and Zimmerman, D. (1996). “Persistence and Presentism”. Philosophical 
Papers: 25,  115-26.  The sense in which I think existence is part and parcel is different from those as I 
shall try to explain in the following. In addition, what I would like to stress is the novelty in the approach 
to these issues, that is instead of the traditional bottom-up, say from theories of time to theories of 
persistence, I shall pursue a top-down investigation, namely from theories of persistence, to theories of 
time, and in turn to theories of existence.
	
 If this is the case, then the attempt to solve single puzzles like the Ship of 
Theseus or McTaggart’s paradox is, of course of great interest, but not conducive to 
what the thesis should like to achieve, in the sense advertised above. Single puzzling 
situations are small pieces of the overall jigsaw puzzle which is reality. Reality which 
begins to emerge only when the question about the ontological implications and 
connections of and between apparently distinct ‘existences’ is suitably pursued and 
addressed. A puzzle could be solved through a fair amount of fine hair-splitting but in 
the end we would still be wondering about its place in the whole picture. Perhaps, the 
objection goes, the next step towards that sort of overarching understanding of reality 
could be to solve another puzzle, perhaps one after another, constructing reality as a 
results from these narrow domains of enquiry. I must confess I am not a keen 
extensionalist40 in general and I struggle to grasp what ‘Composition As Identity’41 
(CAI) is about, even in its weaker variety; thus I do not think that this strategy 
ultimately succeeds. In particular, (i) it is still to be demonstrated that a collection of 
perspectival approaches jointly taken is able to attain a general, wider, stance on a topic; 
and (ii) it is not clear how that piecemeal approach could address the crucial question 
concerning the implications and connections among distinct ‘existences’ when the 
object of its enquiry is by definition a single ‘existence’. To clarify, pursuing these 
subtopics only, one overlooks whether the solution offered to a puzzle is compatible 
with or affects the one offered to another. But this is crucial: if it is not clear which the 
relationships between one and the other are (to wit the implications and connections 
emphasised so far), then plausibly the way the world is cannot be accurately captured 
since what reality is fundamentally about is what is invariant under different frames of 
reference. This is why investigating the implications and connections is decisive, and 
the narrow scope of contemporary philosophical investigation does not seem conducive 
to that. Moreover, this focus prevents one from using insights gained in considering one 
case, from aiding the consideration of another. For example, it has been traditionally 
argued that eternalism entails perdurance. Although this might not be my preferred way 
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40  Extensionalism is the thesis that sameness of composition is sufficient for identity. See for example 
Varzi, A. (2009). “Universalism entails Extentionalism”. Analysis 69: 599-604.
41 “The intuitive notion that the whole is ‘nothing over and above’ its parts - that the whole is the same as 
its parts - may be clarified by claiming the whole is identical, in some sense or other, to its parts. This is 
the thesis of composition as identity (CAI).” See Cotnoir, A.J. (2014). “Composition As Identity: Framing 
the Debate”. In D.L.M. Baxter & A.J. Cotnoir (eds.) Composition as Identity. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, Ch. 1. See also D.L.M. Baxter (1999). “The Discernibility of Identicals”. Journal of Philosophical 
Research 24: 37–55. Lewis, D. (1991). Parts of Classes. Oxford: Basil Blackwel. Baxter, D.L.M. 
(1988a).  “Identity in the Loose and Popular Sense”. Mind 97: 576-82; (1988b). “Many - One Identity”. 
Philosophical Papers17: 193–216.
of framing the relationships between the two theories (distinct existences) it 
nevertheless remains the case that if the former entails the latter, the entailment would 
illuminate another reason (invariant) in which perdurance motivates eternalism.
	
 Therefore, I shall advocate in favour of an old-fashioned way of doing 
philosophy, an holistic approach (in keeping with what I claimed at the outset about 
metaphysics as a discipline) in which the understanding of how things motivate one 
another on a very general level is prior. Only at that level of abstractness one could have 
an appreciation of whether the lesser parts require investigation, and also how deep the 
investigation has to be. The history of philosophy is one in which systematic 
metaphysics has had a great impact and, to this extent, my attempt at such methodology 
at least has precedent. Further, the tasks I have set myself are specific and may have 
answers that determine the course of future research (e.g. showing certain combinations 
of ideas to motivate others or not) even if they do not settle the matter once and for all. 
Lastly, this approach explains and addresses the potential question of why only a 
restricted number of arguments for perdurance and eternalism will be considered in 
detail in the thesis.
	
 So much for what this work is about. I shall now briefly outline what it shall not 
be. Paraphrasing Peter Unger, it shall not be my  concern here to argue whether there are 
any people, or conscious beings. I shall only be after mere things, and among these 
mere things, I shall only  consider those which are not living or alive: namely  ordinary 
inanimate objects. To clarify, nothing fundamental depends upon any  such division; it 
serves merely  to restrict my topic conveniently.42 No persons, no living things or 
organisms, just ordinary inanimate objects: ‘chairs, tables, pictures, books, flowers, 
pens, cigarettes.’43, ‘pieces of furniture, rocks and stones, planets and ordinary stars, and 
even lakes and mountains.44 As soon as people are included, further complexity is added 
but again nothing fundamental depends upon it for the overall purposes of the thesis; 
there is a chance of benefit by adopting this restriction, and little chance for loss in the 
current project.
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42 Unger, P. (1979). “There Are No Ordinary Things”. Synthese 41: 117-54.
43 Austin, J.L. (1962). Sense and Sensibilia. OUP. p. 7-8. Although flowers could be a tricky examples 
since they may qualify as living things.
44 Unger, P. (1979). “There Are No Ordinary Things”. Synthese 41: 119.  See also Quine, W.V.O. (1960). 
Word and Object, Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T.  Press, 1. Although the usage of the expression ‘ordinary 
things’ is similar in Quine and Unger, at rock bottom, the former believes that there are such objects, the 
latter thinks that there are not.
	
 It shall also be at no point an attempt to adjudicate one view over another. 
Casting doubt or raising questions concerning a particular view’s assumptions, 
commitments, and how things in general motivate one another within a specific 
theoretical framework does not amount, straight away, to endorsing the opponent view. 
It is unfortunate but some of the current debate is framed in these terms. For example, 
take the philosophy of time. If one somehow argues against presentism then it seems 
she must endorse eternalism for tertium non datur (and the same mutatis mutandis holds 
for the A- and the B-theory).45 Interestingly, there could be a tertium, as I shall argue, so 
that the focus is steered away from the ‘opposition approach’, towards the 
understanding of what is going on at a more general level. Such ‘opposition approach’ is 
surely convenient when it comes to frame an ongoing discussion which has grown 
disproportionally, (see philosophy of time and/or persistence) but invariably it ends up 
overlooking some important features and commitments which those theories actually 
share; or what can be thought of as a red thread (or the small print) that theories bear to 
other theories; e.g. if and how one motivates or suggests the other. Therefore, in keeping 
with Lowe’s vision, I shall pursue an approach which favours the understanding of the 
positions over the drawing of the oppositions.
	
 Although I said that I shall take common sense and intuition seriously, at no 
point will the thesis prioritise these, either pre-theoretical or informed as it were, over a 
scientific or rational methodology and conclusions (in a very general sense of the 
terms).46  Common sense looks to me far from being simply non-scientific or non-
rational, and so too are our intuitions. However, both appear to have had changing 
fortunes in the contemporary debate. Common sense and most of our intuitions are 
often considered a veil laid down over reality. As soon as the veil is removed, reality 
stops playing tricks on us, or so they claim. I am quite open about whether common 
sense and intuitions are generally misleading, surely they are to a certain extent  but I do 
not buy into the conclusion that since they sporadically  happen to be so then they 
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45 See chapter 2.2 below.
46  The statement is as contentious as it gets. Of course, there is a question about what makes a 
methodology scientific,  and what makes it rational. It might not be that what makes one the case makes 
the other, and vice versa.  In addition, there is also a question whether there is a contrast between common 
sense and intuitions on one hand, and science and rationality on the other. Lastly, there is a question 
whether we can legitimately couple common sense and intuitions on one side, and science and rationality 
on the other. For all these considerations, I recommend the reader to take the statement with a grain of 
salt. I readily admit that the distinction referred to here may not be perfectly clear,  though I intend on 
making use of a ready-made sense in which we understand the alleged opposition between the two 
impulses.
hopelessly  are. A relentless and constant comparison with what we take to be the case is 
unavoidable for a healthy investigation into the fundamental structure of reality.
 At this stage, perhaps, given that I have been mentioning common sense and 
intuitions for a little while, it might be convenient to briefly give a few pointers about 
my take on them. First of all, regarding intuitions, two different readings/interpretations 
seem to be at play here: i) a broad reading, according to which intuitions are uncritical, 
pre-theoretical beliefs; and ii) a narrower interpretation such that intuitions amount to 
intellectual seemings.47 I believe both i) and ii) could be needed although perhaps only 
the latter may be crucial for the purposes of a metaphysical investigation. Registering 
what we pre-theoretically, unreflectively, and uncritically  believe of p, the objection 
goes, yields a view of intuitions as some sort of supernatural power or voice that from 
inside tells something about p which may  be interesting but also somehow bizarre. 
Indeed, the term is doubtlessly misleading, particularly  upon a modern reading since it 
may  convey the idea that ‘some non-rational or non-cognitive faculty - a kind of hunch - 
is involved.’48 But ‘intuition’, from the Latin term intueri means literally  to ‘look at’ or 
‘look upon’, that is ‘if an intellectual object (such as a triangle, or the number two) is 
sufficiently simple, then we can, with our mind’s eye, just ‘see’ certain truths about that 
object [...].’ I must say  that I omitted on purpose the rest of the statement from the 
quote, namely when Cottingham affirms that ‘just seeing certain truths about an object 
happens in a way that leaves no possible room for error’ because I am not quite sure 
how far we can go with this. Also, it must be noted that the conception highlighted 
above is preliminary to Descartes’ ‘clear and distinct ideas’, an aspect of his system 
which is not pertinent to my current purposes. Thus, what I would like to keep  is the 
‘just see’ sense that attaches to intuitions with the caveat that what  we happen to see 
could be somehow revisable in the light of the fact that what Descartes said about 
triangles and numbers, abstract entities, may apply slightly differently to different 
contexts, for example persistence’s issues which are no doubt less abstract and simple 
than those above. 
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47 Bealer, G.  & Strawson, P.F. (1992). “The Incoherence of Empiricism”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society, Supplementary Volumes. 66: 99-143.
48 Cottingham, J. (1998). A History of Western Philosophy: 4 The Rationalists. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 35.  Descartes’ Fifth Meditation in Descartes, R. (1911). Meditations on First Philosophy. In 
The Philosophical Works of Descartes. Trans. by E.S. Haldane. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
	
 Also, the thesis shall not be the umpteenth praise of what is well-known as 
bottom-up metaphysics. I tend to disagree with the compositional or extensional view of 
reality which has come to the fore in recent years. Peter van Inwagen49, trying to 
discipline a long-standing dispute that was thriving dramatically set the agenda of the 
debate on composition so that nowadays whoever wishes to look at that topic ought to 
come to terms with his terminology and framework. I believe van Inwagen’s remarks 
and insight are eminently cogent, altogether with the need to regimenting a topic which 
deserved profound understanding and ordering. However, at the end of the day I cannot 
help to feel that there remains a sense in which van Inwagen, conceptually, followed the 
wrong way round. Van Inwagen famously set up two composition questions, a special 
and a general one. Although two different questions - one wonders under what 
circumstances the xs compose y50 whereas the other asks what composition is51 - in a 
sense they both presuppose an extensional approach as a way to metaphysical 
understanding: one which starts from the parts and goes all the way up to the wholes. 
Surely, this way about seems to be quite common sense and promising, after all it seems 
to be very well supported by our intuitions about thinking and talking in terms of part 
and wholes: four legs and a top compose a table, a number of red bricks a wall, and so 
on and so forth; but also it seems to be bestowed by the conceptual apparatus and 
language of contemporary sciences, say Physics just to name one, in which the smallest 
bricks composing reality appear to be - at least at this moment in time - electrons and 
quarks, and everything that exists is made up by them.52
	
 However, even though this picture may look compelling, there still remains a 
sense which my sceptical impulse wants to point to: the idea concealed at the heart of 
this way of looking at things is that there is a privileged way forward when it comes to 
accounting for whether and how some things are made up by other things. The issue 
here is rather the following: invariably, we start our scientific investigation from things 
which happen to be composite, tables, chairs, walls, houses, etc. and attempt to 
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49 van Inwagen, P. (1990). Material Beings. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, Ch. 2, 4.
50 Ibid. 21.
51 Ibid. 38.
52  It is undeniably a contentious and perhaps incomplete statement. Whether it all comes down to those 
constituents or there is more than what meets the eye is debateable, see for example Ladyman, J. (2002). 
“Science,  metaphysics and structural realism”.  Philosophica, 67: 57-76; (1998). “What is structural 
realism?” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 29: 409-24.
understand how they are the way they are.53 Thus, when it comes to these issues, I think 
that the privileged way forward, if any, should be decomposition rather than 
composition. We pull apart a table, and realise that four legs and a top are its resulting 
parts after dismantling it; we pull apart a table leg and we realised that its resulting parts 
after decomposition are such-and-such, and so on and so forth. Suppose we end up with 
some sort of simple things so that the attempt to iterate the decomposition process fails -
say the much sought after rock bottom of reality. At this point, it would be fair to say 
that via successive decomposition procedures from a table we reached some ultimative 
parts in which a table could be decomposed. The temptation to then run the whole 
process backwards is tempting, I can see the situation first-hand myself. But the 
question is: would we be allowed to claim that those ultimative parts compose - in van 
Inwagen’s terminology - a table? In all fairness, I think we would need a fairly good 
story to go with  the idea of just running the series of decomposition backwards: for 
example, for all we know, reiterate decompositions could bring about some sort of 
disturbance so that from one decomposition to another something may get lost, 
something that may not be gained back just running the decomposition back. If not 
actual, at least this scenario looks possible to me. We may not know for we may lack the 
required sensitivity to detect and register that sort of effect.
	
 If this is conceivable, running the decomposition back up hoping to obtain the 
thing we started with is a bit of wishful thinking, or it presupposes some sort of heavy-
duty metaphysical assumptions - something along the lines of that ‘nothing gets missed 
during the decomposition’, or that ‘decomposition is just another name for top-down 
composition’, etc. which require an awful lot of philosophical work to be cashed out 
rather than magical positing. Also the alleged appeal to the best sciences available 
sounds to me a bit pretentious, for all I know most of what we know, whether true, false, 
or ok for ordinary speeds and distances, began from an apple falling on somebody’s 
head: an apple, an ordinary inanimate object; a person, an ordinary animate one. The 
way sciences approaching reality is similar to the way of decomposition54, whether 
decomposition must then be dismissed further down the line is a substantive 
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53 I think it is fair enough to remark that sciences are after how something is the case whereas philosophy 
is about why something is the case.
54 All I am trying to call the attention upon is decomposition as a metaphysical way about when it comes 
to investigate reality, such metaphysical way about I claim to be top-down. When it comes to the way of 
explanation, clearly the sciences’ way is bottom-up, and this is perfectly fine with me since it is an 
epistemic issue rather than a metaphysical one.
metaphysical conclusion which requires a very good story, a robust metaphysical work, 
to be attained.
	
 A curious feature of contemporary analytic metaphysics which arouses part of 
my scepticism is that it ultimately seems to be up to the single individual which view, 
among many, to buy into. Such an acknowledgement is strengthened by the fact that 
there seems to be a privileged way to go about when it comes to the metaphysical 
argumentation, namely the inference to the best explanation, or abduction. It is said that 
abduction is ubiquitous55 although most notably the exact form as well as the normative 
status of abduction are still controversial. It is ubiquitous but we ignore the details. It is 
curious to observe that some of those philosophers cited above who maintained a 
dismissive attitude towards ‘ubiquitous’ and ‘general’ notions are now those who praise 
abduction as ubiquitous. Briefly, abduction is an inference in which the truth of the 
premises does not guarantee the truth of the conclusion. But then if metaphysics is after 
truth, then how the inference to the best explanation could be so privileged as a way 
about in metaphysics? The pursual (logical and methodological) of this issue, although 
interesting, is well beyond the remit of this work, and a suitable account would take up 
a lengthy digression. Therefore, the reader shall excuse my brevity if I decide not to 
follow up but just to throw it in the mix as evidence for my skeptical attitude. To 
conclude, as David Lewis puts it with exemplary clarity ‘any competent philosopher 
who does not understand something will take care not to understand anything else 
whereby it might be explained.’56
 So much for what turned out as a methodological sort of introduction. I shall 
now highlight the hard details of the project: I shall consider Lewis’ characterisation of 
persistence as a general statement about what persistence consists in, the ‘neutral word’ 
as he put it.57 I shall then propose that the bi-conditional ‘something persists if and only 
if it exists at more than one time’ could be seen as a sort of formula in which 
persistence, time, and existence are placeholders for philosophical theories of 
persistence, time, and the nature of existence respectively. Lastly, I shall venture that 
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55 On abduction see Peirce, C.S. (1931-58). Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. C. Hartshorne, 
P. Weiss & A. Burks (eds.) Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Fann, K.T. (1970). Peirce’s Theory 
of Abduction. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Putnam, H.,  1981. Reason, Truth and History.  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  See also Douven, I (2011).  “Abduction”. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, E.N. Zalta (ed.). URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/abduction/>.
56 Lewis, D. K. (1986). On The Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 203.
57 Ibid. 202.
within that formula there seems to be a red thread tying together views of persistence 
with views of time and existence. On my view, there seems to be a privileged way in 
which perdurance motivates eternalism and the combination entails a Quinean view of 
existence.
 The general consensus, in particular after Sider’s 2001 work on persistence58 has 
it that there appears to be a high degree of freedom in combining different  theories of 
time with different theories of persistence (although he claims that when all is said and 
done there is only one combination which best solves and addresses all the problems 
and questions, namely  four dimensionalism plus eternalism). Contra Sider, I shall argue 
against such a familiar point for as soon as the ontological commitments of the theories 
involved as well as the connections among those theories are made clear then that great 
degree of freedom seems to diminish visibly. It  is not at all haphazard how theories of 
persistence motivate theories of time, and in turn how both motivate theories of 
existence. I shall add that the interplay and connections between a specific theory 
persistence and time, perdurance and eternalism, could likewise motivate a specific 
view on existence, to wit Quine’s.
 I shall now highlight the structure of the thesis: at first, I shall present (i) a 
everyday scenario in which we claim of an ordinary  material object that  it is an instance 
of a persisting object; secondly, (ii) I shall show that there is a sense in which our 
common sense thinking and intuitions about such case harbour a predicament (to wit the 
fact that although we might not be able to pin down in virtue of what a=b, yet  we 
believe that there must be a fact of the matter whether a and b are one or two; for 
instance God would doubtlessly know the right number). Thirdly, at  this point (iii) I 
shall call upon philosophy and see whether it could be of any help. As expected, 
philosophy turns out to be quite helpful in shedding light on that puzzling situation, in 
particular I shall let the three mainstream views on persistence make their 
pronouncements: perdurance, endurance, and stage theory.
 The next step in the development of the argument will be to briefly (iv) assess 
the good and bad of each contender, trying to unveil the commitments and implications, 
the small print as it were, that inevitably come with each theory. Following from (iv), I 
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58  Sider, T. (2001). Four Dimensionalism. An Ontology of Persistence and Time. NewYork: Oxford 
University Press, 68-73.
shall assess (v) what discriminates between perdurance and endurance59; namely, the 
notion of temporal parts. Temporal parts seem to be crucial to perdurance, so much that 
all the alleged benefits of perdurance, if any, hinges upon the notion. Therefore, I think 
it is of paramount importance to understand (vi) what temporal parts are, and (vii) what 
they  are for. Arguably, there is a sense in which I will find both (vi) and (vii) wanting: 
assuming Olson’s objection, it  appears contentious whether Sider’s definition of 
temporal parts could be understood at  all by the detractors of temporal parts; and what 
kind of philosophical work temporal parts carry out. However, although there might not 
be a definition good enough to stand serious philosophical scrutiny, still the notion 
seemingly draws upon our intuitions about parts and wholes as well as some common 
sense considerations about our understanding of spatial parts. Interestingly though, the 
appeal to intuitions and common sense considerations may not be allowed in this 
respect unless some amendments are put in place beforehand. As for what temporal 
parts are, advocates claim that they are an essential posit since the job they carry out in 
solving metaphysical puzzles is unique. Whether true or not, what I shall note is that the 
most challenging of the puzzles which temporal parts happen to solve might  well rest  on 
a misunderstanding: namely the long-standing problem of change. After an introductory 
exposition of the problem which has been eating out philosophy for so long, I shall 
show that there is a robust sense in which the problem of change could be seen as not 
genuine: it all seems to come down to how Leibniz’s Law is interpreted. My contention 
will be that Leibniz’s Law is a law of logic and it is best  interpreted accordingly, 
whereas the way it  is used to ground the problem of change and the consequent need for 
temporal parts is a metaphysical reading of it, a reading which restricts the principle to 
concrete objects and their properties (or what they both stand for). If I am right then 
there is a sense in which the need and justification for temporal parts is weakened. 
Although some Australians would say that near enough is good enough, I believe that to 
stand a chance as a metaphysical theory, near enough is not good at all. 
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59 In the following of the thesis I shall talk in terms of perdurance rather than four dimensionalism. I shall 
take perdurance to mean the worm theory, namely one of the two semantic accounts altogether with the 
stage theory of how proper names and other referring expressions secure their reference. Whether the 
stage theory is just a semantic account is contentious: as I pointed out in my MPhil thesis,  there is a 
strong sense in which the stage theory has a full-blown metaphysics of its own. Also, it is interesting to 
note that other contemporary stage theorists or symphatisers the likes of Katherine Hawley and Achille 
Varzi seem to go in this direction. See for example Hawley, K. (2001). How Things Persist.  Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, Ch. 3; (1999). “Persistence and Non-Supervenient Relations”. Mind,  108: 
53-67. Varzi, A. (2003). “Naming the Stages”. Dialectica 57: 387-412.
 Although perdurance might have failed to provide a compelling argument to 
show what temporal parts really  are and why they are needed beyond any reasonable 
doubt, still I think it has one last resource, namely  (viii) it conveys the idea that reality is 
four-dimensional: the belief that in addition to the three spatial dimensions in which 
reality  extends, there is a fourth - time - in which reality  extends. This point looks to be 
crucial so I shall look into it carefully and from a philosophical point of view, to see if 
what philosophers said makes a good case for time to be an additional dimension in 
which reality is extended. The investigation will be pursued as follows: it is all but clear 
in what sense time could be a dimension but at the same time it is quite clear that  space 
is the best and the only one paradigm of dimension that we’ve got;60 space and time 
happen to share some features (space-time analogies) or so many philosophers have 
thought. Therefore, if we look into those similarities we may perhaps end up  with an 
idea about how time could be alike space. It is one tentative train of thought  devised to 
carve out what is going on, perhaps not the best but at least a feasible one. Arguably, 
from a genuine philosophical point of view (ix) the outcome of the investigation will 
find the idea of the space-time analogy somehow wanting, and not entirely clear why 
this should be the case. Looking into some instances of the philosophical debate upon 
the analogies between space and time that began in 1955 and languished till the mid 
‘80s of the last century, the major concern has been to point out under what respects 
space and time were to be considered alike. The debate sounded overall a bit flimsy, and 
apart from the conclusion that what space and time have in common is the fact  that they 
are both instances of a continuum, the initial question is still up  in the air. Therefore, 
drawing upon Sider’s three respects in which space and time are alike, and Lowe’s 
picture of time as extended and a dimension in which reality  extends, I shall endeavour 
myself to get around the stalemate by devising a picture of time which could comply 
with the requirements just spelt out.
30
60 In conversation, Nancy Cartwright called my attention to the fact that my claim above is odd unless ‘I 
have some special sense of dimension in mind for there are tonnes of dimensions referred to in the natural 
and social sciences.’  My contention is that metaphysics does not fall under either of those sciences 
therefore there is the prima facie evidence that those notions of dimensions refered to by those sciences 
might not be relevant in this respect. Moreover, since metaphysics’  task is concerned with the 
fundamental structure of reality, clearly the notion of dimension at issue can only be of a real dimension. 
Some of the notions referred to in natural and social sciences are not in this sense real. For instance, for 
some reasons we might have to draw a diagram of a person’s happiness so that the different values of that 
person’s happiness are lined up along a dimension, the dimension of happiness. I do not think that there is 
to such a dimension of happiness anything more than a mere measuring device; surely the dimension of 
somebody’s happiness is not real, at least not real as we take space and time to be.
 The next step in the argument will be to look briefly into the current  debate in 
the philosophy of time with a view to showing (x) which view of time could reasonably 
be motivated by the picture devised above. I shall argue that such a picture of time 
seems to fit at  best within an eternalist view of time.61  Again, as claimed at the 
beginning of the introduction, my  approach will not be just after drawing opposition 
between theories of time: eternalism vs presentism, A-theory vs B-theory, etc.; rather I 
shall be more interested in teasing out what the different theories of time are really 
about, namely their basic assumptions as well as ontological implications which are 
supposed to make manifest how each view sees time and what they try to defend as 
basic features of a world in which time would play a role.
 With the link from perdurance to eternalism, I shall endeavour to address the 
next issue which will be essentially (xi) to unveil any  entailment between that view of 
persistence and time, and existence. Given the assumptions unravelled previously in the 
thesis that both perdurance and eternalism seem to be committed to, namely reality as 
spread-out four-dimensionally  with all the space-time points, events, or objects set up 
once and forever (block universe) - a view of time in which all the instants, events, 
objects in the past, present, and future coexist - I shall then argue that such a view of 
persistence and time motivates a view of existence a là Quine, namely existence as 
what is expressed by  the existential quantifier: a view of existence that guarantees an 
existentially closed domain of existents, which is what  four-dimensionalism and 
eternalism entail.
 The conclusion of the overall argument will be that once it is unpacked what 
perdurance, eternalism, and a view of existence a là Quine imply, and are committed to, 
there is a principled way  in which one motivates the others. The conclusion will be 
tentative and provisional, and in keeping with what has been stated early on in the 
introduction, my aim will be to improve the understanding rather than to establish a 
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61  The conclusion perhaps does not sound particularly novel; distinguished thinkers reached it in the 
recent past, see Carter, W. & Hestevold, H.S. (1994).  “On Passage and Persistence”. Americal 
Philosophical Quarterly 31: 269-83. Merricks, T. (1994).  “Endurance and Indiscernibility”. Journal of 
Philosophy 91: 165-84. Le Poidevin, R. (2000). “Continuants and Continuity”. The Monist 83: 381-98. 
but from an different way round, normally from theories of time to theories of persistence (e.g. from 
eternalism to four-dimensionalism/perdurantism). My approach goes instead from perdurance to 
eternalism, and shows that perdurance’s four-dimensional view of reality is at best accommodated by an 
eternalist view of time. In addition, I shall show how such a commitment could have bearing on the 
nature of existence too.
position.62 The particular perspective I take on persistence, time and existence, and the 
path that I steer in the thesis may well be one among (many) alternative ways to carve 
out a debate about reality and what fundamentally it is about. In spite of the fact that the 
alternatives could turn out to be various, what still remains interesting is to see what is 
preserved in the variety, the invariants as it were, if any, which make reality what we 
strongly believe could be the case.
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62 For instance, an exception to my way of presenting four-dimensionalism could be four-dimensionalism 
without temporal parts as in Parsons, J. 2000.  “Must a Four-dimensionalist Believe in Temporal Parts?” 
The Monist 83: 399-418. The truth is though, whether with temporal parts or not four-dimensionalism 
conveys the same four-dimensionally extended view of reality, and interestingly the implications could be 
similar whether temporal parts are factored in or not. I talk about temporal parts as they are very common 
in the literature, and are, contra Parsons, generally assumed as a distinctive feature of four 
dimensionalism.
Part I: Persistence
 Ordinary life seems to be cluttered with a number of truths of common sense, 
unquestioned experiences the evidence of which would be trivial and extravagant to 
dispute. It would indeed be bizarre to question the fact that the bike which is now stored 
in the shed is the same one I bought twelve months ago (what I call ‘my bike’). At 
present it may look a bit battered and run-down if compared to when it was sitting on 
the shop floor. It also has new wheels and few other components have been replaced 
because of ordinary wear and tear. Nonetheless, I am fairly sure that the bike in the shed 
is the bike I bought a year ago. More importantly, this is not just my wishful thinking: a 
number of other people believe that  the bike in the shed is the bike once sitting in the 
bike shop, to wit my  bike. It is quite plausible for me to believe that I am right after all: 
the bike in the shed is that bike; it is my bike.
 Curiously, it is not just about what I or other people happen to believe, in fact we 
can all together believe that actually the bike in my neighbour’s shed is the bike once 
sitting on the shop floor; however, the bike in my neighbour’s shed is not really the one 
I bought  a year ago, it  is indeed his bike. I can believe whatever I want, I can decide to 
deceive myself entertaining false beliefs but this issue is quite different from claiming 
that I know that the bike in the shed is my bike, the one I bought twelve months ago. 
Without  entering the epistemic debate upon the relationships between beliefs and 
knowledge, and the nature of knowledge itself; we can legitimately claim to know that  p 
if we somehow possess enough evidence or good reasons for us to have knowledge that 
p.
 Let us look at the evidence. Generally, to find a good reason to show why what I 
believe is the case, in the current scenario, the first thing would be to look at some 
features which could uniquely identify the bike. So, if the frame number stamped on the 
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bike in my shed is the one once printed on the bike’s frame sitting in the shop then this 
fact could perhaps solve the apparent puzzle. If there is correspondence then this bike in 
my shed is one and the same with that one once on the shop floor: it is my bike. If not, 
this bike and that one are two distinct bikes.
 Sometimes looking at  uniquely identifying features will not do; perhaps there is 
no such number, or if there is it may be useless. Whatever the motivation, let us 
suppose, that we get to the point where we have spelt out all the possible uniquely 
identifying characteristics to straighten this situation out, but  actually there is no such 
ultimately  distinctive feature, nothing at all to appeal to when it comes to deliberating if 
this bike is that bike. In this situation, would we still be entitled to claim to know that 
this bike is that bike? That we are talking about the same bike (or ‘my bike’)? In other 
words, would the sentence ‘This bike in the shed is that one I bought twelve months 
ago’ be true, false, neither true nor false?
 We face an epistemic impasse, namely we do not  know what’s going on. Still 
though, I think it would be fairly plausible to say that somehow when someone, say 
God, decides to count the number of bikes in the universe, They63 do not really need to 
look for a frame number or anything else; they know for sure, at a glance, if this bike in 
the shed must be computed as one with the one once in the shop  or not. In other words, 
apart from the somehow temporary epistemic failure, there seems to be a fact of the 
matter whether they are one or not. If not, then this would be a case in which God 
would not be sure of the number of bikes in the universe (and I take that  we would not 
be particularly  impressed by a divinity  so unreliable such that They  get it wrong when it 
comes to computing in general, let alone to count the number of bikes around). This 
being the case, reality - perhaps just limited to the number of bikes - would be to some 
extent indeterminate.
 I am quite sympathetic to the idea of a metaphysically indeterminate reality, and 
as far as I understand some of the best science available at  this point in time seems to 
suggest something along these lines; however, contemporary philosophers never quite 
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63 I use ‘They’ since I shall not committing myself to whether God should be referred to as She or He.
liked the sound of it, and the idea raised a few eyebrows.64
 This train of thought, plausible and somehow appealing to our best discernment, 
seems to yield to a predicament. Epistemic uncertainty on the one hand: (i) there is a 
robust sense in which we feel that we do really  know what’s going on, we think that we 
know which bike is which without being able to pin down the reasons why this is the 
case; reasons good enough so that  we can claim beyond any reasonable doubt that the 
bike in the shed is the one bought twelve months ago. And metaphysical certainty on the 
other: (ii) there must be a fact of the matter about the number of bikes in reality. 
Seemingly we cannot have both, can we?
 This is where philosophy could come into play (if it hasn’t already). But before 
letting it have a say, I shall hint at some other general and methodological issues in 
addition to those highlighted in the Introduction that  the predicament we reached above 
has prompted into my mind.
 Philosophy is, as I take it, the understanding, clarification, and regimentation of 
our ordinary talking and thinking about the world. Description of what’s going on, 
prescription of how it should be understood. The opposition between a descriptive and a 
prescriptive or revisionary65  approach to reality  is apparently a turning point of 
contemporary  analytic philosophy, something that anyone with an interest in it should 
confront with. So be it, although very  briefly. As pointed out a few times in the 
Introduction, I shall once more refrain from framing any issue in terms of oppositions 
between seemingly mutually exclusive approaches; in this case descriptive and 
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64  See Lewis, D.K. (1986). On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 212-3; (1993) “Many, 
but almost one”. In Ontology, Causality, and Mind: Essays on the Philosophy of D.M. Armstrong,  K. 
Campbell, J. Bacon & L. Reinhardt (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sider, T. (2001). 
Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 120-39. 
The debate upon these issues is vaste, and generally draws upon what is known as ‘the problem of 
vagueness’; it also branches off embracing issues regarding composition (or failure of it). To deal 
adequately with these issues is well beyond the purposes of this thesis so I shall simply flag some basic 
sources. Just to point out where I stand in the debate, perhaps bluntly, I do not believe that either Lewis’ 
or Sider’s arguments succeed in showing what they purport to show. For the record,  I acknowledge that if 
perdurance is supplemented by unrestricted mereological composition, then temporal parts could be a 
way out of problems of vagueness. It is debateable whether it could be a good or bad solution though. In 
keeping with the claim made above, I still do not believe perdurance plus temporal parts settle the 
problem in any philosophically interesting way since I have a problem with how the problem is framed 
and how it draws upon compositional issues. Anyway, groundbreaking contributions are: Russell, B. 
(1923) “Vagueness”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy and Psychology, 1: 84-92. Fine, K.(1975) 
“Vagueness, truth and logic”.  Synthese,  54: 235–59. Reprinted in Keefe & Smith (eds.) 1996, 119-150. 
Evans, G. (1978). “Can there be Vague Objects?”, Analysis, 38: 208. Unger,  P.  (1979) “There are no 
ordinary things”. Synthese, 4: 117-54.  Lewis, D.K. (1982). “Logic for Equivocators”, Noûs. 16: 431-41; 
(1988). “Vague Identity: Evans Misunderstood”. Analysis, 48: 128-30. Van Inwagen, P. (1990) Material 
Beings. Ithaca,  NY: Cornell University Press.  Williamson, T. (1994). Vagueness. London: Routledge. 
Merricks, T. (2001) “Varieties of Vagueness”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63: 145-57.
65 Strawson, P.F. (1959). Individuals. London, New York: Routledge, 9.
revisionary, but I acknowledge a robust sense in which Strawson has a point when he 
claimed that there is a distinction - perhaps a not so clear-cut one but one so that  we can 
still sometimes tell the two apart:
“Descriptive metaphysics is content to describe the actual structure of our thought 
about the world, revisionary metaphysics is concerned to produce a better structure. 
[...] there is another kind of metaphysics [the descriptive variety] which needs no 
justification at  all beyond that  of inquiry in general. Revisionary metaphysics is at 
the service of descriptive metaphysics. Perhaps no actual metaphysician has ever 
been, both in intention and effect, wholly the one thing or the other. But we can 
distinguish broadly: Descartes, Leibniz, Berkeley are revisionary, Aristotle and 
Kant descriptive. Hume, the ironist  of philosophy, is more difficult to place. He 
appears now under one aspect, now under another.
The point is then that there seems to be two quite distinct and distinctive ways to go 
about in metaphysics, at least in its contemporary analytic variety, which, as it stands, 
can hardly be reduced one to another. According to Strawson, the dealings of the 
revisionary variety, although theoretically admirable, are always subjected to those of 
the descriptive one (which happens not to require any  justification beyond that of 
general enquiry). Looking at the contemporary  development of analytic metaphysics, 
the two approaches tended to polarise over time up to a point where the revisionary/
prescriptive one clearly had the upper hand twisting Strawson’s lesson. In Quine’s 
wake, a description of reality66  is useful insofar as it a beaming proof of its own 
inadequacy. A veil subtly laid upon reality which once removed reveals its true structure 
so that  at no point the description is at the service of the revision; by contrast, the 
description must be discarded for the revision to be.67
 History is written by the victors, or so they say; however, I believe that what the 
contemporary  prescriptivists have overlooked for too long is the profound sense of 
interplay  between the two ways of enquiry  which shines through Strawson’s words. 
Setting aside the alleged priority  of one over the other (which I must confess I am 
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66 Of course,  the expression ‘description of reality’  must be qualified. If the description corresponds to the 
outcome of the best sciences available then clearly it cannot be a beaming proof of its own inadequacy 
(even though it might well be revisable in the light of new empirical evidence - according to Quine even 
classical logic could be so although in principle). By contrast, if it is a description of reality otherwise 
pursued then for some additional considerations it might well qualify as inadequate.
67  Admittedly, my words may well sound harsh on this issue, and perhaps this may seem to end up 
clashing with my four-dimensional metaphysical impulse. What I think is that there should be a dialectic 
between description and prescription rather than the establishment of one unless a very good enough story 
is provided as it seems to transpire from Quine or in his wake.
strongly unsympathetic with but which it requires some further qualification on 
Strawson’s part as well), it seems to me to make good sense to begin a metaphysical 
investigation (in a genuine analytic spirit) from the point of view of the understanding 
of what is going on, on the level of language, thought, ordinary experience, etc. which 
usually  happens in terms of descriptions; for example, spelling out all that pertains to it 
in the attempt to clarify what we are talking about when we talk about such-and-such. 
Then (and only then) if still unclear and truly unavoidable to discipline the object of 
investigation through revision.
 This ill-fated descriptive approach to reality resembles in many ways the destiny, 
and role of common sense, and intuitions in the contemporary debate. Recall Russell’s 
well-known fate of naïve realism:
“We all start from ‘naïve realism’, i.e., the doctrine that things are what they seem. 
We think that grass is green, that  stones are hard, and that snow is cold. But  physics 
assures us that the greenness of grass, the hardness of stones, and the coldness of 
snow, are not the greenness, the hardness, the coldness that  we know in our own 
experience, but something very different. [...] Thus science seems to be at war with 
itself [...] Naïve realism leads to physics, and physics, if true, shows naïve realism 
to be false. Therefore naïve realism, if true, is false; therefore it is false.”68
And supplement it with Wittgenstein’s ladder metaphor:
“My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who 
understands me eventually recognises them as nonsensical, when he has used them 
- as steps - to climb upon beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the 
ladder after he has climbed up it.) He must transcend these propositions, and then 
he will see the world aright.”69
Therefore, we and our investigations seem to be doomed to a great extent: the prius or 
first evidence we begin from turns out blatantly  wrong so it ought to be dismissed in 
order for us to see the world for what it really is. Of course, there are here at play some 
additional assumptions, for instance the fact that the picture that the best sciences 
available (physics) draw is the truest representation of reality or the best explanation 
theory  (at least the most reliable till next time around when it will be amended 
following some new evidence, etc.) which are somehow questionable but  for brevity’s 
sake I shall not pursue this further.
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68 Russell, B. (1940). An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth. Allen & Unwin. 14.
69 Wittgenstein, L. (1961). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. London: Routledge & Kehan Paul, 151.
 Be it as it may, what I think matters to the purposes and methodology of the 
present research is the fact that historically  the revision outweighed the description to 
such an extent that the description is simply misleading, deceiving, and ultimately 
wrong, so that it is somehow pointless to pursue. An attitude which overlooks the sine 
qua non element of the understanding (description) which comes before any 
prescription. Strawson made a very robust point  (although he might have gone a bit too 
far) in claiming the priority  of one over the other (but again most hinges upon what kind 
of priority that priority is), and the fact that there seems to be a core, in terms of 
conceptual scheme, shared and universal, which we, as human beings have, know that 
we do have, and for which no further analysis or justification in terms of more 
fundamental concepts can be offered. However, logically and conceptually  speaking I 
believe that there is something undeniably right about Strawson. Metaphysics is neither 
descriptive nor revisionary, it  must be descriptive in order to be revisionary, namely to 
understand what is going on before prescribing how such understanding and description 
should be modified. It cannot be the other way around otherwise, as it seems plausible, 
we would lack any ground where to apply the revision to. Descriptions, common sense, 
and intuitions can all potentially be revised if and only  if good reasons are provided.70 If 
not then I think that the best revision ever, if any, would be as much ungrounded, 
arbitrary, or the product of ideology as anything could be.
 So much for this brief, and surely incomplete detour into the methodology of 
metaphysics. Going now back to where we have left, the intervention of philosophy 
might turn out useful to overcome the stalemate, namely the clash between the evidence 
- we have no good reason to say  which bike is which - and our intuitions - we know for 
sure that there must be a fact  of the matter whether they  are one or not. But before 
plunging into these issues, I would like to say something about my commitment to some 
pieces of philosophical terminology or jargon which have been postponed so far. I 
believe this is important matter, since to clarify and understand what we are talking 
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70  Perhaps this is just one instance in which my asleep and nuanced Mooreanism raises its ugly head. 
‘ugly’ because such Moorean attitude (or clutching onto common sense at the expense of philosophical 
reasoning) could potentially clash with my sympathy for perdurance which in turn is supposedly the 
outcome of a highly theoretical philosophical speculation. However, as I show later on there is a robust 
sense in which the basic notion of perdurance, namely temporal parts, draws upon intuitions as well as 
common sense considerations. Thus, either the conflict is only apparent or it could emerge once that 
evidence is relinquished in favor of a philosophical concoction of perdurance and temporal parts. In the 
latter case, I will be more than willing to revise my Mooreanism as long as good reasons are provided to 
that end as I claimed in the Introduction.
about when we talk about something is traditionally one breakthrough of the analytic 
tradition, and also it serves to wave off objections such as the alleged equivalence of 
terms or notions which are on the surface different;71  or the recently popular charge of 
philosophers ‘talking past each other’: people talking about different subjects, whilst 
they believe that they are talking about the same thing.72  And this is what I shall 
endeavour to achieve in the next section.
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71 See for instance the alleged equivalence of 3D and 4D as in Lowe, E.J. & McCall, S. (2006). “The 3D/
4D controversy: a storm in a teacup”. Noûs 40: 570-8; (2003). “3D/4D equivalence,  the twins paradox, 
and absolute time”. Analysis 63: 114-23. See also Miller, K. (2005). “The Metaphysical Equivalence of 
Three- and Four-dimensionalism. Erkenntnis 62: 91-117.
72  Miller, K. (2013). “Presentism, Eternalism, and the Growing Block”.  In A Companion to the 
Philosophy of Time. H. Dyke & A. Bardon (eds.). John Wiley & sons, inc. 345-64.
1.0 Preliminary Remarks73
 In this section, I shall briefly set up what it may  be called the terminological 
commitments of the thesis, or at least most of it. For example, all along the Introduction 
as well as the previous section, I employed terms like perdurance, and four-
dimensionalism without the care of fixing their meanings within their context of usage.
 In the literature, for some time, philosophers have been using the two terms 
presumably as synonyms, perhaps not explicitly, but clearly with four-dimensionalism 
they  just meant what then Lewis named perdurance. For instance, let us recall Quine’s 
famous solution of Heracleitus’ ‘You cannot bathe in the same river twice, for new 
waters are ever flowing in upon you’:
“The truth is that you can bathe in the same river twice, but not  in the same river 
stage. You can bathe in two river stages which are stages of the same river, and this 
is what constitutes bathing in the same river twice. A river is a process through 
time, and the river stages are its momentary parts.”74
Therefore, say the river Wear, is (i) a whole which has river stages as parts; and (ii) 
something which in addition of extending spatially from the Pennines, eastwards 
through Durham city and reaching the North Sea in the city of Sunderland, it extends 
temporally too.75  If space has three distinct directions along which something can 
extend, say up, down, and across; time has one, say from the past towards the future. 
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73 Some of the concerns expressed in this section can be found in nuce in Hawley, K. (2010). “Temporal 
Parts”. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
74  Quine, W.V.O. (1950). “Identity, Ostention, and Hypostasis”. Journal of Philosophy 47: 621-33. 
Reprinted in Quine, W.V.O. (1963). From a Logical Point of View. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 65-79.
75 Admittedly, it might be a bit difficult to see how something like a river extends temporally, but let us 
say that it does if we factor in the first time ever it qualifies as a river untill the last beyond which, for 
some reason or another, it does not qualify as a river any more, say it dries up. Otherwise, for 
convenience’s sake, let us think of something that qualifies as a process, say a kid growing up; it is easy 
to see that such an event extends over time in the sense that a kid growing up includes different temporal 
stages, say infancy,  teenage, etc.  If this is plausible then it can be easily carried over to the case of the 
river with similar results.
Thus, overall reality extends in four dimensions, therefore four-dimensionalism.76
 Quine was not the first to talk about reality  in these terms but  sure enough he 
was one the most influential. Along the same lines, and sometime before Quine, 
philosophers such as Bertrand Russell, A.N. Whitehead, Nelson Goodman, and most 
famously  D.C. Williams in The Myth of Passage did. 77 Ten years later, in 1960, Quine 
furthers the solution to Heraclitus’ problem to a new level:
“Once we put the temporal extent of the river on a par with the spatial extent, we 
see no more difficulty in stepping into the same river at  two times than at two 
places. Furthermore the river’s change of substance, at a given place from time to 
time, comes to be seen as quite on a par with the river’s difference in substance at a 
given time from place to place; sameness of river is controverted no more on the 
one count than on the other. [...] Physical objects, conceived thus four-
dimensionally in space-time, are not to be distinguished from events or, in the 
concrete sense of the term, processes. Each comprises simply the content, however 
heterogeneous, of some portion of space-time, however disconnected and 
gerrymandered.”78
Thus, as stated above, it should now be clear what four-dimensionalism is about, at  least 
in Quine’s terms. However, theories tend to evolve over time so perhaps a quick look 
into whether and how four-dimensionalism developed over the next decades would be 
instructive.
 The next passage worth mentioning would probably be Lewis’ 1986 On the 
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76 For completeness’ sake,  there is another sense in the literature in which four-dimensionalism could be 
understood. For example Michael Rea has it that “Four dimensionalism [...] is a view about the 
ontological status of non-present objects. Presentists say that only present objects exist.  There are no 
dinosaurs, though there were such things; there are no cities on Mars,  though perhaps there will be such 
things. Four-dimensionalists, on the other hand, say that there are past or future objects (or both); and in 
saying this, they mean to put such things ontologically on a par with present objects. According to the 
four-dimensionalist, non-present objects are like spatially distant objects: they exist, just not here, where 
we are”. Rea, M. (2003). “Four-Dimensionalism”. In M. Loux and D. W. Zimmerman (eds.) The Oxford 
Handbook for Metaphysics.  Oxford: Oxford University Press,  246-80. What Rea is talking about amounts 
to what is generally called eternalism which is a view on time rather than a theory of persistence.
77  Russell, B.  (1914). “The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics”. In Mysticism, and Logic, and Other 
Essays. New York: Longman’s, Green & co.,  112; (1927). The Analysis of Matter. New York: Harcourt, 
Brace & co., 243, 284-9. Whitehead, A.N. (1920). The Concept of Nature. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. Goodman,  N. (1951). The Structure of Appearance. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, Ch. IV, sect. I. Williams, D.C. (1951).  “The Myth of Passage”.  Journal of Philosophy 
48: 457-72.
78 Quine, W.V.O. (1960). Word and Object. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 171.
Plurality of Worlds, but from the Introduction we are already familiar with it.79 Instead, 
let us see what Frank Jackson made of four-dimensionalism a few years after Lewis:
“The dispute between three-dimensionalism and four-dimensionalism, or more 
precisely, that part  of the dispute we will be concerned with, concerns what 
persistence, and correlatively, what change, comes to. Three-dimensionalism holds 
that an object exists at  a time by being wholly present at  that  time, and, 
accordingly, that  it persists if it  is wholly present at  more than one time. For short, 
it  persists by enduring. Four-dimensionalism holds that an object exists at  a time 
by having a temporal part at  that  time, and it  persists if it has distinct  temporal 
parts at more than one time. For short, it persists by perduring”80
Tentatively, I guess it would be safe to say that Jackson is on the same page as Quine 
and Lewis, four-dimensionalism seems to be linked to temporal parts as well as 
perdurance.81
 Lastly, given the prominence in the recent literature, and how the book affected 
the debate afterwards, I believe a brief look should be given to Sider’s Four-
Dimensionalism. In The Four-Dimensional Picture, Sider gives a vivid impression of 
how four-dimensionalism could be rendered; drawing upon the spatial case he claims 
that:
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79  In addition, we could look at Mark Heller, a keen as well as prolific four-dimensionalist: Heller,  M. 
(1984). “Temporal Parts of Four Dimensional Objects". Philosophical Studies 46: 323-34; (1990). The 
Ontology of Physical Objects: Four Dimensional Hunks of Matter.  Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press; (1992). “Things Change”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52: 695-704; (1993). 
“Varieties of Four Dimensionalism”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71: 47-59. Heller is also a 
peculiar four-dimensionalist in the sense that although he believes that the true ontology is the one 
conveyed by four-dimensionalism, yet none of the objects in this ontology - temporal parts - are referred 
to by everyday terms.
80  Jackson, F. (1998). “Metaphysics by Possible Cases”. In Mind, Method, and Conditionals.  London: 
Routledge, 138.
81  Parsons would probably disagree with my provisional conclusion. He claims that such use of four-
dimensionalism is “[i]napposite.  [And] this is not the usage intended by Jackson. Temporal parts are a 
‘part of the dispute’  between four- and three-dimensionalists,  not the whole of that dispute. For Jackson, 
four-dimensionalism is a broader programme that (allegedly) entails a certain specific theory of 
persistence, namely perdurantism.” Parsons, J. (2000). “Must a Four-dimensionalist Believe in Temporal 
Parts?”. The Monist 83: 399. I suppose we should then ask Parsons to clarify what four-dimensionalism 
(and three-dimensionalism) is about apart from persistence and change. I have myself an answer, one 
which actually fits in with the underlining thesis of the dissertation, namely the idea that persistence,  first 
and foremost,  branches off into time, and a bit further down the line from time into existence. Perhaps, the 
other part of the dispute, in Parsons’  terms, besides temporal parts is indeed time; in the sense that 
perdurance is primarily a theory of persistence which falls under four-dimensionalism’s umbrella - with 
or without temporal parts. What four-dimensionalism and perdurance happen to share is the thesis that 
space and time are somehow analogous: the fact that reality extends in four dimensions. Therefore, it 
seems fair to say that the commitment to such analogy is fundamental, and if this is the case then it must 
be of crucial importance to investigate how such commitment develops affecting the topic of time, 
namely the question about what it means for time to be extended (or a dimension), and whether this could 
be the case or not.
“Four-dimensionalism may be made vivid by pictures: an object  with temporal 
parts persisting through time is like a road with spatial parts extending across 
space. [...] According to the ‘four-dimensional’ conception of persons (and all other 
objects that persist over time), persons are a lot like their stories. Just as my story 
has a part for my childhood, so I have a part consisting just  of my childhood. Just 
as my story has a part describing just  this instant, so I have a part that  is me at-this-
very instant.”82
Thus, what shines through Sider’s words is, once again an analogy between space and 
time in terms of ‘parts’. Undeniable evidence says that things have spatial parts83. 
Drawing upon this remark, four-dimensionalism claims that in addition to spatial parts 
things have temporal ones since there is an analogy between space and time in respect 
of parts; and generally the analogy is cashed out via ordinary examples.84
 The emphasis on the analogy between space and time in respect of parts is 
strengthened throughout Sider’s chapter:
“My spatial parts extend through time like I do. We call them spatial parts because 
they are smaller than I, spatially speaking; they are ‘cut  out of’ me along a spatial 
dimension. Reverse time and space in this description and we obtain a description 
of my temporal parts, which extend through space like I do but  are smaller than I, 
temporally speaking; they are what  you get  by slicing me along a temporal 
dimension.”85
Lastly, to bring my point home, namely the claim that plausibly  four-dimensionalism 
and Lewis’ perdurance have been employed as synonyms for quite a long time, what we 
should aim for is then a very  recent characterisation of four-dimensionalism which 
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82  Sider, T. (2001). Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1.
83  Whether such evidence is empirical or not is a matter of debate. If I understand Parsons, given the 
thesis that space and time are analogous (Analogy Thesis in its strongest form) then it is an empirical 
matter whether things entend or pertend,  then it should be similarly an empirical matter whether things 
endure or perdure. See Parsons, J. (2000). “Must a Four-dimensionalist Believe in Temporal Parts?”.  The 
Monist 83: 404, 413.
84  Quine, W.V.O. (1950). “Identity, Ostention, and Hypostasis”. Journal of Philosophy 47: 621-33. 
Reprinted in Quine, W.V.O. (1963). From a Logical Point of View. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 65-79. Lewis, D.K. (1983a). “Survival and Identity”, 63. In Lewis (1983b). Philosophical Papers 
I. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 55-77. Sider, T. (1996). “All the World’s a Stage”. Australasian 
Journal of Philosophy 74: 441.
85  Sider, T. (2001). Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2.  I must confess it is quite obscure to me why Sider claims that we call spatial parts 
spatial because they are smaller; nonetheless I think I can understand the gist of what he is trying to say.
directly refers to temporal parts and perdurance; and timely Sider gives it to us: 86
“This picture of persistence over time called four-dimensionalism is also known as 
the doctrine of temporal parts and the thesis that objects ‘perdure’.”
Objects perdure if and only if they exist  by having different temporal parts, or stages, at 
different times though no one part of them is wholly present at more than one time, as in 
Lewis.87 Therefore, I guess after this lengthy digression in the genealogy of the idea of 
four-dimensionalism, what we make of it is that what Lewis named perdurance was 
basically  what had been around for quite a while under false pretences, namely  four-
dimensionalism.
 So much so, unfortunately things got a bit more complicated in the aftermath of 
Sider’s work. For example, one issue is to account for a metaphysical picture of reality, 
in this case four-dimensional; another issue instead is to account for the relationship, if 
any, between temporal parts and ordinary language; namely how referring expressions, 
the likes of proper names and definite descriptions, secure their referents; an issue 
which has primarily to do with semantics rather than metaphysics. The semantic 
branching out of four-dimensionalism and perdurance has traditionally been known as 
the worm theory:
“On the worm view, it  is spacetime worms that are continuants - the referents of 
ordinary terms, members of ordinary domain of quantification, subjects of ordinary 
predication, and so on.”88
What space-time worms are is merely mereological sums of temporal as well as spatial 
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86  Ibid. 3. It is however interesting to note that perhaps Sider changed his view slightly from what he 
claimed a few years earlier in the light of the following remark: “We need to look carefully into just what 
three- and four-dimensionalism amount to. These names for the doctrines [...] are poor guides.” Sider, T. 
(1997). “Four-dimensionalism”. Philosophical Review 106: 197-231. There is a sense in which Sider’s 
statement is appropriate, for example if we consider Josh Parsons’ Flatland case of a three dimensional 
space-time, would we still call the doctrine of temporal parts four-dimensionalism? Perhaps we will not 
for it would make very little sense. However, Sider seems to clearly settle for the terms ‘four-
dimensionalism’, ‘perdurantism’,  and ‘the doctrine of temporal parts’ being interchangeable or somehow 
definable one in terms of the other.
87 Lewis (1986), On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 202.
88  Sider, T. (2001). Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press,  60. See also Sider, T. (2004). “Symposium on Four-Dimensionalism”. Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 68: 642-7, 674-87.  Sider, T. (1996). “All the World’s a Stage”. Australasian 
Journal of Philosophy 74: 433-53. Lewis, D.K. (1983a). “Survival and Identity”. 58-60. In Lewis, D.K. 
(1983b), Philosophical Papers I. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 55–77. Quine, W.V.O. (1976). 
“Worlds Away.” Journal of Philosophy 73: 859–63. 
parts or stages.89
 However, in 1996 in a groundbreaking article, and in 2001 - the book quoted 
quite few times throughout this section - Sider prepares the ground for something along 
the lines of a semantic revolution:
“Some philosophers believe that  everyday objects are 4-dimensional space-time 
worms, that a person (for example) persists through time by having temporal parts, 
or stages, at each moment of her existence. None of these stages is identical to the 
person herself; rather, she is the aggregate of all her temporal parts. [...] I aim to 
defend an apparently radical third view: not only do I accept  person stages; I claim 
that we are stages. [...] simply don’t  think spacetime worms are what we typically 
call persons, name with proper names, quantify over, etc.”90
Along the same lines:
“The view I am suggesting is that  all continuants are stages, I call this the stage 
view. The opposing four-dimensionalist  view is the ‘worm view’, according to 
which continuants are temporally extended spacetime worms.”91
To conclude, it then seems plausible to say that four-dimensionalism and perdurance are 
synonyms as both convey  the same metaphysical picture of reality: a picture extended in 
four dimensions and made up  with temporal parts (whether instantaneous or not is not 
crucial at this stage); whereas the worm view and the stage view are two distinct 
semantic ways to address the issue of how reference is secured, in the background of 
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89 Sider,  T. (2004). “Symposium on Four-Dimensionalism”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 
68: 642.
90 Sider, T. (1996). “All the World’s a Stage”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74: 433-4.
91  Sider, T. (2001). Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 191. The stage view is also known in the literature as exdurance or exdurantism: 
ordinary persisting objects are stages that persist by having distinct stage counterparts at other times. 
“[d]uration is via the object’s relation to entities other than or outside of it.“  Haslanger, S.  (2003). 
“Persistence Through Time”. 318. In M.J. Loux & D.W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. 315 - 54.
that metaphysical picture of reality.92
 Arguably, the complexity goes further: around the same time as Sider’s work on 
four-dimensionalism, Josh Parsons came out with a view according to which it  does not 
seem to be compulsory to endorse temporal parts in order to be a four-dimensionalist; 
an outcome which defies the tentative conclusion above. Apparently, we could easily  do 
away with temporal parts, Parsons suggests, employing a slightly different theoretical 
apparatus, namely  distributional properties93: temporally indexed properties which are 
genuinely intrinsic and non-relational. Let us briefly see how.
 Temporal parts are just a small part of the dispute between three and four-
dimensionalism; four-dimensionalism is a broader programme which seemingly entails 
perdurance (or the doctrine of temporal parts), namely a specific theory of persistence. 
Does the above-mentioned entailment really hold? According to Parsons it does not. 
One among the many benefits of endorsing temporal parts is the fact that they can easily 
address the long-standing problem of temporary  intrinsics.94  Things change their 
properties over time, my bike’s frame was straight when it left  the bike shop floor but it 
is now bent. Being straight or bent is supposed to be an intrinsic properties of things, at 
least according to Lewis’ reading of it, so if I say that  the bike’s frame was straight and 
now bent, according to some philosophical regimentation of it what I am really  saying is 
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92 Sider’s claim might well be debateable. As I showed in my MPhil thesis - The Persistence of Objects in 
T. Sider - there is a robust sense in which Sider’s stage theory maps into a metaphysics which could be 
slightly different from say orthodox perdurance. Therefore, there is more to his version of stage theory 
than just semantics. However, for the current purposes nothing hinges upon whether it does or not.  I am 
happy to assume Sider’s conclusion. Before moving on though, it should be noted that some other stage 
theorists, the likes of Hawley and Varzi are keen to point out that the stage view is more than just a 
different semantics for the same metaphysics. See Hawley,  K. (2001). How Things Persist. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press,  Ch. 3; and Varzi, A. (2003). “Naming the Stages”. Dialectica 57: 403.  Varzi is 
quite clear on this: “However, it would be incorrect to infer from this that the stage view is just a variant 
of four-dimensionalism. The theories are different both semantically and metaphysically. [my italic] 
Semantically,  they differ with respect to the basic mechanisms of reference: on the 4D view an ordinary 
proper name picks out a 4D worm, not the stages that constitute it.  Metaphysically, they differ with 
respect to the basic features of the world. The stage view is truly reductionist, in that all the work is done 
by the time-bound stages; their temporally extended aggregates, if such there be,  add nothing.They are 
nothing over and above the stages, and their properties reduce to the properties of their stages.  On the 4D 
view, by contrast, there is no commitment to such claims: there is no commitment to the primacy of the 
stages over their aggregates and, as a matter of fact, there is no commitment at all to the existence of 
instantaneous stages. The 4D world could consist of temporally atomless gunk.”
93 Parsons, J. (2000). “Must a Four-dimensionalist Believe in Temporal Parts?”. The Monist 83: 399-418. 
Recall Lewis’ charge against those who do not believe in temporal parts when it comes to addressing the 
problem of temporary intrinsics. The objection was that perfectly intrinsic properties like shape becomes 
relational, for example ‘bent-at-t1’. See Lewis, D.K. (1986). On the Plurality of Worlds.  Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell,  203-4; (2002). “Tensing the Copula”. Mind 111: 1-14. I shall look into the temporary intrinsic 
issue in 1.3.2. For the record, I am skeptical about Lewis’  conclusions for I believe that the problem of 
temporary intrinsics as well as the problem of change in general are ill-posed.
94 See Lewis, D.K. (1986). On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 203-4.
that the bike’s frame is straight-at-t1 and bent at-t2, and t1<t2. Although looking a bit 
fanciful, it might be a fair way to put it. Not  on Lewis’ view though: being straight and 
bent are intrinsic properties95 and a reading like the one above makes them relational - 
being straight or bent in relation to a time (indexing such properties to times) - which 
betrays their clear and genuine intrinsicality. So we need something that explains the 
evidence without making the relevant intrinsic properties relational: temporal parts. On 
this view, what is indexed to times is an object, a temporal part therefore to say that  the 
bike’s frame was straight whereas now is bent amounts to say  that the bike’s frame 
temporal part-at-t1 is straight whilst the bike’s frame temporal part-at-t2 is bent. What 
gets indexed to time is the object not the relevant intrinsic property, and this is no big 
deal.
 Thus, if we do not like the idea of linking the four-dimensional picture of reality  
to temporal parts, and if we accept the problem of temporary intrinsics as in Lewis, we 
would then have to have a different story about it. Parsons has one, one which has to do 
with distributional properties: temporal indexed properties which are perfectly intrinsic 
but disjunctive.96 A spatial distributional property looks like the following:
“[t]ake a poker that  is hot at one end, and cold at the other. It has a certain heat 
distribution, and has the distributional property of having that  heat  distribution. 
Imagine such a poker, call it a, and another poker, b, which has a different  heat 
distribution, being uniformly hot, for example. Call the heat  distribution of a, the 
property A, and that of b, B. Note that  these distributional properties are fully 
determinate: having any one of them entails that  you do not [my italic] have any 
other of the same determinable (in this case the determinable property of having 
some heat distribution). So, for example, that  a  has A entails that  a  does not [my 
italic] have B. A and B are both intrinsic properties. [...] Now notice that we can 
define now up the property of being hot at  one end. It  is simply having A or B or 
any other of the fully determinate heat  distribution properties that, as it were, put 
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95  The debate over intrinsicality is long-standing and the literature vaste, however to understand what 
Lewis is going on about, surely the following paper is where to start from: Langton,  R. & Lewis,  D.K. 
(1998). “Defining Intrinsic”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58: 333-45.
96 Seemingly Lewis’ problem was not just about indexing properties to times per se, it was rather about 
the outcome of the indexing properties process: the fact that it makes them non-intrinsic or relational. I 
say seemingly because another issue Lewis raises against indexers (that I omitted above) is the fact that 
the relevant properties end up being had by objects non-simpliciter. The truth of the matter is that Lewis 
is playing two distinct games, although he might believe he is just playing the same: when he talks in 
terms of having properties simpliciter he is referring to the single temporal parts being straight, bent, or 
whatever. Clearly, the properties I refer to when I say the the bike’s frame which was such-and-such and 
now is thus-and-so are no longer simpliciter since they are the properties of an aggregate of temporal 
parts which is straight in virtue of a temporal part straight-at-t1 and another bent-at-t2 with t1<t2 which 
makes them non-simpliciter, period.
heat at one end of the object. And this property is intrinsic as well. You can’t  get  an 
extrinsic property by conjoining or disjoining two intrinsic ones.”97
The same applies mutatis mutandis in the case of temporally  indexed properties. To 
conclude:
“wherever we have a temporally indexed property of being X-at-t, we have a 
number of corresponding permanent distributional properties: the X-ness 
distributions. X-at-t is a disjunction of some of those X-ness distributions, the ones 
that are compatible with being X-at-t.”98
Parsons seems to make a good case for the fact that four-dimensionalism does not entail 
perdurance as well as for the more curious conclusion that a four-dimensionalist of 
Parsons’ bend could easily accept an endurantistic account of persistence!
 Therefore, it  seems to me plausible to use the terms outlined above as follows: 
by four-dimensionalism I shall understand a metaphysical picture in which reality is 
considered extended in four dimensions, three spatial and one temporal. Crucial to this 
view is the analogy between space and time.99  By perdurance, I shall understand a 
theory  of persistence which is a conjunction of four-dimensionalism plus temporal 
parts: something perdures iff it persists by having temporal parts at each time it exists at 
(Sider’s ‘doctrine of temporal parts’). Crucial to this view, I shall take a qualified (in 
terms of parts) analogy  between space and time. By the worm view, I shall understand 
one of the two semantic branches of perdurance, namely  the one which takes ordinary 
persisting things - continuants - to be aggregates of temporal parts. Lastly, by  the stage 
theory I shall understand Sider’s version of it, namely the view according to which 
ordinary  persisting things are instantaneous stages, a view which is neutral whether 
there are aggregates of the above-mentioned entities or not. And this is the 
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97 Parsons, J. (2000). “Must a Four-dimensionalist Believe in Temporal Parts?”. The Monist 83: sect. IV.
98 Ibid.
99 I would be inclined to say ‘an unqualified analogy between space and time’ but am not sure it would 
make sense. By unqualified I shall mean ‘not in terms of parts’ otherwise such four-dimensionalism will 
yield to perdurance straightaway. However, it might be instructive to look at what D.C. Williams says 
with regard to this: ”The theory of the manifold [four-dimensionalism] leaves abundant room for the 
sensitive observer to record any describable difference he may find,  in intrinsic quality, relational texture, 
or absolute direction, between the temporal dimension and the spatial ones.” But the interesting point is 
that it is unnecessary to add any of the further differences between space and time he describes above. 
Space and time are alike in various ways, period. See also Mark Heller’s ‘minimal four-dimensionalism’ 
in Heller, M. (1993). “Varieties of Four-Dimensionalism”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71: 47-59. 
See also Parsons, J. (2000). “Must a Four-dimensionalist Believe in Temporal Parts?”. The Monist 83: 
footnote 2.
terminological framework I shall commit myself to. I shall reserve the right to define 
any other extension to this terminological apparatus at due course if required.
 Let us now go back to where it all started. I shall quickly recall the case exposed 
at the outset and the conundrum we discovered ourselves stuck into; and see if 
philosophy, in its contemporary metaphysics variety, could help  to clarify what is going 
on.
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1.1 Lewis on Persistence: Perdurance vs Endurance
 David Lewis was the first to attempt to discipline the debate about persistence; 
recalling from the Introduction, he characterised persistence as follows:
“Let us say that something persists iff, somehow or other, it exists at various times; 
this is the neutral word.”
Therefore, if we ever come across an entity, say a bike, that presumably exists at various 
times - say in my shed now, in a bike shop once - then that entity could potentially be an 
instance of a persistent entity. But the recognition that there could be persisting entities 
does not amount to say that there actually are persisting entities, let alone the fact that 
the bike in the shed is the one I bought twelve months ago. Perhaps, sketching how 
entities persist could clarify  whether there are any of such variety or not. In order to 
figure this out, I shall then suggest focussing on what Lewis writes within parentheses 
in his definition, i.e. somehow or other. The expression, as vague as it  gets, succeeds, in 
hindsight, in orientating the reader towards the two theories of persistence that he is 
about to expose, i.e. perdurance and endurance.
“Something perdures iff it  exists by having different  temporal parts, or stages, at 
different  times though no one part  of it is wholly present  at  more than one time; 
whereas it endures iff it persists by being wholly present at more than one time.”100
Lewis’ characterisations gathered paramount agreement among philosophers and his 
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100 Lewis, D.K. (1986). On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 202.
ground-breaking work set out the agenda of the contemporary debate.101
 Lewis’ neutral characterisation might be revised as to include, pre-emptively  as 
it were, perdurance and endurance as follows:
 (LP) Something persists iff it exists partly or wholly at various times. 
One thing that perhaps could be worth pointing out is that in moving from the neutral 
notion of persistence to those of perdurance and endurance Lewis ignored - whether 
deliberately  or not is debatable - to flag that the neutral word of common sense is 
abandoned in favour of metaphysics, which is no longer neutral. If ‘existing at more 
than one time’ could suggest a rough and ready  idea of what it takes for something to 
persist, clearly as soon as the phrase ‘partly or wholly’ is added then the metaphysical 
debate fires up. What is crucial though, is the fact that Lewis is quite reasonably 
assuming that persistence or identity over time has a good deal of claim to factor in as a 
basic feature of reality, both from the point of view of common sense as well as a 
metaphysical feature of reality. How then we are to understand such a feature is a matter 
of philosophical debate.
 Sure enough, to ascribe such commitment to Lewis’ account of perdurance 
might sound unusual: for some reasons, perdurance is traditionally associated with a 
denial of identity over time, or this is what has been believed for some time. I think that 
with careful consideration there is a robust (although slightly deceiving) sense in which 
perduring continuants preserve their diachronic identity as I shall argue in the following 
section.
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101  Some disagreed, and I think I generally agree with their disagreement.  See Lowe E.J. & McCall, S. 
(2009). “The Definition of Endurance”. Analysis 69: 277-80. The trouble was that originally both parties, 
perdurance and endurance accepted to frame their respective views in Lewis’  terms. Although, it turned 
out to be perfectly viable for perdurantists or four-dimensionalists, in hindsight probably it was a mistake 
for the opponents of Lewis’  view. It is paramount how endurantists ended up playing right in Lewis’ 
hands: Lewis used the phrase ‘wholly present’ against endurance, stressing its obscurity. At that point it 
was just too late for the endurance supporters to take it back; the die was cast, period. Perhaps, it was not 
a great move on the endurantists’ part to let their philosophical opponent account for their own view but 
this is history, and most of the literature in the aftermath of Lewis revolved around the attempt to clarify 
the expression ‘wholly present’ (see for example Crisp, T. & Smith, D. (2005). “‘Wholly Present’ 
Defined”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: 71: 318-44; Olson, E. (2006). “Temporal Parts 
and Timeless Parthood”. Noûs 40: 738-52; Wasserman, R.  (2004). “Framing the Debate over 
Persistence”. Metaphysica 5: 67-80). All this until 2009 when a genuine endurance supporter like Lowe 
finally claimed what endurance was really about. To this extent, in the following I shall draw upon Lowe 
& McCall’s conclusions when I claim that what seems to crucially discriminate between perdurance and 
endurance is the notion of temporal parts. Of course, such a line of argument could be supplemented 
noting for example that the expression ‘to exist at more than one time’ which is supposedly the common 
part between the definitions of perdurance and endurance is susceptible of different readings from the 
point of view of perdurance and endurance (see Lewis’ ‘partly or wholly’), and therefore not the ‘neutral 
word’  as Lewis put it. In a nutshell, it seems that the dice were loaded against endurance right from the 
beginning.
 Going back to Lewis’ agenda, it is interesting to note that a few years down the 
line, his tacit  assumption that  persistence is an ubiquitous feature of reality is called into 
question: some philosophers102, apparently independently, set forth new approaches 
which, while allegedly relying on the same background, more or less tacitly ended up 
denying this feature of reality.103
 In what follows, I shall apply  Lewis’ perdurance and endurance definitions to the 
scenario we began with, namely if the bike in the shed is the bike bought twelve months 
ago, to see how they square with it, and most importantly if they  can be of any  help in 
understanding, and clarifying what is going on; as well as potentially overcoming the 
predicament harboured above.
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102  Sider,  T. (2001). Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time.  Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. Hawley, K. (2001). How Things Persist.  Oxford: Oxford University Press. Varzi, A. 
(2003a).  “Naming the Stages”. Dialectica 57: 403; (2003c). “Entia Successiva”. Rivista di Estetica 22: 
139-58.
103 Perhaps, at this point, one move could be to disentangle the notion of persistence from that of identity 
over time.  None of the stage theorists,  whether a là Sider or not, denies that things persists; generally they 
say that they do by having different counterparts at different times (analogy time-modality). What they 
say is instead that there is no sense in which things preserve any identity over time: they are not so since 
entities existing at different times (those we quantify over) are not numerically identical.  In addition,  they 
tend not to commit to aggregates to temporal counterparts excluding by fiat the only one condidate left 
able to preserve a sense of identity across time in such four-dimensional/perdurantistic picture.
1.1.1 Perdurance, Endurance, and...Bikes
 How perdurance describes the situation above would be something along the 
following lines: 104  what I refer to as ‘my bike’ is a collection of, broadly  speaking, 
bike-like spatio-temporal parts which make up that thing; one spatio-temporal part of it 
now happens to be in the shed, whereas another one was once on the shop floor (and 
allegedly many more parts in between, before, and after). From, say, God’s perspective 
what I refer to as ‘my  bike’ looks like a huge worm-like entity  which extends in space 
as well as time or in spacetime. The idea of the worm-like entity is, as we saw above, 
what gives name to this view as the worm theory.105
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104 Eminent perdurantists include: Taylor, R. (1955). “Spatial and Temporal Analogies and the Concept of 
Identity”.  Journal of Philosophy 52: 599-612;. Armstrong, D.M. (1980). “Identity Through Time”. In 
Peter van Inwagen (ed.) Time and Cause. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 67-78; Robinson, D. (1982). “Re-
identifying Matter”. Philosophical Review 107: 225-60; Heller, M. (1990). The Ontology of Physical 
Objects.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; (1984). “Temporal Parts of Four-Dimensional 
Objects”. Philosophical Studies 46: 323-34; Le Poidevin, R. (1991). Change, Cause,  and Contradiction. 
Basingstoke: Macmillan; (2000). “Continuants and Continuity”. The Monist 83: 381-398; Jubien,  M. 
(1993). Ontology, Modality,  and the Fallacy of Reference. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 
Hudson, H. (2000).  “Universalism, Four-Dimensionalism, and Vagueness”. Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 60: 547-60; Jubien, M. (1992). Ontology, Modality, and the Fallacy of 
Reference.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Le Poidevin,  R. (2000). “Continuants and 
Continuity”. The Monist 83: 381-98; (1991). Change, Cause and Contradiction. New York: St Martin’s 
Press; Lewis, D.K. (1988). “Rearrangement of Particles: Reply to Lowe”. Analysis 48: 65-72; (1986). On 
the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell, 202-4; (1976). “Survival and Identity”.  In Amelie Rorty (ed.) 
The Identities of Persons. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 117-40. Reprinted in Lewis, D.K. 
(1983). Philosophical Papers I. New York: Oxford University Press; (1971).  “Counterparts of Persons 
and their Bodies”. Journal of Philosophy 68: 203-11; Lotze, H. (1887). Metaphysics, Book I (Ontology). 
B. Bosanquet (ed.). Oxford: Clarendon Press, Ch. 1-4; McTaggart,  J.M.E.  (1921). The Nature of 
Existence, I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 176-7; Noonan, H. (1988). “Substance, Identity 
and Time”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,  suppl. vol. 62: 79-100; (1976). “The Four-
Dimensional World”. Analysis 37: 32-9; Quine, W.V.O. (1981). Theories and Things. Cambridge MA: 
Harvard University Press, 10-3; (1976a). “Whither Physical Objects”. In R.S. Cohen, P.K. Feyerabend & 
M.W. Wartofsky (eds.) Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos.  Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 
497-504; (1960). Word and Object. Cambridge MA: MIT Press, sect. 36; (1953). “Identity, Ostention, and 
Hypostasis”. In From a Logical Point of View. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 65-79; 
Robinson, D. (1985). “Can Amoebe Divide without Multiplying?”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 
63: 299-319; Russell,  B. (1914). Our Knowledge of the External World. London: Allen & Unwin Ltd., 
112; (1927).  The Analysis of Matter. New York: Harcour, Brace & Company, 243, 284-9; Sider, T. (2001). 
Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1-11; 
(1997). “Four-Dimensionalism”. Philosophical Review 106: 197-231; (1996). “All the World’s a Stage”. 
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74: 433-53; Smart, J.J. (1972). “Space, Time and Individuals”. In R. 
Rudner & Israel Scheffler (eds.) Logic and Art: Essays in Honor of Nelson Goodman. New York: 
Macmillan Publishing Company, 3-20; (1963). Philosophy and Scientific Realism.  London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, Ch. VII; Whitehead,  A.N. (1920). The Concept of Nature. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press; Williams, D.C. (1951). “The Myth of Passage”. Journal of Philosophy 48: 457-72.
105 Mutatis mutandis,  what I just said could be easily applied to each of the two spatio-temporal parts ‘the 
bike in the shed’ and ‘the bike once in the bike shop’. According to perdurance, they are both aggregates 
of bike-like spatio-temporal parts, and in turn each part of each bike, say frame, handlebars, etc. is an 
aggregate of frame-like, handlebars-like, etc. spatio-temporal parts. Something that could potentially give 
God a headache in case They decided to count how many things there really are.
 In relation to the question at issue, a perdurance theorist would probably say that 
what I call ‘the bike in the shed’, and ‘the bike once in the bike shop’ refer to different 
parts of only one bike, the one I call ‘my bike’, an overarching entity, which has those 
entities as its parts. For a perdurantist there is such an entity  so that what I call ‘my 
bike’ is a persisting entity, a part of which was once in a bike shop whilst another is now 
in my shed.106
 Curiously though, the three entities which allegedly refer to what I call ‘my 
bike’, ‘the bike in the shed’, and ‘the bike in the bike shop’ are by no means one and the 
same: they are three different entities (numerically non-identical), each one of which is 
identical with itself but not so with any of the others. Therefore, strictly  speaking they 
are three: three different parts107 of the one and the same108 overarching entity. So, if the 
reader ever suspected that the question at the outset whether the bike in the shed is the 
one once in the bike shop was about one bike, at this point perhaps she could feel a bit 
disheartened for there are actually quite a few bikes at issue.
 As confusing as it gets, prima facie it seems as though perdurance is playing two 
different games, it claims that if we count the number of bikes the result is one: ‘my 
bike’; but also that it is three: my  bike, the bike in the shed, and the one once in the 
shop.109 Potentially though, there might be many more than just three, there could be a 
bike for each moment or interval of time we see fit; for instance, suppose between the 
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106 For perdurance, parthood is primarily atemporal.  My use of tenses like ‘is now’ and ‘once was’  is just 
instructive. For completeness’ sake, a further issue to be added to those highlighted in this section 
regards, if perdurance is true, how numerically different spatio-temporal parts stick together to form a 
numerically identical worm. The relevant literature offers various options: without entering in much 
detail, generally what sticks parts together is a relation, something along the lines of Lewin’s genidentity 
(made then popular by Reichenbach), which is salient and relevant in the case at issue. For example, what 
bonds parts could be a spatiotemporal, causal, psychological, etc. glue. See for example, Lewis’ I- and R-
relation in (1976). “Survival and Identity”, 63-4. Reprinted in Lewis, D.K. (1983).  Philosophical Papers 
I. New York: Oxford University Press, 55-77; Armstrong, D.M. (2010). Sketch for a Systematic 
Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Ch. 7; (1980). “Identity Through Time”. In P. van 
Inwagen (ed.). Time and Cause.  Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company, 67-78; Hawley, K. (2001). How 
Things Persist. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Ch 3; just to name few. It is for sure an important issue 
per se, but one which is not crucial for the purposes of my argument so I shall flag it and leave it aside for 
the time being.
107 I say three for what I call ‘my bike’, the worm-like entity, figures as ‘part’, although an improper one, 
of itself. But when it comes to counting, things become a bit complicated as I shall flag in the following.
108  This is why I claimed early on that contrary to the established view according to which perdurance 
denies diachronic identiy, there is a robust sense in which an entity which persists by perduring is 
identical over time.
109  The situation is slightly more complicated than that. Generally speaking,  if perdurance is 
supplemented with unrestricted mereological composition, the total amount of bikes in this situation 
would probably be two since once you have the parts, the whole is no addition to them, or as in jargon ‘an 
ontological free lunch’.  See Armstrong, D. M. (1997), A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 12.
shed and the shop  floor the bike spent some time at my parents’ house, on a plane, etc. 
then there would be a spatio-temporal part of ‘my bike’ which crashed at my parents’ as 
well as another one on a plane, etc. so that the number of bikes would be more than just 
three. Interestingly, nothing seems to be able to hold the procedure back, in fact it  could 
be easily reiterated so that at the end of the day what we could get is a potentially 
infinite number of bikes, one for each instant or interval of time; how many they are or, 
what seems more sensible, how many perdurance is content to posit.110 To conclude, 
when it  comes to counting the number of bikes, it all comes down to what is, relevantly 
and saliently, to be counted111: ‘my bike’ as a collection of all its parts in space and 
time, or just some of its parts. As long as we are clear with this then there is no problem. 
The epistemic impasse is overcome, we find ourselves somehow undecided simply 
because we do not  realise what exactly  has to be counted; but as soon as we figure that 
out then the epistemic uncertainty  vanishes. Counting is somehow relative, relevant, and 
sensitive to what is counted; therefore relative to the sheer number of entities which 
make up the furniture of reality then the count would presumably be two112 - the bike in 
the shed, and the one on the shop floor. Whereas relative to the question whether my 
bike is one or many, clearly it  is one but one which has many parts: one of which is now 
in the shed whilst another was once on the shop floor.
 By the same token, the metaphysical certainty is preserved, God would count the 
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110  I guess the number of parts in time could depend also on the nature of time itself, whether discrete, 
continuous, or dense.  Once more, as I claimed at the outset of this part on persistence, it might well be the 
case that there is more to four-dimensionalism than just temporal parts, namely the question about time 
and its nature.
111  On counting see Lewis, D.K. (1976). “Survival and Identity”, 63-4. Reprinted in Lewis, D.K. (1983). 
Philosophical Papers I.  New York: Oxford University Press, 55-77; Armstrong, D.M. (2004). Truth and 
Truthmakers.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 103; (1997), A World of States of Affairs. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 17, 47; (1989). Universals: An Opinionated Introduction. 
Boulder: Westview Press, 2-5; (1978). Universals and Scientific Realism Volume I: Nominalism and 
Realism. 37, 111-2; Baxter,  D.L.M. (2001a).  “Instantiation as Partial Identity”. Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy 79: 449-64; (2001b) “Loose Identity and Becoming Something Else”. Noûs 35: 592-601; 
(1999). “The Discernibility of Identicals”. Journal of Philosophical Research 24: 37-55; (1988a). 
“Identity in the Loose and Popular Sense”. Mind 97: 575-82; (1988b).  “Many-One Identity”. 
Philosophical Papers 17: 193-216; See also Bishop Butler’s “Of Personal Identity”, in The Analogy of 
Religion, S. Halifax (ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press (1833), 361-70.
112  See previous footnote.  Once more, I shall stress how all must be taken with a grain of salt. The 
situation is more complicated than it looks. There is here at play quite a peculiar view on composition 
(unrestricted: for any plurality of non-overlapping objects, those objects compose something; 
supervenience: the whole is nothing over and above its parts, etc.) together with a question on 
quantification,  namely over what entities we do/should quantify. All these issues are philosophically 
contentious, and could potentially influence a sharp answer to the counting question. Regrettably, given 
the broad nature of the topic and the approach of this thesis, I shall drop most of these issues but 
whenever needed I shall briefly flag, footnote or refer to what I think would be crucial for a sound 
understanding of them.
sheer number of bikes as two, the one in the shed, and the one once in the shop as 
distinct entities in their own right since they so are, but  also as belonging as 
spatiotemporal parts to one entity, what I refer to as ‘my bike’.
 It is questionable if Lewis’ account of perdurance clarifies the initial scenario, 
however what matters is that although intricate, the perdurance’s machinery seems to do 
the trick, namely to wave off the predicament we found ourselves into between the 
evidence available (or the lack of it) on one hand, and our intuitions on the other. Either 
us or God would obtain the correct number insofar as both realise that counting is 
relative to what is counted. To sum up: relative to the number of bikes in the shed, the 
number would be one; relative to the number of bikes once on the shop floor, again the 
number would be one; lastly, relative to the number of bikes which would qualify as 
‘my bike’, once more the result would be one although by no means would the three 
count as just one bike.
 Faced with this argument and conclusion, the average person on the street  may 
understandably feel a bit confused; perhaps she has been thinking all along that the 
whole thing was mainly about one bike, ‘my bike’ whether the one in the shed was the 
one once in the shop (in the case it  had turned out it wasn’t then it would have been 
about two bikes but this is a negligible detail) whereas Lewis opened the lid on a can of 
worms; he showed that actually there is an awful lot of bikes going on.113
 Pointing at the huge number of bikes Lewis shows why the average Jane and Joe 
got in trouble in the first place, namely Lewis offers a solution to the puzzle. And 
presumably this is what we were looking for. From the point of view of the 
methodology discussed in passing in the Introduction Lewis’ way is impeccable: 
beginning from a fairly ordinary situation, he would draw upon our beliefs and 
intuitions about what is going on; he would then point out how they lead to a puzzling 
situation (the reason why the situation is puzzling); and lastly he would offer a way out. 
A way  out which comes at a cost: the cost of revising some of our beliefs about the 
number of objects involved in that particular situation. Isn’t this the whole point of 
philosophy?
 To raise the objection that this view is counter-intuitive, that clashes with our 
common sense beliefs that the whole thing is about one bike will not do; in the same 
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113 See also Lewis, D.K. (1993). “Many but Almost One”. In K. Cambell,  J.  Bacon & L. Reinhardt (eds.). 
Ontology, Causality,  and Mind: Essays on the Philosophy of D. M. Armstrong.  Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 23-38.
way as it will not do to point out that a philosophical system devised by a prescriptive 
rationalist, say Spinoza or Leibniz, is at odds with common sense. The whole point of 
their undertaking is to prove that what we ordinarily believe is, to some extent, wrong; 
saying conversely what should be the case. So I guess the lesson we could draw at this 
point is to accept perdurance as a clever, and robust explanation of what happens when 
an object persists through time.
 So much for perdurance, I shall now highlight how endurance would allegedly 
account for that circumstantial evidence; and how, if at all, they could escape the 
predicament. According to endurance, something persists by enduring if and only  if it 
persists by being wholly present at more than one time. As vague as it comes, Lewis 
attempts a clarification when he says that:
“Endurance corresponds to the way a universal, if there are such things, would be 
wholly present  wherever and whenever it is instantiated. Endurance involve 
overlap: the content  of two different times has the enduring thing as a common 
part.”114
Whether the addendum is clarificatory or not is matter of debate, particularly given the 
contentious status of universal entities; more to the point since it  does not explain the 
apparently  obscure phrase ‘wholly present’. Given this uncertainty, to outline how an 
endurance theorist would deal with the scenario presented at the outset would be 
ultimately  unfair to endurance, therefore the first  thing I shall do is to possibly 
implement Lewis’ dictum. Lowe & McCall decided not to play right into Lewis’ hands, 
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114 Lewis, D.K. (1986). On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 202. 
and so provided an insightful definition of endurance:115
“An object endures iff (i) it  lacks temporal parts, and (ii) it exists at  more than one 
time”116
Therefore, going back to the bike in the shed, the one in the shop, and the one I refer to 
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Zimmerman, D.W. (1995). “Theories of Masses and Problems of Constitution”. Philosophical Review 
104: 53-110; (1997).  “Immanent Causation”. In James Tomberlin (ed.) Philosophical Perspectives xi. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell.
116 Lowe, E.J. & McCall, S. (2009). “The Definition of Endurance”. Analysis 69: 278.
as ‘my bike’, endurance would likely  says that there is an entity, the one I call ‘my 
bike’, which is a bike, it does not have any temporal parts (of course it  has spatial parts 
but this is trivial), and most  importantly it  existed all along: it was once in the bike shop 
whilst now is in my  shed (and they would add that this is no big deal). Would this 
explanation do any good in waving off the predicament we stumbled upon? Not quite. 
Suppose we say that according to endurance what I call ‘my bike’ is an example of a 
persisting-by-enduring entity, therefore at any point in its life path, career, or whatnot it 
does not have temporal parts, it  just exists at different times. Would this clarify the 
epistemic stalemate we agreed upon at the beginning? Not really. Still we would be 
clueless as to what enables us to ground why  we believe what  we believe, namely that 
the bike in the shed is the one once in the shop. To claim that this is the case because 
‘my bike’ is an enduring entity would sound a bit question begging, or as in Lewis’ 
words a clear lack of analysis. Thus, endurance needs to have a good story  about this 
otherwise perdurance might have an edge.117
 How about the metaphysical certainty that there is a fact of the matter whether 
my bike is now in the shed whilst once was in the shop? I think in this case, we could 
easily use the same remark above, that metaphysically speaking my bike qualifies as an 
enduring entity  therefore, my bike which is now in the shed, twelve months ago was in 
a bike shop, period. What seemed to be a not so insightful reason earlier, turned out to 
be potentially a very  good one; it is good for it is adequate to the current context 
(metaphysics) whereas it was not  in the one just above (epistemic). Still though, we do 
need a story  good enough to address the epistemic stalemate, and eventually  to 
overcome it. Yet perdurance seems to have an edge despite the ridiculous number of 
bikes involved.
 It would not take us very  far to claim that we do not need to provide good 
reasons when it comes to bestowing why we believe that my bike is the bike now in the 
shed which was once in the shop  just  because this is the way it is. Getting rid of a 
question because it  sounds somehow suspicious is never a great idea, to show why  it is, 
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117  In conversation, Dr. Francis Pearson called to my attention that what I say might sound unfair to 
endurance. Ideally, it would be nice to be as fair as possible to both contenders although my sympathy 
goes for perdurance. In any case, what I am saying is that how endurance purports to explain why there is 
only one bike all along by claiming that a bike is an instance of an entity which persists by enduring - a 
shorthand for it has no temporal parts and it exists at more than one time - fails to address the epistemic 
issue above. We still do not know on what ground the bike in the shed is the one once in the shop; and to 
claim that the bike in the shed is the one once in the shop does not help. It never helps to answer an 
epistemic question with a metaphysical answer.
and then to get rid of it would definitely be more fruitful.
 To this extent, I think it would be appropriate to raise a couple of remarks, 
perhaps a little subtle, just to make clear what we are talking about when we talk about 
bikes persisting over time; so that at the end of the day it  might be possible to come 
down on one side or the other of the perdurance/endurance debate. Otherwise, the dice 
would be unfairly loaded against endurance, as Lowe & McCall point out.
 To this end, I shall now introduce a topic which I overlooked whilst  exposing 
perdurance since I thought it would not be needed to show what a perdurance theorist 
would say about the scenario at stake. Though the reader may think that this is a case in 
which the medicine is worse than the disease, I respond that more often than not the 
medicine is bad when it is not clear or adequately understood the disease which it is 
used for. What I think is that perdurance might  be a good remedy insofar as the disease 
is taken at face value; once we scratch the surface then there might  be a chance for 
endurance to even out perdurance’s edge (which at no point settles the question whether 
we should go for one or the other).
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1.1.2 Identity, Individuation, and Identification
 In this brief section, I shall outline what I take to be a promising view which 
employs some subtle distinctions (often overlooked), useful for the purpose of 
clarifying what’s at stake, and also helpful for restricting the range of the inquiry. I am 
referring to a terminological and conceptual issue which regards a conflation and a 
consequent misunderstanding of three philosophical notions: identity, individuation and 
identification. Although, often used as synonyms in the literature; a careful analysis 
shows that they are not.
 In this, I shall draw upon Lowe’s idea that there are two ways in which identity 
is understood: 118  (i) as a relation, and (ii) as a name which picks out the individual 
essence of something. The former way characterizes what we call criteria of identity 
while the latter yields to what we call principles of individuation. Individuation, 
metaphysically  speaking, is a determination relation between entities: a relation which 
obtains between entities x and y when x determines or fixes which entity of its kind y is. 
And when x stands in such relation to y then x is an individuator of y. However, 
something more has to be said about this issue, in particular focusing on the epistemic 
or cognitive side which happens to be what we need to address the epistemic stalemate 
that seems to penalise the endurance account.
 Identity is then a logical and metaphysical relation. Individuation, in a 
metaphysical sense, expresses the individual essence of an entity  whereas in a cognitive 
sense it  amounts to singling out some object by pointing or description: for instance, we 
single out an object via its properties - at one time it possesses some properties while at 
a later time it possesses different  properties (think about the case of my bike, it is now a 
bit run-down but  it was in perfect condition a while ago). Individuation in this epistemic 
sense is not sufficient to explain such evidence, thus something else seems to be needed, 
namely identification. Again it qualifies as an epistemological relation, namely a 
cognitive act or a judgement between two distinct acts of epistemic individuation.
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118  Lowe, E.J. (2010). “On the Individuation of Powers”. In A. Marmodoro (ed.). The Metaphysics of 
Powers: Their Grounding and Their Manifestations. New York: Routledge, Ch. 1; (2007). “Sortals and 
the Individuation of Objects”. Mind and Language 22: 514-533; (2003). “Individuation”. In M.J. Loux & 
D.W. Zimmerman (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, Ch. 3.
 Let us then apply  the above to the bike-now-in-the-shed/once-in-the-shop 
scenario, a situation in which we are curious of the whereabouts of a bike over a stretch 
of time: following from Lowe, we start picking out via two distinct acts of individuation 
an object at t1, say  the battered bike in the shed, and another at t2, the new bike when it 
first was bought twelve months ago. Now the philosophical issue concerns whether the 
two objects are the very same objects (diachronic scenario, but  the same holds mutatis 
mutandis in synchronic cases). A plausible answer, I gather, would be that they are the 
very same object or in a more refined way, by those two acts of individuation we picked 
out the same object. But several times such identification is not that easy to be attained. 
Sometimes it is epistemically indeterminate if the two objects we singled out are the 
same or distinct  but this cognitive indeterminacy  does not affect the metaphysical side 
of the matter. It is just epistemic indeterminacy.119
 How then could this brief digression help endurance in dealing away  with the 
predicament? In all fairness, I think that endurance does have to do away with nothing 
really, let alone the predicament; instead what endurance should point out is that there is 
more than just what meets the eye (in a sense in which seems to resemble what 
perdurance did, but without overgrowing the number of bikes)120. Once all is said and 
done, to live with such alleged epistemic indeterminacy is just  the way it is without 
affecting our everyday life, and most importantly without affecting the metaphysical 
certainty about the number of bikes which furnish reality  (if we are so keen to go for 
metaphysical determinacy at any rate). Perhaps, we could attempt to rephrase it as 
follows: epistemic undecidability is simply a feature of our situated/perspectual 
condition/situation, therefore we must understand how it works, and live with it. If this 
is really the case, surely, the urge to fix it qualifies as a case in which the medicine 
could be worse than the disease.
 So much for how the two main contenders would describe and address the 
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119 The whole thing can be easily rephrased in terms of identification and re-identification. Such a way of 
naming may be misleading for the following reason: it seems that re-identification means that 
identification never fails whereas as I pointed out above, more often than not,  it is indeterminate whether 
it holds or not.  However,  mutatis mutandis the distinction between identification and re-identification 
amounts to the distinction between individuation and identification. Identification according to the first 
distinction is an act of individuation while re-identification corresponds to a judgement between two 
distinct acts of individuation, thus it amounts to identification in the sense I presented above.
120  Perdurance gave us two distinct things/parts and a question about whether they form one/a whole; a 
question which may have a determinate metaphysical answer even if we do not have a determinate 
epistemological one. Similarly, endurance has given its two specific identifications,  and a question about 
whether they identify the same thing; again, a question with a determinate metaphysical answer even if 
not a determinate epistemological one. And to this degree the two seem to be on an equal footing.
scenario at  the outset. It would be incomplete though just to leave it like that  since there 
is at least another contender which reclaims, allegedly with a good deal of reasons, its 
own place in the dispute. I am hinting at what is well-known as the Stage Theory.121
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121  The stage theory seems to come in many ways,  in particular it first came to the fore in 1996 after 
Sider’s paper All the World’s a Stage,  whilst it got sanctioned, philosophically speaking, in 2001 with 
Sider’s well-regarded book Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. At the same 
time though, a couple of other philosophers saw it at a viable approach to persistence and, generally a 
solution to more or less traditional puzzles of identity over time, composition, constitution, etc. In 2001, 
Hawley published How things Persist,  which is a full-blown stage theoretic view of persistence, whereas 
the stage theory took Varzi’s fancy in Naming the Stages in 2003. Although, generally speaking the trio 
sings along the same lines, some decisive features could be tracked down to fundamental differences 
among the three. I shall hint at the potentially crucial differences in the following of the section.
1.1.3 Instantaneous Stages and...Instantanous Bikes
 According to its first  propounder the stage theory is supposed to be a semantic 
contender to the worm theory in the economy of a perdurance account of persistence.122 
As we know, the worm theory is a semantic account of how expressions like ‘my bike’, 
‘the bike in the shed’, etc. work; namely what items they  refer to. When I utter the 
expression ‘my bike’ what I am actually referring to is an extended object, taking up the 
three dimensions of space and the one of time whereas my referring expression like ‘the 
bike in the shed’ points at  just a small but still spatio-temporally  extended part  of that 
huge object.
 Surely, there is a good sense in which when we quantify  over a common object 
like a bike, what we do is just to quantify over that object without really meaning any 
extended worm-like entity. Thus, from the point of view of the stage view, whether 
there are worms or not does not matter since the ultimate subjects of quantification are 
single instantaneous stages. Therefore, there is no more hesitation when it comes to 
decide on what we are really quantifying over when we claim that something is such-
and-such. According to Sider, the entities quantified over are instantaneous temporal 
parts, three dimensional slices of four-dimensional wholes, even though there might not 
be any (the extension of which is non-zero when it comes to their spatial dimensions 
whereas zero when it comes to their temporal one). Instantaneity  does not defy 
temporality, or this is what the story tells.123
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122  Eminent stage theorists include: Sider, T. (2001). Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence 
and Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1-11; (1997). “All the World’s a Stage”. Australasian Journal 
of Philosophy 74: 433-53; Hawley,  K. (2001).  How Things Persist. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 
Varzi A. (2003a). “Perdurantism, Universalism and Quantifiers”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81: 
202-15; (2003b). “Naming the Stages”.  Dialectica 57: 387-412; (2003c).  “Entia Successiva”. Rivista di 
Estetica 22: 139-58. In addition, Yuri Balashov attempts to draw a precise definition of stage theory or 
exdurance in Balashov, Y. (2007). “Defining ‘Exdurance’”. Philosophical Studies 133: 143-9.
123 There are again some further issues lurking underneath; for example, how something with no temporal 
extension could adequately be thought of as making up a temporally extended entity. Secondly, there is a 
question concerning the nature of an instantaneous entity; for instance, how instantaneous is an instant. 
Thirdly, if the stage theory is fundamentally about three-dimensional entities, how come it is said to fall 
under a four-dimensional view of reality? In addition to it,  following from the first question advertised 
above (perhaps a trivial question but one which has never been adequately addressed): namely how many 
three-dimensional stages are needed in order to make the sum four-dimensional? All these questions are 
doubtlessly interesting (and some trivial also) but I shall drop them since nothing from what I say in the 
following of the thesis depends on my answer or an answer to them. They are interesting in their own 
right and there is plenty of literature for a keen reader to delve into them.
 Applied to the present case of a bike now in the shed which was or not once in 
the shop, the stage theory’s pronouncement could sound like the following: right now 
what I call my bike is an instantaneous entity which happens to be in my shed (which in 
turn is an instantaneous stage of a shed-like entity) but twelve months ago it was 
another instantaneous stage of an entity  which was, incidentally or not, in a bike shop 
(which in turn is an instantaneous stage of a bike shop-like entity). Thus, metaphysically 
speaking what I call my bike is really just that instantaneous entity (stage) which sits in 
my shed. It has though, say, an instantaneous temporal counterpart located twelve 
months ago in a bike shop but the one is not the other, which is the same as one is not 
one and the same with the other. The novelty behind the stage view or exdurance is the 
fact that temporality is treated analogously to modality (modal counterpart  theory to be 
precise), that  is identity over time and identity  over possible worlds are somehow 
comparable.124
 Going back to the predicament, the stage view’s contribution could be this: 
again, there is no epistemic undecidability, when I presently  say ‘my bike’ what I mean 
is the instantaneous stage which is now in my shed whereas if/when I said ‘my bike’ 
twelve months ago what I referred to was an instantaneous entity in a bike shop. The 
two instantaneous existences are clearly distinct but related by a temporal variety of 
Lewis’ counterpart relation, such that one bike is the temporal counterpart  of the other 
(how temporal counterparts stick one another is a bit of a puzzle in itself though). 
Therefore, is the bike in the shed the same as the one in the bike shop? Of course it is 
not. So then, how many  bikes are there at the end of the day? Doubtlessly two (perhaps 
three if it turns out that there are aggregates of stages, but this also depends on which of 
the many views on material composition is endorsed).
 To conclude, as in the perdurance’s case above, the epistemic impasse is 
disencumbered, what we need to do is to figure out what we are talking about when 
uttering an expression like ‘my bike’. Once this is done, we gain certainty  of what/how 
many items there are at play  (in this case two bikes). Lastly, if God decided to count the 
number of bikes the outcome would be two in line with perdurance, distinct bike-like 
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124  We should bear in mind that Lewis did not seem to be willing to go all the way with this temporal/
modal parallel. See Lewis, D.K. (1986). On the Plurality of Worlds.  Oxford. Basil Blackwell, Ch. 4; 
(1968). “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic”. Journal of Philosophy 65: 113-126. See also 
Hawley, K. (Forthcoming). “Lewis on Persistence”. In B.  Loewer & J. Schaffer (eds.) Blackwell 
Companion to David Lewis. For an unconventional stance on the time/modality analogy see Lowe, E.J. 
(2006). “Endurantism Versus Perdurantism and the Nature of Time”. Rivista di Filosofia Neoscolastica 4: 
713-27; (1986). “On the Supposed Temporal/Modal Parallel”. Analysis 46: 195-7.
instantaneous entities somehow related by a temporal counterpart relation.
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1.2 Assessment
 The purpose of these initial sections above was to introduce the topic of concern, 
to wit the persistence of material objects, via an ordinary  case of an allegedly persisting 
object. This ordinary case, on closer examination, gave us a puzzle: is the bike currently 
in my shed the same thing as the bike that was in the shop some time previously? It was 
shown that we have quite strong intuitions about the case, i.e. that the two bikes are the 
same; these intuitions might then be supplemented by some common sense 
considerations, i.e. even though we might not be able to tell whether the two bikes are 
the same, we anyway believe that they must be a fact of the matter whether they  so are 
or not. Together these intuitions and considerations moved us in a particular direction 
that harboured a predicament, namely the thought that the number of bikes must be 
determinate although we might not be able to tell on what grounds. Further to this, the 
point was to see if philosophy  could shed some light on that situation: at first, to see 
what the predicament was about, and to provide a viable way out in the case the 
predicament was genuine.
 Perdurance (in its two varieties, worm and stage theory), and endurance all had a 
saying: perdurance provided a clever solution to the predicament (the fact  that the 
number of bikes must be determinate even though we might not be able to tell what  it is 
and more importantly  why it is so), one which involved some sort of theoretical entities 
called temporal parts (whether instantaneous or not has no particular bearing when it 
comes to solving the puzzle). Whereas the endurance answer was more along the lines 
of seeing the predicament’s outcome as not genuine: distinguishing between two distinct 
aspects of the issue, one epistemic and one metaphysical, and then claiming that the 
epistemic failure of identification does not imply the metaphysical failure of there being 
a fact of the matter concerning the number of entities in question.
 I think the conclusion we could draw at this stage is that all of them provided 
quite good stories about the legitimacy  of the predicament or not, and in both cases, 
whether there is a predicament or not, they again afforded quite good stories about  how 
to acquit the appearance of it. Since there is no clear-cut answer (for instance there 
would be a clear-cut one if one view sounded blatantly  bizarre whilst the other robust 
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and sound) it  is then quite difficult to come down on one side or the other. Perdurance, 
in the attempt to preserve some sort of homogeneity  between our epistemology  and 
metaphysics prescribes a deep revision of our language and thought showing how 
semantically  and metaphysically  we talk and think about the world really works. 
Conversely, endurance professes the awareness that the epistemic impasse might not be 
likely to be overcome and could be read as giving up  the idea of a clean and tidy 
epistemology. However, what is important is that this awareness at no point affects the 
alleged metaphysical order and tidiness; as mentioned a few lines above, the epistemic 
uncertainty/undecidability does not yield to a similarly sloppy metaphysics.
 Thus, both perdurance and endurance appear to say  sensible and adequate things 
but which one should we go for? They both seem to provide good reasons why 
persistence should be read with one’s filter or the other. But how good are their reasons? 
Surely, there would not be an easy to answer to this question. Assessing the goodness of 
a theory’s reasons is just a small part of the task. Reasons could be good for different 
reasons (it sounds like a pun but if we replace the second ‘reasons’ with 
‘considerations’ it then sounds less of a pun), and for different purposes: practical, 
explanatory, useful, etc. So perhaps, what we should try  to tease out are, say, the small 
prints that come with a theory, in this case theories of persistence. Theories have 
implications thus an indirect and complementary way to evaluate a theory is to make as 
plain as day all these small prints, so that the strength and likelihood of a theory  could 
be motivated by the more or less strength and likelihood of its commitments.
 Admittedly, the question about on what grounds a theory’s commitments should 
be judged is a contentious one, potentially  one that could easily  take up a research 
project by  itself.125 For this and similar reasons, I am forced to leave it like that. What I 
shall attempt to do is to make clear, at any stage, what my intuitions and considerations 
are and thus why I end up claiming what I do.
 In the next chapter, I shall start the review of what I think is the most crucial 
element of distinction between perdurance and endurance’s approach to persistence (in 
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125  See for example the debate about Ockham’s Razor and parsimony (for the record, it is debateable 
whether they are about the same thing or not).  Theoretical economy is supposed to be a crucial 
requirement when it comes to weighing competing theories but as we saw over the last few decades 
parsimony seems to come in many ways, for instance qualitative vs. quantitative; therefore it is still quite 
a hot topic in philosophy. I acknowledge the need to look into this since the outcome of the debate is left 
wanting but unfortunately for convenience’s sake I will not be able to follow up on this.  See for example: 
Lewis, D. (1986). On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Basil Blackwell,  115-27; (1973). Counterfactuals. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 87.
the light of Lowe & McCalls’ definition of endurance), namely the concept of temporal 
parts. As I shall point out in the following, there is a sense in which temporal parts seem 
to be what discriminates between the two theories of persistence: pick a material object, 
it persists by perduring if it  exists at more than one time by having different temporal 
parts for the different times it exists, or it  persists by  enduring if it  exists at more than 
one time without having temporal parts for each time it exists. If this is plausible, then 
temporal parts carry out much philosophical work which I think ought to be untangled.
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1.3 Temporal Parts
 What seems to follow from how perdurance and endurance are traditionally 
defined is that the opposition rests, crucially, upon the notion of temporal part: 
perdurance claims that perduring things exist at more than one time by having different 
temporal parts for each time they exist, whereas endurance hits back saying that 
enduring things exist at more than one time without having temporal parts.126  In its 
stage theoretic variety, perdurance claims that persisting things exist at more than one 
time in virtue of having instantaneous temporal counterparts at different times, but 
whether it amounts to a denial of persistence (or diachronic identity) rather than an 
affirmation of it is controversial.127
 What seems to be obvious is that there is a good deal of theoretical pressure, as 
it were, put on this notion, and an equal amount of responsibility for perdurance 
adequately to account for it. Or so it  should be I think. It  looks like a case in which the 
burden of proof, if any, should be on perdurance rather than on endurance, despite the 
fact that endurance denies the notion of temporal parts, given that the burden of proof is 
generally  on the denier. Perhaps, this is just a case in which the burden of proof is on 
who says more, and perdurance seems to say a lot more. It may also be added that 
seemingly perdurance claims things which are not readily apparent in everyday talk, so 
the burden of proof may be on it insofar as it proposes a change from our common 
outlook. However, as I shall show later in the chapter, it may  actually be that the most 
basic intuition in the background of perdurance is all but against our common outlook. 
 Be it as it may, if this line of thought is plausible, it is fair to say that perdurance 
ought to explain in the first place what temporal parts are about and why they are so 
crucial, and what has been done so far in this direction seems to be far from exhaustive 
or conclusive. Therefore, in this chapter, I shall pursue the investigation of what 
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126  Lewis, D.K. (1986). On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Basil Blackwell,  202. Lowe, E.J. & McCall, 
S.  (2009). “The Definition of Endurance”. Analysis 69: 278-9. As I mentioned earlier in the thesis, I shall 
consider Lowe & McCall’s as the most insightful and satisfactory definition of endurance; therefore, I 
shall leave Lewis’ and others characterisation of endurance in terms of ‘wholly present’. See footnote 
103.
127  Sider seems to be happy to bite the bullet, and Varzi too. See also footnote 105 on the suggestion of 
disentangling persistence from diachronic identity in the light of the stage theory.
temporal parts are128 for the following reason: temporal parts (whether instantaneous or 
not) are a fascinating as well as a fundamental feature of perdurance, thus a proper 
account and understanding of them is compulsory.129 If not, I believe this would then be 
a case similar to constructing a magnificent building on weak/cheap foundations, it 
looks good but it may fall down at any time after all.
 Conversely, I shall not pursue an investigation of the very  many objections 
raised against the concept of temporal parts. The reason is the following: at no point 
shall the aim be to line up, for taxonomy’s sake as it  were, all the various and eventual 
flaws in the notion which most of the time come from those who would not buy into 
temporal parts anyway. The stress instead will be on whether and how, which 
admittedly sounds quite unusual, temporal parts could stand scrutiny  from the point of 
view of perdurance itself, and four-dimensionalism generally. This sort of theoretical 
sincerity and integrity is what I shall be looking for. Arguably though, at the end of the 
inquiry  there seems to be a sense in which temporal parts do not seem to be able to meet 
such requirements unless some features of perdurance are dismissed. I shall show why 
and how I believe so in the following of this chapter.
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128 This statement will need some qualification as I shall do at the outset of the next section. I shall not be 
after what temporal parts are in the sense of a definition (I shall assume Olson’s conclusion that Sider’s 
temporal definition of temporal parts is not good enough), rather I shall focus on those intuitions which 
are in the background of the notion which plausibly helped and moved temporal parts theorists to define 
temporal parts as they did. 
129  Apparently, temporal parts are not mandatory for a four dimensional view of reality, as argued in 
chapter 1.0. We can get away without them by positing distributional properties. See Parsons, J. (2000). 
“Must a four-dimensionalist believe in temporal parts?”.  The Monist 83: 399-418; and (2004). 
“Distributional properties”. In F. Jackson and G. Priest (eds.) Lewisian Themes, Oxford University Press, 
173-180.
1.3.1 Temporal Parts Exposed130
 The question about the nature of temporal parts has been present in the literature 
for quite a while, more often than not from the perspective of the critics to show it 
wanting altogether with perdurance as the doctrine which takes the notion so crucially. 
As I made clear early on, I have sympathy  for perdurance, and have looked forward to 
buying into temporal parts, but  arguably, flicking through the literature, they remain a 
bit obscure. The dispute between enthusiasts and opponents turned out as barren as it 
gets. Nonetheless, I find temporal parts quite appealing and perhaps this is one of the 
reasons which has driven me into this investigation in the first place.
 As briefly  mentioned above, the originality  of this section concerning the nature 
of temporal parts lies in the approach rather than in the outcome: we are all well aware 
that however temporal parts are defined, tentatively or not, in mereological131  or 
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130  The literature is abundant: objections are raised for instance by Thomson, J.J. (1965). “Time, Space, 
and Objects”. Mind 74: 1-27; Meiland, J.W. (1966). “Temporal Parts and Spatio-Temporal Analogies”. 
American Philosophical Quarterly 3: 64-70; Mellor,  H. (1981). Real Time. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 133; Van Inwagen, P.  (1981).  “The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts”. Pacific 
Philosophical Quarterly 62: 123-37; Hacker, P.M. (1982). “Events and Objects in Space and Time”. Mind 
92: 1-19; Thomson,  J.J. (1983).  “Parthood and Identity Across Time”.  The Journal of Philosophy 80: 
201-20; Butterfield,  J. (1984).  “Spatial and Temporal Parts”. The Philosophical Quarterly 35: 32-44; Le 
Poidevin,  R. (1991). Change, Cause and Contradiction. New York: St. Martin’s Press, Ch. 4; Lowe, E.J. 
(1998). The Possibility of Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 98-102; Rea, M.C. (1998). 
“Temporal Parts Unmotivated” The Philosophical Review 107: 225-60; Merricks, T.  (1999a). 
“Persistence, Parts,  and Presentism”. Noûs 33: 421-38; Loux, M.J. (1998). Metaphysics: A Contemporary 
Introduction.  London: Routledge, ch. 6; van Inwagen,  P.  (2000). “Temporal Parts and Identity Across 
Time”. The Monist 83: 437-59; Haslanger, S. (2003). “Persistence Through Time”. In Michael J. Loux & 
Dean Zimmermann (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
315-54; Olson, E.T. (2006). “Temporal Parts and Timeless Parthood”. Noûs 40: 738-52. In favor of 
temporal parts see are Quine, W.V.O. (1953).  From a Logical Point of View. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
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spatial132  terms, so on and so forth, the chances for the definition to succeed - to be 
somehow exhaustive in giving necessary as well as sufficient conditions as definitions 
should do - is uncertain. The concept of temporal parts is theoretical and considerations 
in favour or against, quibbles and the likes are easy to spot or make up as the literature 
clearly  shows. Perhaps, temporal parts just come down to an instance of David Lewis’ 
famous pronouncement according to which “any philosopher who does not understand 
something will take care not to understand anything else whereby it might be 
explained.”133
 In any  case, the long-standing debate among supporters and sceptics has 
seemingly reached a stalemate after, say, the Sider-Olson exchange to the conclusion 
that the doctrine of temporal parts failed to address the notion of temporal parts from an 
angle which could be intelligible and understandable by the detractors. According to 
perdurance parthood is essentially timeless (or atemporal) whereas for the opponents, 
generally  endurance theorists, parthood is essentially temporal.134 In short, for the latter, 
temporal parts are temporal, for the former timeless.135  If Olson is right, one cannot 
frame the concept in a fashion on which both sides could agree. Therefore, when it 
comes to the philosophy of temporal parts, the outcome is uncertain: it might not be as 
successful as it was thought it could be. If this is really the case then it might be the case 
that there is a break in the communication between the party of the supporters of 
temporal parts and those who deny them; a failure of communication which does settle 
nothing apart from the fact that (i) one party  does not understand what the other is 
talking about; or (ii) they are talking past each other - worst case scenario. Arguably, for 
the purposes of my argument, I shall assume Olson’s conclusion for it sounds quite 
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132  Thomson, J.J. (1983). “Parthood and Identity Across Time”. The Journal of Philosophy 80: 207-20. 
Heller,  M. (1984). “Temporal Parts of Four Dimensional Objects”. Philosophical Studies 46: 145-7. 
McGrath, M. (2007). “Temporal Parts”. Philosophy Compass 2: 730-48.
133 Lewis, D.K. (1986). On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 203.
134 “When the perdurantist claims that objects have temporal parts, the endurantist might wonder what he 
means.  The perdurantist generally appeals to timeless parthood - simply being a part of something 
simpliciter [...] x is a temporal part of y iff, roughly, there is a time t such that: (1) x and y exist at t; (2) x 
exists at and only at t; (3) x is a part of y; and (4) everything that overlaps x overlaps y. The endurantist 
[...] might protest that at least when speaking of material objects she doesn’t understand what it is to 
simply be a part of something. She might say she understands only temporally qualified parthood, 
parthood at a time.” McGrath, M. (2007). “Temporal Parts”. Philosophy Compass 2: 740.
135 See Sider, T. (2001). Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 59; Miller, K. (2005).  “The Metaphysical Equivalence of Three and Four 
Dimensionalism”. Erkenntnis 62: 91-117; McGrath,  M. (2007). “Temporal Parts”. Philosophy Compass 
2: 730-48.
plausible and, more to the point, in the light of the fact that philosophers in both parties 
consider the atemporality of parthood by perdurance a point taken.136 We would then be, 
I guess, better off looking elsewhere.137
 My contention is that perhaps we could look into what fosters the idea of 
temporal parts, something along the lines of a set of intuitions and/or common sense 
considerations which might lie at the rock bottom of the notion. As pointed out in the 
Introduction, what I mean by ‘intuition’ cannot be more distant from the philosophically 
uneducated set of platitudes which allegedly  seem to lead out our lives on a everyday 
basis; therefore anything resembling Lewis’ trivialities and platitudes will be taken off 
the table right now. ‘Intuitions’ as seeing something to be the case, an awareness and 
appreciation which could be potentially further enlivened via auxiliary explanation 
whether theoretical or practical.
 Perhaps the last statement needs to be qualified further: temporal parts are a 
theoretical entity, an artful term which presumably conveys a meaning. Thus, perhaps 
the investigation of the set of considerations upon which philosophers have drawn to 
include temporal parts as elements of the furniture of reality might be somehow 
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136  Olson, E. (2006). “Temporal Parts and Timeless Parthood”.  Noûs 40: 738-52. In Four-
Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time,  Sider exposes the apparatus of notions required 
before coming to a definition of temporal parts (temporal and atemporal parthood plus the notion of 
existence at a time which is distinct from quantification): “The temporal part of x at time t is sometimes 
defined as the part of x that exists only at t and has the same spatial location as x, but I distrust the appeal 
to spatial location. The idea is to insure that the temporal part of x is a ‘big enough’  part of x, but the 
definition fails for an object without spatial location, and for an object sharing spatial location with one of 
its proper parts (for example a ‘trope’ for its shape). I therefore prefer a purely mereological definition: x 
is an instantaneous temporal part of y at instant t =df (1) x exists at, but only at, t; (2) x is part of y at t; 
and (3) x overlaps at t everything that is part of y at t. [...] ‘Temporal part’ can also be defined using the 
atemporal part-whole relation of the Calculus of Individuals: x is an instantaneous temporal part of y at 
instant t =df (1) x is a part of y; (2) x exists at, but only at, t; and (3) x overlaps every part of y that exists at 
t. This definition is more perspicuous for a four-dimensionalist since it is stated using atemporal 
parthood,  but as noted it is sometimes better to have a definition that the three-dimensionalist can accept 
as intelligible.” Pace Sider, Olson concludes that: “I doubt whether any other attempt to define ‘temporal 
part’  in terms of temporally qualified parthood will do any better than Sider’s. You need to understand 
parthood timelessly in order to understand the concept of a temporal part. To put it paradoxically, 
temporal parts are timeless parts. Sider’s goal is admirable - to explain what temporal parts are to those 
who take parthood to be irreducibly time-relative - can never be attained.” For the purposes of the thesis I 
shall not dispute Olson’s conclusion, I shall assume he is right since what I shall attempt to do is to gather 
agreement between perdurance and endurance not on how temporal parts are philosophically defined, 
rather on what intuitions and common sense considerations, if any, the concept of temporal parts rests 
upon.
137  My attitude on this issue might sound dismissive but actually is not. I would like to stress that the 
attempt to define temporal parts in a fashion which could be grasped by those who do not see what they 
are about, whatever the reason, has not been successful so far.  This recognition does not imply that any 
temporal definition whatsoever will ever fail, which is by the way a slightly different issue from the, say, 
contingent failure of communicating the notion in temporal terms. The former is perhaps Olson’s 
conclusion but I am not after the assessment of the implications more or less concealed in Olson’s 
argument.  If it is the latter, then the possibility is open for somebody to come out with a better story 
somehow sometime.
enlightening or simply  a new and original way to go about and to look at a long-
standing debate whose outcome seems to be unsettling as well as to leave the reader 
wanting (or at least this is the feeling I had myself).
 Further to the claim that temporal parts are theoretical entities138 it might well be 
added that they so are in a way  that does not need any particular recourse to scientific 
evidence in order to be posited; in fact, if we look at the way they are generally  cashed 
out in the literature, as I shall shortly do, it is obvious that we do not need to appeal to 
any sort of subtle scientific remark or evidence to figure that out. For instance, as the 
narrative goes, material things appear to have parts in space, one is here another one is 
there: looking at my road bike sitting by my desk, the rear wheel is right here whilst the 
front one is further away. Similarly, an attentive outlook suggests that things might 
behave in time in a similar way: for instance, the bike Marco Pantani won the Tour de 
France in 1998 on was, at that time, a state-of-the-art product of bike engineering 
whereas now it sits demure in a museum. Things have a history, if so a part of that  bike 
was in 1998 in France whilst  the 2014 one is in Cesenatico. Most importantly, things 
have histories in time so to speak.139
 There seems little appeal to scientific or empirical experience in the argument 
above. Temporal parts are such an instance of a theoretical posit which is cashed out 
mostly  without recurring to any superior sort of evidence; it is the outcome of what I 
clearly  ‘see’ to be the case.140  If this sounds plausible then it  might be that the 
expectation for temporal parts to be validated by the best sciences available is a wishful 
thinking at best or a category mistake at worst; and the fact that the sciences seem 
somehow to go in that direction (they  seem to be talking in terms of events which are a 
paradigmatic sample of things with temporal parts) is again an indication or a promise, 
if at all, that certain philosophy and certain sciences happen to be on the same page but 
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138  By ‘theoretical’ I mean ‘not empirical’. And the reference to ‘scientific’  evidence means 
‘experimental/empirical’. Given temporal parts’ status that sort of evidence would be incongruous.
139 And people too: my infancy, teenage, etc. are all parts of me; not in space but in time.
140  It might be argued that Pantani’s bike is not Pantani’s bike history.  It might well be so. However,  I 
confess that I am not sure how to address this remark apart from asking the objector to show me in what 
they differ.
nothing more than that. To conclude, no empirical undertaking could establish whether 
there are temporal parts and what they are.141
 Moving closer towards the focus of this section, I believe that a careful 
investigation into how temporal parts are usually introduced and presented in the 
literature could turn out to be beneficial for the clarification and understanding of where 
the notion comes from; and in addition to see if it is possible to gather some agreement 
by the opponents bypassing in one go the not wishy-washy problem of the disagreement 
upon the philosophical regimentation of the notion. 
 First thing first, it is instructive to notice that generally  how temporal parts are 
introduced and explained is via examples which draw upon some sort  of intuitions about 
parthood that our thinking as well as language seem to be endowed with; intuitions 
about parts of things in space and in time plus some other common sense 
considerations. Let us now see how.
 To recapitulate, a very  brief survey on how temporal parts are generally 
introduced and presented in the literature.
 The first  locus is Quine. In Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis, perhaps one of 
the most celebrated examples, Quine has it that:
“The truth is that you can bathe in the same river twice, but not  in the same river 
stage. You can bathe in two river stages which are stages of the same river, and this 
is what constitutes bathing in the same river twice. A river is a process through 
time, and the river stages are its momentary parts. [my italic] Identification of the 
river bathed in once with the river bathed in again is just what determines our 
subject matter to be a river process as opposed to a rive stage. [...] We begin [...] 
with momentary things and their interrelations. One of these momentary things, 
called a, is a momentary stage of the river Caÿster, in Lydia, around 400 B.C. [my 
italic]”142
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141  See Sider, T. (2008). “Temporal Parts”. In T. Sider, J. Hawthorne & D. Zimmerman, Contemporary 
Debates in Metaphysics. Blackwell: 241-62. Whether no empirical undertaking could ever establish the 
existence and nature of temporal parts is an interesting question. Sider seems to leave the possibility open. 
I do not have myself a cristal ball so at best what I could offer is the following remark: if the questions 
upon the existence and the nature of temporal parts are genuine metaphysical questions then any scientific 
answer, whether from the best or the worst sciences available,  would not count as a good answer to that 
question. See also Mark Johnston’s remark: “Temporal part theory is not meant to poach on empirical 
preserves.” in Johnston, M. (1987). “Is There a Problem About Persistence?”.  Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 61: 107-35.
142  Quine, W.V.O. (1953). From a Logical Point of View. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
65-6. See also Quine, W.V.O. (1960). Word and Object.  Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, §24,  36. In the 
passage quoted, Quine sketches the notion of spatiotemporal stage as well as how stages could be 
different stages of the same entity, namely what Quine calls ‘their interrelations’.
As celebrated as the one above, in the Appendix B to Survival and Identity, a few years 
down the line, Lewis claimed that:
“Some would protest that  they do not know what I mean by “more or less 
momentary person-stages, or time-slices of continuant  persons, or persons-at-
times”. Others do know what  I mean, but  don’t believe there are any such things 
[...] A person-stage is a physical object, [my italics] just as a person is. [...] It does 
many of the same things that  a person does: it talks and walks and thinks, it  has 
beliefs and desires, it  has a size and shape and location. It even has a temporal 
duration. But only a brief one, for it does not last long. [my italics] [...] It begins to 
exist  abruptly, and it  abruptly ceases to exist  soon after. Hence a stage cannot  do 
everything that  a person can do, for it cannot  do those things that  a person does 
over a longish interval.”143
As van Inwagen put it, ‘if one cannot understand a philosophical question, [what 
temporal parts are] one’s best course is to look at some alleged answers to it; sometimes 
these answers enable one to see what question it is that they are offered as answers to 
it.’144 Let us then see how Lewis argues for the existence of temporal parts:145
First: it is possible that a person-stage might  exist. Suppose it to appear out  of thin 
air, then vanish again. Never mind whether it is a stage of any person (though in 
fact I think it is). My point is that it is the right sort of thing.
Second: it  is possible that  two person-stages might exist in succession, one right 
after the other but without  overlap. Further, the qualities and location of the second 
at  its appearance might exactly match those of the first at its disappearance. Here I 
rely on a patchwork principle for possibility: if it  is possible that X happen 
intrinsically in a spatiotemporal region, and if it  is likewise possible that Y happen 
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143 Lewis, D.K. (1983). “In Defense of Stages”, Appendix B to “Survival and Identity”. In Philosophical 
Papers I.  New York: Oxford University Press,  76. Although, as I pointed out in the Introduction, for 
convenience’s sake I shall be concerned only with ordinary material objects and not persons; still I think 
Lewis’ passage would be inescapable for the purposes to address the question of the nature of temporal 
parts. After all,  Lewis’ talk in terms of persons could be easily rephrased in terms of ordinary material 
objects, for example a table-stage is “a physical object, just as a table is. [...] It does many of the same 
things that a table does: [...] it has a size and shape and location. It even has a temporal duration. But only 
a brief one, for it does not last long.”
144 van Inwagen, P. (2000). “Temporal Parts and Identity Across Time”. The Monist 83, 437-59.
145  What Lewis claims in the following is decisively affected by Lewis’ peculiar stand on modality and 
other things. Lewis was a modal realist therefore when he claims that ‘it is possible that a person-stage 
might exist’, what he really means must be read in the light of famous pronouncement that “absolutely 
every way that a world could possibly be is a way that some world is.” Lewis, D.K. (1986). On the 
Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 2. In addition, it is also affected by his humean 
supervenience, or “the thesis that the whole truth about a world like ours supervenes on the 
spatiotemporal distribution of local qualities.” Lewis, D.K. (1986).  On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, ix-xvi. See also Lewis,  D.K. (1994). “Humean Supervenience Debugged”. Mind 103: 
473-90.
in a region, then also it  is possible that  both X and Y happen in two distinct but 
adjacent  regions. There are no necessary incompatibilities between distinct 
existences. Anything can follow anything.
[...]
Sixth: then our own world is a world of stages. In particular, person-stages exist.
Seventh: but persons exist too, and persons (in most cases) are not person-stages.146 
They last  too long. Yet persons and person-stages, like tables and table-legs, do not 
occupy spatiotemporal regions twice over. That can only be because they are not 
distinct. They are part-identical; in other words, the person-stages are parts of the 
persons. [my italic]”147
It is contentious if the passages above count as an adequate account of temporal parts, 
what they  are or what content the concept is supposed to convey; I do not think myself 
they  do a great deal of elucidation but, at the same time, it does not seem to make any 
further harm. More to the point, I had to start  from somewhere and Quine and Lewis 
generally qualify as the basics.
 Any case, what seems to emerge quite clearly  is the fact that  (i) there are good 
reasons to believe there are such momentary  things (Lewis), and that (ii) they also seem 
to do some decisive philosophical work (Quine). I shall then take (i) and (ii) seriously, 
and shape the remainder of this first part of the thesis accordingly. At first, as I pointed 
out above, given the failure of defining what temporal parts are from a strict 
philosophical perspective, I shall look at the reasons, if any, lurking in the background 
which might turn out beneficial to account for the existence of temporal parts: in other 
words what  entitles perdurance to believe that temporal parts exist; and secondly, I shall 
look into what temporal parts are supposed to do: in other words what philosophical 
work they  carry  out, which again will be a way to answer, indirectly, the question about 
their existence as well as nature.
 So much so, I believe I still owe the reader an answer to the question (which I 
am sure has been tacitly  hovering around since I first exposed my strategy in this 
78
146 It is interesting to contrast this stamement with Sider’s incipit of All the World’s a Stage: “not only do I 
accept person stages; I claim that we are stages.” Sider, T. (1996). “All the World’s a Stage”. Australasian 
Journal of Philosophy 74: 433-53.
147 Lewis, D.K. (1983). “In Defense of Stages”, Appendix B to “Survival and Identity”. In Philosophical 
Papers I. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 76-7. For the record, Lewis’  explanation of what 
temporal parts are supposed to be is quite lengthy and uninstructive at times therefore in the quotation 
above I shall highlight only those points which I believe are relevant for the purposes of my argument.
chapter): why should I bother looking at what lies in the background if the sheer attempt 
of defining temporal parts turned out pointless? There could be two answers to this 
question: the first  one (i) draws upon the fact that  to say that the attempt of defining 
temporal parts in a way that they could be grasped by their opponents was idle does not 
amount to saying that  any definition of temporal parts is so: definitions in terms of 
atemporal parthood are quite appropriate although difficult to communicate.148 
Secondly, (ii) even though a definition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions 
does not succeed (or it partially does), it does not amount straight away to say that we 
do not have a clue of what’s going on in that situation: a philosophical definition is 
generally  a regimentation of a set of intuitions, common sense considerations and 
beliefs which need to be systematised. It seems to me plausible to have strong intuitions 
as well as to be able to make common sense considerations even though I am 
momentarily unable to pin them down and to frame them into a definition. A lack or 
failure of definition does not affect the strength of the intuitions and the reasons which 
seemingly support some common sense considerations, if any, which the definition is 
supposed to regiment.
 In addition, if such bedrock could be ever reached, it  could be then used to 
gather agreement in a way in which it is precluded to any philosophical definition or 
argument: intuitions and common sense considerations speak for themselves, as it were. 
It is undeniable that different people sometimes have different intuitions and draw 
different conclusions appealing to presumably different common sense considerations; I 
am perfectly  happy with that. The aim is not to impose my own intuitions and common 
sense considerations over other people; what I shall try to achieve is to provide clear 
and good reasons why my intuitions and common sense considerations are what  they 
are. If they will be found convincing then I shall consider my job successful.
 So much for Quine, and Lewis. One philosopher who thought of implementing 
the notion of temporal parts with mixed blessing is Ted Sider. In the attempt to arguing 
for the notion of temporal parts he drew upon a parallel between parts of things in space 
and parts of things in time as in the following:
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148 We could easily carry the same pattern over Lewis’ definition of endurance in terms of ‘being wholly 
present’ and note that the outcome would be similar: the attempt to define what it takes for something to 
be ‘wholly present’  remains obscure to a perdurance theorist however it might be explained. For this 
reason, we ought to take these issues with a grain of salt.
“Having a part at a time is familiar. The end of my fingernail is part of me today 
but is not part of me tomorrow if I clip it off; a plank is part of a ship at one time 
but not another.” 149
On a slightly different  note, perhaps less rigorous but definitely  more instructive for our 
purposes, temporal parts are accounted for as follows:
“A temporal part  of an object  at  a time is a temporal cross-section of that  object; it 
is that-object-at-that-time. Consider the temporal part of the person in 2000. [...] 
This object is the exact same spatial size as the person in 2000. But the temporal 
part is not the same temporal size as the person; the temporal part exists only in 
2000 whereas the person exists at  later times as well. The person herself is the sum 
total of all her temporal parts [...] Time is just one of the dimensions of space-time, 
alongside the three spatial dimensions, just as it appears to be in the space-time 
diagrams. Time does not flow; time is like space.150
Although time is not completely like space, time and space are analogous at least  in 
three respects: reality 151, parts, and in terms of here and now152:
“[In terms of parts.] Material objects take up space by having different parts. My 
body occupies a certain region of space. Part of this region is occupied by my head, 
another by my torso; other parts of the region are occupied by my arms and legs. 
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149  Sider, T. (2001). Four-Dimensionalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 55-6.  Sider goes on adding 
that: “Familiar as this notion is, it is not the notion of parthood usually discussed by four-dimensionalists. 
[They] tend to speak of the parts of an object simpliciter, rather than the parts it has at this time or that. 
This is actually a special case of a more general fact: four-dimensionalists tend to employ an atemporal 
notion of exemplification of properties and relations. Thus,  a four-dimensionalist will say that my current 
temporal part is,  atemporally, sitting, 69 inches tall, and wearing a (temporal part of a) hat. Likewise, the 
four-dimensionalist will say that my current temporal part is, atemporally, part of the larger spacetime 
worm that is me. This is not to say that four-dimensionalists reject change. Intrinsic change is difference 
between successive temporal parts. I change from sitting to standing by having a temporal part that sits 
and a later one that stands. Change in relations is analogous: I sit in a chair at one time but not another 
because my earlier temporal part sits (simpliciter, atemporally) in a temporal part of the chair whereas 
one of my later temporal parts fails to sit in the corresponding later temporal part of the chair. 
Mereological change is a special case of relational change: my fingernail end ceases to be a part of me 
because its later temporal parts are not part of my later temporal parts.
150 Conee, E. & Sider, T. (2005). Riddles of Existence. New York: Oxford University Press, 49. Which by 
the way echoes Lewis’ passage above.
151 Ibid.  50. “  Objects far away in space [...] are obviously just as real as things here on Earth. We may not 
know as much about the far-away objects as we know about things around here, but that doesn’t make 
[them] any less real.  Likewise, objects far away in time are just as real as objects that exist now. [...] 
Distant objects, whether temporally or spatially distant, all exist somewhere in space-time.”
152  Ibid.  51.  “If I say on the phone ‘here it is raining’ to a friend in California, and she replies ‘here is 
sunny’, which one one of us is right? Where is the real here, California or New Jersey? [...] There is no 
‘real here’. The word ‘here’ just refers to whatever place the person saying it happens to be. [...] The 
space-time theory says an analogous thing about time: just as there is no objective here,  so there is no 
objective now. If I say ‘It is now 2005’, and Guy Fawkes said ‘It is now 1606’, each statement is correct. 
There is no single, real, objective ‘now’. The word ‘now’ refers to the time at which the speaker happens 
to be located.”
These parts may be called my spatial parts, since they are really spatially smaller 
than I am. The corresponding fact about  time is that an object lasts over a stretch of 
time by having different parts located at  the different  times within that stretch. 
These parts are the temporal parts mentioned above. These temporal parts are just 
as real objects as my spatial parts: my head, arms, and legs.”153
It seems that, slowly  but steadily, it is all coming together. To strengthen my overall 
point I think that a couple more samples could be beneficial. The first two are once 
again by Lewis and Sider, the final one by Katherine Hawley.
 To illustrate the idea that something persists by  perduring, Lewis draws upon a 
very ordinary case:
“Perdurance [the doctrine of temporal parts] corresponds to the way a road persists 
through space; part  of it  is here and part of it is there, and no part  is wholly present 
at two different places.”154
Along the same lines Sider claims that:
“Temporal parts theory is the claim that time is like space in one particular respect, 
namely, with respect  to parts. First think about  parts in space. A spatially extended 
object  such as a person has spatial parts: her head, arms, etc. Likewise, according 
to temporal parts theory, a temporally extended object  has temporal parts. 
Following the analogy, since spatial parts are smaller than the whole object  in 
spatial dimensions, temporal parts are smaller than the whole object  in the temporal 
dimension. They are shorter-lived.”155
Finally Katherine Hawley, in the entry ‘Temporal Parts’ of the Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy offers a very instructive exposition of what temporal parts are supposed to 
be:
“You’re performing an amazing trick right now: you’re in two places at once. How 
do you manage to be down there, near the floor, and yet  also be a meter or two up 
in the air? Well, it’s not so very amazing: your feet are down there on the floor, and 
your head is up in the air. Having spatial parts enables you to be in several 
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153  Ibid. 51. It must be noted that Sider in the piece titled “Temporal Parts” adds that space and time are 
similar also under another respect, namely in terms of distant objects (which corresponds to the first 
respect mentioned above. See footnote 157) . It is an important remark which now might sound a bit off 
the peg but in Part II on Time I will try to explain why I think it is significant. Sider, T.  (2008). “Temporal 
Parts”. In T. Sider, J.  Hawthorne & D. Zimmerman, Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics.  Blackwell: 
241-62.
154 Lewis, D.K. (1986). On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 202.
155  Sider, T. (2008). “Temporal Parts”. In T. Sider, J. Hawthorne & D. Zimmerman, Contemporary 
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different places, and to have different properties in different places: [my italic] 
you’re cold down there on the tiled floor, and also warm up there by the heater, 
because your feet are cold and your head is warm. Moreover, having parts could let 
you be in the same place as someone else: if you shared a hand with a conjoined 
(‘Siamese’) twin, then you could both wear the same glove without jostling for 
space.
None of this is special to people: inanimate objects also extend through space by 
having spatial parts. They have different  properties in different places, and 
sometimes they overlap by sharing their parts. These simple facts about  spatial 
parts explain basic features about the way things and people occupy space.
Things and people take up time as well as taking up space: you existed yesterday, 
and, unless reading this article is a real strain, you will exist tomorrow too. Just as 
you can have different properties at different places (hot up here, cold down there), 
you can have different properties at different times [my italic] (yesterday you 
hadn’t heard of temporal parts, by tomorrow you’ll know plenty about them).
Some philosophers believe that you take up time by having different temporal parts 
at  different times. Your spatial parts are things like your head, your feet  and your 
nose; your temporal parts are things like you-yesterday, you-today and you-
tomorrow. If you have different temporal parts, this would explain how you can 
exist at different times, and it would also explain how you can have different 
properties at different times [my italic] (you-yesterday hasn’t  heard of temporal 
parts, you-tomorrow is an expert). According to these philosophers, then, persisting 
through time is pretty much like extending through space: it’s all a matter of 
parts.”156
Perhaps, it  is now time to take stock. Surely, there seems to be a leitmotif running 
through the few passages quoted above: a recurring feature they all happen to urge 
upon. It looks as though we have some sort of strong intuitions when it comes to things 
and their parts. It is quite uncontentious, part  and parcel with common sense, to think 
that material objects like tables and chairs (uncontentious examples of composite 
objects) take up space by means of having different spatial parts in different regions of 
space: one table’s leg is here whilst another is there, with ‘here’ and ‘there’ as a loose 
way to mark off different places or regions of space as in philosophical jargon. In 
addition, things seem to take up time in quite a similar way, they  have different 
temporal parts at different times: for instance, that table has a history; it has been sitting 
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156  Hawley, K. (2010). “Temporal Parts”. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. I agree with the 
gist of Hawley’s passage, I am inclined to disagree when she argues for a parallel between properties and 
parts of things.
in the living room for nearly four years and now it lies in the skip  across the road. It is 
surely a petty  remark which does not take a great deal of effort to figure it  out. As 
flimsy  as it  gets, the remark is quite decisive though. Traditionally, perdurance has been 
charged of being counter-intuitive to begin with, all that weird business about parts of 
things in time, all the way down to its implications and consequences. (For truth’s sake, 
most of the objections were directed to the various odd features and consequences of a 
world in which perdurance was true, rather than towards what I believe is very  a solid 
core of intuitions, if any, which moved perdurance towards temporal parts in the first 
place).
 Be this as it  may, at a careful analysis, there seems to me a perfectly reasonable 
sense in which temporal parts are in line with what intuitions and common sense 
considerations would seem to indicate: the bedrock which bolsters the concept of 
temporal parts consists of intuitions and common sense considerations which regards 
things having parts and being parts of. This appreciation and awareness occurs both in 
language and thought: our language is endowed with a part-whole apparatus which, 
although naively, affords us to understand what’s going on when it comes to things 
having parts or being parts of something else either in space or in time. In addition, our 
understanding and thinking of parts is quite straightforward, at least on this sincere 
level: it is not rocket science to appreciate that a table has one leg as a part and that one 
leg is part of that table; and that the two legs of a table in virtue of being two different 
things occupy two distinct portions of space, one here the other one there.157
 To conclude, if the argument above stands a chance, then there is a sense in 
which the traditional arguments against perdurance’s being preposterous water down: 
perdurance in its essence is no more no less counter-intuitive than any other theory of 
persistence which claims to have an edge because it allegedly complies better with 
intuitions and common sense (to wit endurance). The fact that  most of the objections 
raised over the years targeted the consequences rather than the premises could have 
happened for two reasons: (i) perhaps the import of a recognition along the lines of the 
argument above has been overlooked by perdurance theorists in the first place; perhaps 
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157 By ‘naively’  and ‘on this sincere level’ I mean to stress that to understand the train of thought sketched 
above (the alleged sense in which the innermost part that gives way to the notion of temporal parts is 
anything but counter-intuitive) there is no need to deploy any philosophical weaponry. For example, to 
raise the objection that it is all but clear what ‘to be a part of’ stands for, or ‘to be a part in space/time’ 
means is untimely. Philosophical tools will be required to set off from there: namely when a 
regimentation of those intuitions and common sense considerations is, for whatever reason, a requisite.
it was simply light-heartedly accepted that the notion of temporal parts happened not to 
square very well with intuitions and did not fully met the standards of common sense 
(for the record, as pointed out in the Introduction, perdurance theorists have always 
been quite prompt in remarking how easily intuitions and common sense considerations 
fall through: perdurance qualifies as a revisionary/prescriptive theory of persistence 
after all). Or (ii) that perhaps the emphasis has been given to just  counter those 
objections in virtue of a mainstream methodological approach, namely the need to 
provide piecemeal solutions to philosophical more or less puzzling situations; 
overlooking in turn the requisite of the understanding of that particular puzzling 
situation which comes first, , as repeatedly stressed in the Introduction,.
 Thus, to venture a tentative conclusion, I shall say that apart from the alleged 
success or failure of a philosophical account of temporal parts, when we look at what 
lies at the basis of that philosophical regimentation, we find something clear, 
straightforward and robust: the evidence that objects seem to have parts in space as well 
as in time which is made clear by all the quotations I just gave, in the applicability of 
the notion of part to everyday examples. If so then perdurance can push it further 
stressing that space and time are similar under that respect, to wit in respect to parts. In 
addition to this, space - whatever it may turn out to be158  - seems to qualify 
paradigmatically  as extended, in order for things to take it up and have parts in it. If this 
is the case, and space and time are analogous in respect to parts then it seems quite 
plausible to infer that time qualifies as extended as well in order for things to take it up 
and have parts in it. Space seems also to qualify, again paradigmatically, as an instance 
of a dimension, one along which things extend. If this is the case, then again in virtue of 
the analogy between space and time it would make good sense to claim that time is too. 
Thus, to conclude, the three dimensions of space plus the one dimension of time 
constitute the four dimensions in which reality extends.
 If this train of thought makes sense, it then conveys an innovative way to look at  
these issues which, if adequately supported, could definitely earn my most enthusiastic 
support. But perhaps at this stage it  looks a bit  premature, unless it is clear, and, say, 
beyond any reasonable doubt that space and time are alike in the sense above spelt out: 
namely, as extended as well as instances of a dimension in which things extend. I shall 
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drop the investigation into space and time analogies for now since it will be pursued in 
the second part of the thesis, the one on Time. What I shall go on investigating is instead 
whether that robust core singled out above, from which the notion of temporal parts 
seem to arise, could be legitimately exploited by perdurance for its own good.
 Before moving on, I shall make a quick recapitulation so my contention could be 
even clearer: I pointed at  a bedrock which seems to prop up the notion of temporal parts 
directly, and perdurance as the doctrine of temporal parts indirectly: the fact that we 
have some sort of strong intuitions when it comes to things and their parts. It  is common 
sense consideration to think that material objects take up space by having different 
spatial parts in different regions of space. Likewise, things seem to take up time, by 
having different temporal parts at different times.
 As it stands, the attempt to gather agreement from the opponents of the notion of 
temporal parts upon a definition turned out unsuccessful. Suppose it being the case, the 
question that must be asked is now this: could we ever succeed in gathering any 
agreement whatsoever on the idea of temporal parts from their opponents? I think we 
could, specifically upon that bedrock. But this will not  come for free: we will have to 
set perdurance and temporal parts free from the methodological burden or attitude 
which David Lewis could be seen as a beaming example of. Few lines after the popular 
definitions of persistence, perdurance, and endurance, he boasts that:
“Discussions of endurance versus perdurance tend to be endarkened by people who 
say such things as this: ‘Of course you are wholly present  at  every moment of your 
life, except in case of amputation. For at every moment all your parts are there: 
your legs, your lips, your liver...’ These endarkeners may think themselves 
partisans of endurance, but they are not. They are perforce neutral, because they 
lack the conceptual resources to understand what is at issue. [my italic] Their 
speech betrays - and they may acknowledge it willingly - that  they have no concept 
of temporal part. (or at any rate none that  applies to a person, say, as opposed to a 
process or a stretch of time.) Therefore they are on neither side of a dispute about 
whether or not persisting things are divisible into temporal parts. They understand 
neither the affirmation nor the denial. They are like the people - fictional, I hope, 
who say that  the whole of the long road is in their village, for not one single lane of 
it is missing. Meaning less than others do by ‘part’, since they omit parts cut 
crosswise, they also mean less than others do by ‘whole’. They say the ‘whole’ 
road is in the village; by which they mean that every ‘part’ is; but by that, they only 
mean that  every part  cut  lengthwise is. Divide the road into its least lengthwise 
parts; they cannot even raise the question whether those are in the village wholly or 
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only partly. For, that  is a question about crosswise parts, and the concept of a 
crosswise part  is what they lack. Perhaps ‘crosswise part’ really does sound to them 
like a blatant contradiction. Or perhaps it seems to them that  they understand it, but 
the village philosophers have persuaded them that  really they couldn’t, so their 
impression to the contrary must be an illusion. At any rate, I have the concept  of a 
temporal part; and for some while I shall be addressing only those of you who 
share it.”159
Lewis’ passage is surely pregnant, it  clearly  says what  is and what is not allowed into 
the dispute between perdurance and endurance160. By the end, the passage sounds quite 
patronising but this is generally a distinctive feature of those who - for some reasons 
still unclear - know what’s going on behind those same curtains which happen to 
conceal anyone else from truth. Sarcasm aside, Lewis stoutly claims that if people rely 
on our intuitions and common sense considerations when it comes to appreciating what 
is really at issue (whether things have temporal parts or not, I gather) we would end up 
in the wrong place: “They are perforce neutral, because they lack the conceptual 
resources to understand what is at issue. [...] Therefore they are on neither side of a 
dispute about whether or not persisting things are divisible into temporal parts. They 
understand neither the affirmation nor the denial.”161
 Let us now examine the situation more carefully: first things first, Lewis says 
that ‘the endarkeners’ do not possess such conceptual resources: who is Lewis referring 
to? Does he mean the average Jane and Joe? If so, does he really believe that they 
would engage in any philosophical dispute at  all, let alone one on the persistence of 
material objects? If not, are then the endarkeners those philosophers which support 
endurance? Lewis owes us an answer to each of the above questions but he never 
obliges.
 Secondly, whoever the endarkeners are, Lewis claims that they  do not possess 
the adequate theoretical apparatus to understand what is at issue (whether things have 
temporal parts or not, as I understand it). Curiously, if we recall how Lewis himself 
illustrated the idea of something persisting by perduring, that is ‘Perdurance [the 
doctrine of temporal parts] corresponds to the way a road persists through space; part of 
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160 For the record,  at no point does Lewis claim just what should or should not be allowed in the dispute. 
In addition to setting the agenda of the debate on persistence, he also took care of setting up how to go 
about. 
161 Ibid.
it is here and part of it is there, and no part is wholly present at two different  places.’ 
there seems to be a sense in which the latter statement clashes with the former.
 I shall now clarify in what sense: for argument’s sake, let us suppose that Lewis 
is right: the endarkeners lack the theoretical resources to understand what is at issue. 
Although they are not adequately  equipped to understand what is at  issue, either (i) they 
can understand Lewis’ example of the road (part of which is here whilst part of which is 
there) or (ii) they cannot. (i) Suppose they can, how would that example help  an 
endarkener who although understands it yet does not have the adequate apparatus to 
understand what is at issue? A road has a part here and another one there, and no part is 
wholly present at two different places, but then what? What is the point of introducing 
perdurance (as the doctrine of temporal parts) via the analogy with the road if the 
endarkeners by Lewis’ fiat will not be able to close the gap from one to another because 
of a lack of theoretical apparatus? (ii) suppose instead they do not understand the 
example of the road which has a part here and a part there, and no part is wholly present 
at two different places; how beneficial would it be for them to have an explanation in 
terms of a road which has a part here and one there, whereas no part is wholly present at 
two different places? More to the point, let us ask Lewis: what other subtle theoretical 
apparatus do we need to possess to fully grasp the example of the road and what is at 
issue? Perhaps, the answer lies simply in what Lewis says at the end of the passage 
above: “At any rate, I have the concept of a temporal part; and for some while I shall be 
addressing only those of you who share it.”
 Lastly, let  us put Lewis aside and recall how the other supporters of perdurance 
quoted early on introduced the notion of temporal parts. It  goes without saying how 
clearly  they drew upon intuitions and common sense considerations that we have in 
those situations in which ordinary objects are involved. Therefore, it  seems more than 
just plausible to say that intuitions and common sense considerations play a crucial role 
in this respect. But then, as Lewis put it, it seems that intuitions and common sense 
considerations suddenly cease to be so decisive, for instance when it comes to deciding 
how things persists. This being so, then there has to be some confusion: firstly, on the 
role ascribed to intuitions and common sense at this level of explanation; and secondly 
on which methodological attitude to follow in order to engage the notion of temporal 
parts. To begin with, intuitions and common sense considerations are decisively drawn 
upon but then bluntly dismissed since that very  same evidence turns out deceiving as 
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soon as we have to pronounce which theory of persistence to go for. If this is the case 
then it would be legitimate to ask how far intuitions and common sense considerations 
could go in the argument/explanation? Clearly, they cannot go all the way. Why not?
 Perhaps a tentative answer could be the following: perdurance theorists in 
general, and Lewis in particular, have always been cautious about the opportunity to 
concede an edge to their opponents on the topic of intuitions and common sense since 
traditionally  endurance is thought of as having an advantage on the understanding of 
how things persist  in time. Endurance does have an advantage but one which turns out 
utterly unharmful. Let me dig this point out a bit more.
 The question is whether we could save intuitions and common sense 
considerations for the purposes outlined above or if we should give up on them. Sure 
enough, we cannot have both like Lewis pretends: the outcome of his approach looks 
like an example of an ad hoc, somehow shifty methodology which sounds a bit like bad 
philosophy. My judgement sounds harsh but I believe Lewis’ attitude deserves it. The 
thing is that if we follow Lewis we end up with a questionable methodology  which 
sooner or later will affect our philosophy overall. Conversely, if we give up totally on 
intuitions and common sense considerations we lose the chance to start  the dispute 
between perdurance and endurance from a levelled field. A field upon which the 
philosophical debate will then be played. But at  least both views have a solid ground 
where to start from.
 If the idea of giving up on intuitions and common sense does not look 
theoretically tempting for the reasons offered above; and if Lewis’ dealing with 
intuitions and common sense does not too; then the question becomes whether there is a 
way out to Lewis’ attitude. Suppose there isn’t so that we ought to stick to Lewis. In that 
case, the evidence would be that  the philosophical regimentation of the notion of 
temporal parts, the one which was supposed to be understandable by the opponents, has 
failed: for perdurance parthood is atemporal so however we try to dress it up it does not 
work for endurance, according to which parthood is essentially temporal. Therefore, it 
looks like the whole debate would not even start: incomunicability  would set in, and 
likely the whole thing would carry on wearily as it did for quite a while; with the two 
parties yelling at each other arguments, presumably compelling, without really grasping 
what one says to the other.
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 But there is a way out. Indeed it would be to dismiss Lewis’ dodgy attitude and 
methodology and allow perdurance and endurance to dwell on intuitions and common 
sense considerations as much as they want, and to articulate a philosophical debate upon 
that. Lewis’ worry  that endurance could have an edge over perdurance because ‘Of 
course you are wholly present at  every moment of your life, except in case of 
amputation. For at every  moment all your parts are there: your legs, your lips, your 
liver...’162  turns out to be, on one hand Lewis’ own mistake: after all he characterised 
endurance in that way, and then twisted that definition against endurance itself; whereas 
on the other, Lewis’ worry  has no grounds at all: let us concede that endurance has an 
advantage, for some reasons it conveys quite well the initial understanding that we have 
in cases of material objects persisting over time. Is that initial understanding, all it is 
needed when it comes to answer the philosophical question of how material things 
persist over time? Surely it is not. The question is philosophical and qua talis it will 
have to be addressed with philosophical means; isn’t the whole point of philosophy  to 
question where we start from, our assumptions which, more often than not, are made up 
with materials coming from our intuitions and common sense considerations?
 To conclude, I think there is a clear and straightforward sense in which material 
things could have parts in time along the same lines as they have in space. Such 
recognition is gained without any appeal to remarkable speculation, our intuitions and 
common sense considerations seem to nicely  allow for that outcome. If this sounds 
plausible then the idea of temporal parts upon which perdurance as the doctrine of 
temporal parts cashes in is, at least in its bedrock, no more no less counter-intuitive as 
endurance is in assuming that material things persist by  being wholly present  at all 
times they exist (or to persist  without having temporal parts at all times they exist): the 
play field is levelled.
 More importantly, upon this core we can easily gather agreement from our 
opponents, and agree with them about theirs: for perdurance, as mentioned above, the 
fact that it is plausible to take material things as having parts in time along the same 
lines as they do in space; whereas for endurance, the fact  that it is plausible to take 
material things as being present as a whole whenever they exist.
 The next step will be to afford a systematisation of that core of intuitions and 
common sense considerations, building on it a philosophy of how material things persist 
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over time. In this case, it is likely that the initial agreement might well quickly  vanish 
but as long as the whole dispute is fought with philosophically legitimate weapons then 
there should be at no point any trepidation in discovering that actually  one party 
manages to give a more philosophically reliable account than the other. Isn’t the whole 
point of philosophy to question our assumptions with a view to near the truth and 
reaching it eventually?
 What the line of thought outlined in this chapter shows is that the notion of 
temporal parts could be easily cashed out from the evidence that time and space happen 
to be analogous in some respects, in respect to their reality, parts, their giving rise to 
indexical notions, as Sider argues.163 Therefore, it seems to me that the analogy between 
space and time which gives way to the idea of temporal parts must precede the idea 
itself so that the investigation of such analogy should come first in order to assess 
whether there really are temporal parts. Actually, a strand in the contemporary analytic 
philosophy looked into that issue from a more general perspective rather than just in 
respect to parts164; thus I believe it might be helpful to see what they came up with. 
Perhaps their conclusions could shed some light on the thesis that space and time are 
alike which happens to bolster the notion as well as existence of temporal parts. This 
investigation will be afforded in Part II of the thesis which will concern Time.
 For the time being, even though there might not be an unequivocal way  to define 
what temporal parts are; yet there is another sense, perhaps indirect, in which temporal 
parts seem to deserve their place in philosophy: they are said to solve numerous 
philosophical puzzles. One of them (and perhaps the most challenging) is the long-
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standing problem or puzzle of change. I shall now redirect the focus of the thesis on it to 
see how temporal parts are supposed to fit nicely into that picture.
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1.3.2 The Problem of Change
 Why is the remark that things take up  time as they do space so crucial for 
perdurance? One way to look at it could be this: having spatial parts enables a thing to 
be (partly of course) in many  different places at one time, to be (partly) in the same 
place as something else, and finally to have different properties in different  places. For 
instance, take a poker165, it lies across the floor, one end by the fireplace the other on the 
carpet (which means the poker is partly where the fireplace is and partly on the carpet, 
both the fireplace and the carpet being far apart). Also it is hot  at one end (by the 
fireplace) and cold at the other (on the carpet).
 Let us now focus on the last remark: usually the story goes on saying that just as 
something can have different properties at different places, it can likewise have different 
properties at different  times. For example, the poker was hot this morning but it cooled 
down this afternoon. Thus, parthood whether spatial or temporal seems to guarantee the 
discontinuity of intrinsic properties: namely, for a thing to have different, even 
incompatible, intrinsic properties at a time (synchronically) as well as over time 
(diachronically). Which surely is a datum that, taken at face value, can hardly  be denied. 
However, it has also traditionally been one of the most puzzling issues in philosophy.
 In this chapter, I shall first  look into this issue and see if the fact that temporal 
parts are said to be a good solution the so-called problem of change could somehow tell 
in favour of their existence. Secondly, I will see if the most recent varieties of what is 
commonly called the problem of change, i.e. the problem of temporary intrinsics as well 
as the argument from Leibniz’s Law, qualify as a philosophical problem at all. The 
feeling is that once the two situations which are said to generate the problem are 
adequately understood then it  is not  so clear whether there really  is such a problem, or 
rather it  has been somehow artificially  made up starting from unclear assumptions, to 
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the conclusion that there are better, more intuitive ways, of motivating perdurance. Be 
this as it may, I shall substantiate my contention in what follows.
 Tentatively, the previous chapter concluded as follows: there seems to be an 
asymmetry between how temporal parts are described from the perdurance point of 
view, namely atemporally or tenselessly, and how they should be in order to be 
intelligible for the opponents. I (duly  or unduly) assumed Olson’s conclusion as the 
beginning of my argument and tried to see if that no-start could be somehow overcome. 
For example, I then found that  appealing to alternative evidence some sort of agreement 
could be gathered upon what I called the ‘bedrock’ of the notion of temporal parts: a set 
of intuitions and common sense considerations (that is why I called it ‘bedrock’) which 
advocates of temporal parts seemed to rely on in order to present  and explain the notion 
itself. As loose as it gets (the bedrock comes before any philosophical regimentation at 
all), I myself believe it to be clear, robust and persuasive enough, at least according to 
my standard of intuitions and common sense considerations, with the trust that it could 
be so for others as well.166 If this could be the case, there might then be a solid basis 
from where to start from in devising an adequate definition of temporal parts, one which 
desirably should be understandable to those who deny  them.167 Therefore, despite the 
fact that we may contingently lack a philosophically unambiguous definition, still we 
have a solid appreciation of what is going on.
 If we deny  this, as I argued early  on, we are then doomed to a predicament: we 
do not know what temporal parts are supposed to be (Olson’s caveat) - as a perdurance 
enthusiast I am sure I do know but there is no chance to communicate it to my 
opponents in a way  such that  a philosophical debate could be generated - and we cannot 
draw upon intuitions and common sense considerations to gather agreement in order to 
initiate a philosophical debate (Lewis’ proviso).
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existing at different times as the same despite exhibiting different features (sometimes incompatible) as 
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167 I find it hard to think of the possibility of denying something without having a suitable understanding 
and appraisal of what it is about. For instance, even in those situations in which a contradiction emerges 
as obvious,  still the understanding of the fact that there is a contradiction going on seems to me to precede 
the refusal of that situation.
 I tried to steer a middle path between Olson and Lewis (I assumed the 
plausibility of the former and argued for the implausibility of the latter) but for the time 
being I shall put my beliefs aside since it will not be crucial for what will follow: the 
good news is that  whether the definition of temporal parts fails or not, whether we could 
appeal to intuition and common sense considerations to pin them down, it is common 
currency that temporal parts are decisive in taking the sting out of various philosophical 
puzzling situations, at least from the perspective of perdurance.
 Matthew McGrath, in his excellent survey  of temporal parts168, spells out list of 
arguments given for the doctrine of temporal parts which at rock bottom represents the 
philosophical work that temporal parts are supposed to carry out:
1. Arguments from spatial analogy.
2. Arguments from relativistic considerations.
3. Arguments concerning the solution of the puzzles of coincidence.
4. Arguments concerning the explanation of intrinsic change over time.
5. Arguments from considerations of the vagueness of composition.169
For the record, in the thesis I will focus only on two of McGrath’s claimed advantages 
of temporal parts, point 1 and 4, the latter being named by Lewis as the problem of 
temporary intrinsics. My reasons for so focussing are: (i) the analogy between space and 
time seems to play a crucial role, an assumption which the notion of temporal parts 
seems to draw upon, as I argued early on; and (ii) Lewis himself claims that the problem 
of temporary intrinsics is ‘the principal and decisive objection to endurance’ which 
implies that perdurance has a clear advantage over endurance for the latter cannot easily 
account for it on pain of undesirable consequences, as Lewis duly pointed out.
 It is also worth noting that there is more to the problem of temporary intrinsics 
than just what Lewis claimed: for instance, apparently the solutions to the problem of 
temporary intrinsics are not just three as Lewis claims: Johnston, Haslanger, and Lowe 
independently elaborate a fourth solution which is commonly known in the literature as 
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168 McGrath, M. (2007). “Temporal Parts”. Philosophy Compass 2: 730-48.
169 Ibid. 732.
the adverbial view.170  An approach which is best understood in the light of Lowe’s 
distinction between semantic and metaphysical aspects of the problem of change.171
 In any  case, what  matters is that McGrath’s voice is accompanied by a multitude 
of others, perdurance theorists in particular, who have been traditionally sensitive and 
prompt in selling temporal parts as the occasion arose. The bandwagon of those who 
conversely claim that the allegedly puzzling situations above - point 3, 4 and 5 - could 
be explained doing away with temporal parts is just as large. The literature is copious, 
the debate ongoing and fiercely fought.172
 Be it as it may, of McGrath’s five proposed advantages, the problem of 
temporary intrinsics has posed, and continues to pose the most  philosophical questions. 
Thus, I shall begin presenting the problem as in Lewis:
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170  See Johnston, M. (1987). “Is There a Problem About Persistence?”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society, Supplementary Volumes 61: 107-35.  Haslanger, S (1985). Change, Persistence and Explanation. 
(Berkeley PhD Thesis); (1989a). “Persistence, Change and Explanation”, Philosophical Studies 56: 1-28; 
(1989b).  “Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics”. Analysis 49: 119-125. Lowe, E.J.  (1987). “Lewis on 
Perdurance versus Endurance”. Analysis 47: 152-4; (1988). “The Problems of Intrinsic Change: Rejoinder 
to Lewis”. Analysis 48: 72-7. Curiously, the solutions might be more than four; for example Jeffrey 
Brower offers a type of solution available to endurantists,  one which is structurally identical to the 
temporal parts one usually offered by perdurance theorists. See Brower, J.E. (2010). “Aristotelian 
Endurantism: A New Solution to the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics”. Mind 119: 883-905.
171  The Semantic Problem of Change: To specify the logical form of the sentences ascribing temporary 
intrinsic properties to persisting objects in such a way that we do not run into contradiction in describing 
such an object as undergoing a change from possessing one such property to possessing another 
incompatible one.  The Metaphysical Problem of Change: How there can be objects for the description of 
which the semantic problem arises - that is, how there can exist objects such that we need to be able to 
say, without fear of contradicting ourselves, that one and the same object may undergo a change from 
possessing one intrinsic property to possessing another incompatible one. See also Lewis’ reply: (1988). 
“Re-arrangement of Particles: Reply to Lowe”. Analysis. 48: 65-72; (2002). “Tensing the Copula”. Mind 
111: 1-13. In addition,  few years further down the line, Thomas Hofweber distinguished three kinds of 
problems related to change: an Empirical, a Metaphysical,  and a Meta-Problem of Change. See 
Hofweber, T. (2009). “The Meta-Problem of Change”. Noûs 43: 286-314.
172 Since the aim of this chapter concerns a particular argument for perdurance, to wit what Lewis named 
the problem of the temporary intrinsic, the references I shall give in the following of this footnote contain 
arguments that reflect it. See for example: Taylor, R. (1955). “Spatial and Temporal Analogies and the 
Concept of Identity”. The Journal of Philosophy, 52, 599-612; (1959). “Moving About in Time”. The 
Philosophical Quarterly, 9, 289-301. Armstrong, D.M. (1980). “Identity Through Time”. In P. van 
Inwagen (ed.) Time and Cause: Essay Presented to Richard Taylor. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 67-78. Heller, 
M. (1984). “Temporal Parts of Four Dimensional Objects”. Philosophical Studies 46: 323-334. Lewis, 
D.K. (1986). On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  Heller, M. (1987). “The Best 
Candidate Approach to Diachronic Identity”. The Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65: 434-51; (1990). 
The Ontology of Physical Objects.  New York: Cambridge University Press; (1992). “Things Change”. 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52: 695-704; “Varieties of Four-Dimensionalism”. 
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71: 47-59; (2000) “Temporal Overlap is not Coincidence”.  The 
Monist 83: 362-80. Hawley, K. (2001). How Things Persist.  Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sider, T. 
(2001). Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. New York: Oxford University 
Press. McGrath, M. (2007). “Temporal Parts”. Philosophy Compass 2: 730-48. Sider,  T. (2008). 
“Temporal Parts”. In T. Sider, J. Hawthorne & D. Zimmerman, Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics. 
Blackwell: 241-62. Hawley, K. (2010). “Temporal Parts”. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
For objections as well as alternative approaches to the problems spelt out in the main text I shall suggest 
to look at Lowe’s excellent overviews: Lowe E.J. (1998). The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, 
Identity, and Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Ch. 4, 5; and (2002). A Survey of Metaphysics. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, Ch. 2, 3, 4.
 “The principal and decisive objection against endurance, as an account of 
the persistence of ordinary things such as people or puddles, is the problem of 
temporary intrinsics. For instance shape: when I sit, I have a bent  shape; when I 
stand, I have a straightened shape. Both shapes are temporary intrinsic properties; I 
have them only some of the time. How is such change possible? I know of only 
three solutions.”173
The three solutions Lewis offers are: (i) shapes are not genuine intrinsic properties but 
disguised relations which things may bear to times; (ii) the intrinsic properties of a thing 
are only those it has at the present moment; and (iii) different temporary intrinsics 
belong to different things; things are made up of temporal parts, and the temporary 
intrinsics are properties of such parts ‘wherein they differ one from another’. Lewis 
takes only the last one to be tenable. It would be incredible, as Lewis claims, if the 
solution to the problem of temporary intrinsics were that there are no temporary 
intrinsics as suggested by (i). And it would be just as incredible to claim that a solution 
to a problem of persistence must rejected persistence altogether. The only intrinsic 
properties of a thing would be those it has at the present moment whereas ‘Other times 
are like false stories’ ‘which represent or misrepresent the way things are’, as in (ii).174 
Therefore, what is left is to embrace the doctrine of temporal parts and say that yes there 
are genuinely  temporary intrinsic properties but  there is no problem, as clearly there 
isn’t, about how different things can differ in their intrinsic properties.
 The problem originally  posed is supposed to be how can something change its 
intrinsic properties, as one seems to, when they change from being bent  to being straight 
when they stand up? It is controversial whether Lewis’ argument actually addresses this 
problem, unless Lewis’ ‘what we all believe’ is that the two ‘I’s in Lewis’ passage refer 
to distinct things to begin with. I will not pick this up against Lewis (others did as we 
shall shortly  see); however, my contention is clear from the beginning: Lewis’ dealings 
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173 Lewis, D.K. (1986). On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 203.
174  Presentism rejects persistence for there is a sense in which it fails to comply with the basic 
requirement of the definition of persistence: ‘something persists iff it exists at more than one time. If 
presentism is true then nothing exists at more than one time since anything exists only at one time, to wit 
the present. However,  it is interesting to note how Lewis plays with the phrase ‘what we all believe’ in 
respect to the second solution.  If ‘what we all believe’  were so crucial in ruling out a philosophical 
answer to a philosophical problem then it would be plausible to grant endurance a decisive edge over 
perdurance since ‘what we all believe’  is that things persists by being the same whenever they exist 
(‘being wholly present’), which curiously goes against what Lewis himself claims a few lines above. 
Once more, it looks like Lewis should say clearly where he stands when using intuitions and common 
sense considerations (‘what we all believe’).
are suspicious, and I am sure I offered good reasons for this conclusion in the 
Introduction as well as in the last chapter.
 Let us grant that Lewis is right, that there is such a problem and that the doctrine 
of temporal parts and perdurance is the only  response. If so, then I think a good question 
to ask would be what exactly generates the problem of temporary intrinsics, and once 
the cause is individuated why temporal parts supposedly are an excellent remedy, and 
apparently  the only  one. If perdurance can afford to adequately  answer those two 
questions then, given Lewis’ blunt conclusions against endurance, there is clear 
evidence for temporal parts and perdurance. Let us see if perdurance can attain it.
 The expression ‘temporary intrinsics’ is an artfully contrived name for a long-
standing philosophical problem, namely  what is traditionally  known as the problem of 
change:
“Begin with a stick. Bend it. The stick changes from being straight  to being bent. 
But  nothing can be both bent and straight, and so it  can’t be one and the same stick 
which is straight and which is bent. But  it  has to be the same stick if this is to be 
genuine change. Thus, change is impossible.”175
 The discontinuity of intrinsic properties - whether an ordinary object, say a stick, 
can exhibit incompatible intrinsic properties: impossible according to some, perfectly 
plausible according to others - turns out to be a tough nut to crack.176 As pointed out by 
Lewis, what ‘what we all believe’ suggests will not do in this case: the stick above is at 
one time straight whereas at  another bent, period. There is no contradiction but it seems 
that what we are saying is that a stick S is bent at t1 and that the same stick S is straight 
at t2 with t1<t2 which ends up making an allegedly intrinsic property like shape into a 
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175 McGrath, M. (2007). “Temporal Parts”. Philosophy Compass 2: 737.
176 A quick look at the literature will give the pulse of how the plot is entangled. For a recent overview on 
the topic see S. Haslanger & R.M. Kurtz (2006) Persistence. Contemporary Readings. Cambridge, Mass.: 
The MIT  Press. Traditional literature is: Lewis, D.K. (1986). On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. Lewis, D.K. (1988). “Re-arrangement of Particles: Reply to Lowe”. Analysis.  48: 65-72; 
(2002). “Tensing the Copula”. Mind 111: 1-13. Johnston, M. (1987). “Is There a Problem About 
Persistence?”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,  Supplementary Volumes 61: 107-35. Haslanger, S. 
(1989a).  “Persistence, Change and Explanation”, Philosophical Studies 56: 1-28; (1989b). “Endurance 
and Temporary Intrinsics”. Analysis 49: 119-125.  Lowe, E.J. (1987). “Lewis on Perdurance versus 
Endurance”. Analysis 47: 152-4; (1988). “The Problems of Intrinsic Change: Rejoinder to Lewis”. 
Analysis 48: 72-7.  Hinchliff, M. (1994). “The Puzzle of Change”. Philosophical Perspectives 10: 119-36. 
Oaklander, N.L. (1998). “The Problem of Time and Change”. Stoa 1: 85-109. Bottani, A. (2005). 
“Introduction”. Dialectica 59: 381-400. Wasserman, R. (2006). “The Problem of Change”.  Philosophy 
Compass 1: 48-57. Recent ‘enemies’ of the problem of change (and temporary intrinsics) as traditionally 
posited are: Oderberg, D.S. (2004). “Temporal Parts and the Possibility of Change”. Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 69: 686- 708. Hansson, T. (2007). “The Problem of Change Revisited”. 
Dialectica 61: 265-74. Hofweber, T. (2009). “The Meta-Problem of Change”. Noûs 43: 286-314. Rychter, 
P. (2009) “There is No Puzzle About Change”. Dialectica 63: 7-22.
relation to a time (see Lewis’ point (i) above), so that an object cannot be bent or 
straight simpliciter but only relative to a time.177
 Interestingly, in addition to Lewis’ formulation, there seems to be another way in 
which the problem of change can be generated, a way which does not seem to appeal 
directly  to Lewis’ problem of temporary  intrinsics, but one that  shows that the problem 
can be easily generated via the discontinuity of properties or parts in general. In Things 
Change, the overall purpose of Mark Heller’s piece is to rescue the doctrine of temporal 
parts from an allegedly knock-down objection: the fact that an ontology that includes 
temporal parts is inconsistent with the evidence, or metaphysical datum as in 
Oderberg178 , that things change.179 Heller’s argument goes as follows:180
 (1) When Heller was young (at a time, t, let us say), he was not bearded;
 (2) Today (at t’), Heller is bearded.
From (1) and (2), and given t≠t’, Heller infers that
 (3) Little Markie and Dr. Mark differ in their properties.181
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177  What the term simpliciter is supposed to pick out is a bit of a philosophical mystery. I shall take it to 
be, as I will point out in the next chapter, a fancy word somehow equivalent to timelessly.  To say that an 
object is straight simpliciter is, on my reading, equivalent to saying that that object possesses that 
property, period. For istance, the temporal part of a stick at t is straight simpliciter whereas the stick as a 
whole is straight in virtue of having a temporal part at t which is straight (simpliciter).  Whether this is 
what Lewis meant is still obscure to me. Along the same lines, Sider claims that simpliciter means 
atemporally. See Sider, T. (2001).  Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. New 
York: Oxford University Press. For the record, I shall urge that the problem alluded to by Lewis is one 
aspect of a larger problem of change: in addition to a change of properties (whether intrinsics or not) we 
need to factor in a change of parts as Heller and Sider seem to refer to. Paramount is Quine’s passage: 
‘Undergoing a change as I do, how can I be said to continue to be myself? Considering that a complete 
replacement of my material substance takes place every few years, how can I be said to continue to be I 
for more than such a period at best?’  Or referring to the allegedly analogous Heraclitus’ problem about 
rivers ‘how can you step in the same river twice if new waters are ever flowing upon you? In these cases, 
‘the most obvious and dismissive answers to these questions’ (along the lines of the one above, namely 
being bent or straight at-t or at-t1) such as ‘It is just of the nature of persisting human beings and rivers 
that they are constituted by different matter at different times [my italic], not wholly and abruptly 
different matter of course,  but not too different matter as between not too distant times’  will not do for 
similar reasons. See Quine, W.V.O. (1963). “Identity, Ostention and Hypostasis”. In W.V.O. Quine, From 
a Logical Point of View. New Tork: Harper and Row; and Johnston, M. (1987). “Is There a Problem 
About Persistence?”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 61: 107-35.
178  Oderberg, D. (2004). “Temporal Parts and the Possibility of Change”. Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 69: 686-708. For the record, Oderberg is one of the ‘enemies of temporal 
parts’ as Heller calls them.
179 Heller, M. (1992). “Things Change”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52: 695-704.
180 Ibid. 698-9.
181  I must confess I cannot see the point of renaming, say, Heller-at-t and Heller at-t’ with Little Markie 
and Dr. Mark; Heller is a friend of temporal parts after all. I believe this move to be ultimately self-
defeating in the sense that it leaves his argument open to Oderberg and Hansson’s objections as I shall 
point out shortly. However, for argument’s sake I shall not take issue with it.
From (3) plus the principle of the Identity of the Indiscernible which says that:
 (4) For any objects, x and y, if x and y differ in their properties, then x and 
  y are not identical.
He can then conclude that:
 (5) Little Markie and Dr. Mark are not identical.
In Lombard’s words:182
“In saying that  the beardless Little Markie and the bearded Dr. Mark are distinct, 
(5) appears inconsistent  with the claim that  just one person, namely Heller, was 
first  beardless and then bearded. Thus, Heller undertakes to show how it  is 
possible, despite (5)’s truth, for just  one thing, Heller, to have survived a certain 
change. The explanation is that persisting things, like persons, are composed of 
distinct temporal parts. And while neither Little Markie nor Dr. Mark changed, 
Heller did change in the sense that  he is composed of temporal parts at least  two of 
which, Little Markie and Dr. Mark, are qualitatively different.”183
In Four-Dimensionalism, Sider tells a similar story (swapping ‘beard’ with ‘hair’ would 
do the trick):
“But  now consider any ordinary case of change. Suppose I get  a haircut. It would 
seem that the person before the haircut, call him Longhair, has different  properties 
from the person, Shorthair, after the haircut; one has long hair while the other has 
short  hair. Leibniz’s Law then seems to imply that  Longhair and Shorthair are 
distinct, and thus that  I do not  survive the haircut, since the person after the haircut 
is not the same person as the person before the haircut.
 The puzzle is that Leibniz's Law seems to prohibit  anything’s surviving 
any change. [...] for now I wish only to note that  the four-dimensionalist has a nice 
solution. Leibniz's Law does indeed imply that there are two distinct objects with 
different  properties involved: a temporal part, which we may call ‘Longhair’, and a 
distinct temporal part, ‘Shorthair’. Longhair is my temporal part before the haircut, 
and does not survive the haircut; Shorthair is my temporal part  after the haircut, 
and did not exist before the haircut. But it does not  follow that I do not survive the 
haircut, for I am not  identical to Longhair, nor am I identical to Shorthair. I am a 
sum of temporal parts that  includes both Longhair and Shorthair, and survive the 
haircut in virtue of including each as parts. Change over time for the four-
dimensionalist is thus a matter of dissimilarity between successive temporal parts. 
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182 Lombard, L.B.  (1994).  “The Doctrine of Temporal Parts and the ‘No-Change’ Objection”.  Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research 54: 365-72.
183 Ibid. 696-7.
As noted above, a changing person can be likened to a changing road with 
dissimilar subsections.”184
Thus, the conclusion is that endurance is in trouble whenever it attempts to account for 
the evidence of change. Endurantists believe that an object persists through time by 
enduring just if the object itself, the subject of persistence so to speak, is numerically 
the same despite the discontinuity  of intrinsic properties that it may exemplify. But the 
principle of the Indiscernibility of the Identicals tells a different story: it prescribes that 
identity  of things yields identity  of properties; thus, if the properties are not the same, 
indeed they are discontinuous, then what we thought were the same thing are instead 
two distinct things.
 Reflecting on the passages quoted above, seemingly there are two distinct ways 
in which the problem of change can be generated, one a là Lewis whereas a second one 
as Heller and Sider propose. The former appeals to discontinuous intrinsic properties, 
the latter to Leibniz’s Law (and it looks as if it  does not take issue with intrinsicality).185 
The question now arises as to why Lewis focused on intrinsicality  when the puzzle 
could be otherwise established (intrinsicality is quite a contentious topic, Leibniz’s Law 
understood as the principle of the Indiscernibility  of the Identicals is generally  less 
controversial).
 If I understand Lewis’ intent, the insistence upon intrinsicality was due, once 
again, to his commitment  to modal realism, and thereby  to the parallel between space, 
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184  Sider,  T. (2001).  Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. New York: Oxford 
University Press.
185 Oderberg, Hansson, and Rychter reconstruct what brings about the problem of change in a similar way. 
See Oderberg, D.S. (2004). “Temporal Parts and the Possibility of Change”. Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 69: 686-708; Hansson, T. (2007). “The Problem(s) of Change Reviseted”. 
Dialectica 61: 265-74; and Rychter, P. (2009). “There is No Puzzle about Change”. Dialectica 63: 7-22. I 
believe the first who initiated this way of arguing against how the problem of change traditionally draws 
upon Leibniz’s Law was Lowe; see for example his remarks in Lowe, E.J. (1998). The Possibility of 
Metaphysics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, Ch. 2, 4, 5; and (2002). A Survey of Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, Ch. 2, 3, 4.
time, and modality. If we assume the parallel (and his view of intrinsicality186) we can 
then frame the modal problem in a way  similar to the temporal one (or vice versa): how 
can an object o have the intrinsic property F in one possible world, say w1, and the 
intrinsic property ?F in a possible world w2, and be (the object o) wholly present in 
both worlds? There seems to be no easy  answer to this question if, as Lewis does, we 
believe in (or are committed to) the reality of non-actual worlds; in this case the 
metaphysical worry would be to account for o’s contradictory intrinsic properties in two 
worlds which both contain o. In the light of this commitment and Lewis’ view of 
intrinsicality, what he is forced to do is to embrace the counterpart theory giving up the 
idea that in worlds w1 and w2 we are talking about the same (numerically the same) 
object o. The similarity with the temporal problem is obvious.187
 What if one rejects modal realism and therefore does not face Lewis’ 
metaphysical worry? Still, one seems to face the same puzzling situation since the 
problem of change looks like it  arises anyway via Leibniz’s Law; and again the only 
way to go seems to be the doctrine of temporal parts: the fact that at the end of the day 
what we are looking at are two fundamentally  distinct things, one beardless or short-
haired and another one with a beard or long hair.188
 That the problem of change is quite a heart-felt issue is clear just looking at the 
many instances of the phrase which litter the literature. For this reason, I shall begin 
assuming that there is such problem.189 But before moving to my argument against how 
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186  Lewis, D.K. (1983). “Extrinsic Properties”.  Philosophical Studies 44: 197-200; (1986). On the 
Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 61-2; Langton, R.  & Lewis, D.K. (1998). “Defining 
‘Intrinsic’”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58: 333-45. For the record, Lewis defines 
‘intrinsicality’ as follows: an intrinsic property is a property ‘which things have in virtue of the way they 
themselves are’,  as opposed to an extrinsic property,  which things have ‘in virtue of their relations or lack 
of relations to other things’. Therefore, ‘being long-haired/bearded’ qualifies as an intrinsic property 
whereas ‘having a long-haired/bearded brother’ is not.  This core idea is then formulated in terms of 
duplicate: ‘If something has an intrinsic property then so does any perfect duplicate of that thing.’ And 
’two things are duplicates iff (1) they have exactly the same perfectly natural properties, and (2) their 
parts can be put into correspondence in such a way that corresponding parts have exactly the same 
perfectly natural properties, and stand in the same perfectly natural relations...  an intrinsic property is one 
that can never differ between two duplicates.’ See also Sider, T. (1996).  “Intrinsic Properties”. 
Philosophical Studies 83: 1-27.
187  More on this in Oderberg, D.S.  (2004). “Temporal Parts and the Possibility of Change”. Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research 69: 686-708.
188 For the record, I shall stress that the properties in both Heller’s and Sider’s examples (being bearded or 
not, and being long-haired or short-haired) would qualify as intrinsic according to Lewis’  definition. 
Thus, what we believed got kicked out through the door, has come back in through the window. See 
footnote 189.
189 I am not appealing to a sort of principle of authority; I am rather looking at the evidence. It will be the 
aim of this chapter to question this evidence and to assess if there is any problem of change as claimed by 
and articulated in the literature.
Heller and Sider generate the problem appealing to Leibniz’s Law, I think it would be 
advantageous to look into how change, philosophically speaking, is understood, in order 
to gain a better understanding and appraisal of what is at stake.
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1.3.3 Change
 We take things to exist, to remain the very same (at  least we refer to them as if 
they  would) notwithstanding the gain or loss of some of their features or parts. 190 There 
is a bike in my shed; despite looking different, it is the same bike as the one originally 
on the shop floor. It was new and unmarked whilst now looks a bit run-down. It 
changed over time in virtue of exhibiting discontinuous properties over time despite 
being one and the same. Such common sense understanding of what is going on when 
we face a case of change is exactly  what makes philosophers considerably  suspicious 
about it. Therefore, it seems to be reasonable to question our assumptions about 
change.191
 What do we mean by change and how should we understand this supposed 
feature of reality? As I mentioned above, in the first place, intuitions and common sense 
considerations tell us that in addition to just  changing, things change in particular 
respects. For instance, colour, shape, parts, from one place to another, from being close 
to far, so on and so forth; whereas they do not seem to be able to change in others: for 
example, we never experience a bike changing into a table.192 Thus, the first distinction 
we may postulate is between a change in/of features - or qualitative change - on the one 
hand, say shape, size, colour, weight and so forth, and a change in/of composition - or 
compositional change - on the other, namely the fact that things can acquire or lose 
parts, or that their parts can be re-arranged resulting in a new layout. As a matter of fact, 
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190 At least this is how it appears. See Ch. 1.1.1, 1.1.2, and 1.1.3.
191 See for instance Oderberg: “Things change. If anything counts as a datum [my italic] of metaphysics, 
that does. [...] All change is from something into something else, and hence is at least a two-term relation, 
involving a term from which and a term to which.  Although not every change requires the survival of the 
subject of the change, every change entails a change in something which itself survives the change. Hence 
every substantial change entails a non-substantial change. On the face of it,  I think we, perdurance or 
endurance theorists, may all agree with Oderberg’s characterisation although Oderberg’s distinction 
between substantial and non-substantial change may be said to smuggle a certain amount of contentious 
philosophy in.
192  Which somehow reminds me of Oderberg’s distinction between substantial and non-substantial 
change. See note 194. See also Oderberg, D.S. (2004). “Temporal Parts and the Possibility of Change”. 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69: 686-708. For the record, there might be cases in which a 
bike is said to become a table, say for example some fanciful instance of modern design. In these cases, to 
say that a bike becomes a table is just a manner of speech since the bike has been previously stripped 
down and pulled apart, for instance cutting its frame tubes etc. a process through which it plausibly ceases 
to be a bike, before being rearranged and reassembled into a table (perhaps with the addition of some new 
parts which previously did not belong to the bike).
these two distinct kinds of change are more intimately related than it at first seems, thus 
perhaps the initial distinction could be improved. There are cases in which from a 
particular re-arrangement of parts, a thing can gain either new qualities and features or 
lose old ones. Take Tibbles, the prone-to-injuries cat and imagine that one dismembers 
it; clearly  the dismemberment and the following re-arrangement of its limbs results in 
the loss of a particular property: Tibbles is no longer alive.
 On further investigation, one arguably can pick out other respects under which 
things change but which are not included by  the distinction suggested above. For 
instance, things seem to change not only  in their intrinsic features but also in their 
extrinsic ones; that is, they change in respect  to their relational characteristics. An 
extrinsic characteristic is one that depends upon things other than the individual that has 
it, rather on the environment in which it is immersed. E.g. take two distinct things one at 
one end of a table and the other on the opposite side which become progressively 
spatially  closer, they gradually change their relations between themselves and towards 
their environment.
 A fourth type of change which can be straightforwardly detected regards neither 
features nor parts of things or relations between them or their environment; rather it 
applies to things themselves, namely it is neither a change in themselves nor outside 
themselves. By contrast, it is a more basic experience such as when a thing either comes 
into or goes out of existence; that is, when something is either created or destroyed. 
Such peculiar change has been called by philosophers substantial change since it 
regards things themselves - individual substances - and it amounts to a change in the 
number of things which exist.
 Customarily, all these four types of change are said to be instances of genuine 
change. Such a remark seems to indicate that there ought to be at  least one other 
instance of change besides genuine, which might be called apparent. Philosophers who 
take these matters seriously are inclined to acknowledge all such varieties of change and 
to contrast them with the following instances of apparent change: (i) mere Cambridge 
change: a change which an entity  undergoes when another entity actually changes: for 
instance, take two trees, the second grows taller making the first  less tall than it. But 
what really  changed was the second tree, no genuine change occurred to the first one; 
(ii) McTaggartian change: the fact that what was future is now present and it will soon 
be past; (iii) passage of time: the change that each thing undergoes every  single day 
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becoming one day older; and finally (iv) ostensible change: for instance, Goodman’s 
example of the positional property ‘grue’193. Following Shoemaker, let us introduce the 
predicate ‘grue’ as follows: ‘x is grue at t iff it is earlier than 2000 A.D. and x is green at 
t or t is 2000 A.D. or later and x is blue at t’.194  Then, accordingly anything which is 
green up to 2000 A.D. and remains green for some time after 2000 A.D. necessarily 
changes at 2000 A.D. from being grue to being non-grue. The lesson to be learnt, I 
gather, from the example is that we might very  well invent a similar predicate such that 
- for any interval of time in which something remains unchanged with respect to 
whatever property - that thing either comes to exemplify or ceases to exemplify it. 
Furthermore, if we take to be for every  grue-like predicate a genuine grue-like property 
and we count the gain or loss of this property as genuine change, then we end up with 
the conclusion that whenever anything remains unchanged in any respect, at once it 
changes in some other respect.
 So much for genuine and apparent kinds of change. However, I believe that there 
may be at least one additional type of change and which happens to result from 
philosophers’ vivid imagination. I do not have a name for such a variety  of change thus 
I shall tentatively call it numerical change. Basically, it is a sort of change which things 
undergo when they go through cases of fission and fusion: when a thing splits into two 
distinct things, and when two distinct things merge into one; both cases seemingly being 
a challenge to the transitivity  of identity.195 Admittedly, it is a peculiar, fanciful kind of 
change, perhaps not a kind of change at  all, which is not the subject of our ordinary 
experience (at least not now), which regards the number of entities existing before and 
after the change in question. Since it regards the number of entities which exist, it seems 
it might well be reduced to an instance of substantial change. However, since I take 
such cases to be quite different from everyday  cases of substantial change - for instance 
cases of fission and fusion lack several of the conditions of cases of individual 
substances coming to be and going out of existence - I venture that  such an unusual and 
unlikely type of change must be counted apart but I will not commit to its there being; 
what I shall do is to flag the fact that it has been around for a while in the philosophical 
debate, and it looks different from other types of change spelt out.
105
193 Goodman, N. (1979). Facts, Fiction, and Forecast. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 74.
194 Shoemaker, S. (1969). “Time Without Change”. Journal of Philosophy 66: 363-81.
195 Parfit, D. (1971). “Personal Identity”. Philosophical Review 80: 3-27.
 So much so, it seems to me that only  four are in fact genuine types of change: 
qualitative, compositional, relational, and substantial; whereas I take any other 
identifiable variety of change that philosophers can come up with as merely apparent.196
 The fact that they are all genuine does not entail that they are all fundamental. It 
might be that within certain theoretical frameworks, some of them can be considered 
dependent upon one or more of the other genuine varieties of change which appear to 
possess some sort of priority  (either in the order of being or explanation or both), 
although I am not myself persuaded by that. Briefly, to show where I stand, I think that 
there is a sense in which the so-called individual substances are somehow prior to 
properties which in turn are dependent on substances. Hence, I take substantial change 
as a seemingly persuasive and fundamental feature of reality  whereas qualitative change 
as somehow dependent upon it. Furthermore, I am inclined to deny the reality of those 
types of change I classified as apparent for I take a sparse view on properties: I do not 
like the idea that for every meaningful predicate we manage to construct there is a 
corresponding property. Finally, I oppose the idea that those supposed properties that 
McTaggart singles out in his famous argument, past, present and future, are in any sense 
properties of individual substances. Clearly, all the claims above ought to be 
substantiated but the good news is that for the purposes and conclusions of this thesis 
nothing depends on them being the case. I shall then plead the reader to consider them 
an offhand avowal.
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196 Lastly, it might be instructive to add to the mix Bertrand Russell’s eminent characterisation of change. 
In The Principles of Mathematics,  he had it that: “Change is the difference, in respect to truth or 
falsehood, between a proposition concerning an entity and a time T and a proposition concerning the 
same entity and another time T’ provided that the two propositions differ only by the fact that T  occurs in 
the one where T’ occurs in the other.” Russell, B. (1903). The Principles of Mathematics. London: Allen 
& Unwin, 469. For an insightful criticism of Russell’s definition see Le Poidevin, R. (1991). Change, 
Cause and Contradiction. New York: St. Martin’s Press, Ch. 5.
1.3.4 Is There a Problem About Change?
 Apparently, there is. The purpose of the previous section was to highlight the 
different and intricate ways in which change is understood, from the point of view of 
ordinary  life up to the philosophically refined and subtle regimentation of it. The 
characterisation above is in no way  exhaustive and it will not affect  the issues addressed 
in what follows; it was meant to be an instructive interlude before coming down to the 
main argument, and so I should like it to be read.
 The problem of change seems to be generated in two ways: Lewis’ problem of 
temporary intrinsics, and the line of argument which draws on Leibniz’s Law. Once we 
reject Lewis’ modal realism and the metaphysical worry it originates from, we are left 
with the question of how Leibniz’s Law allegedly  manages to succeed in bringing about 
the problem.
 In the recent literature, some people have put forth a line of argument which 
pleads that what the use of Leibniz’s Law really achieves in generating the problem of 
change is to produce a pseudo-problem at best, the pseudo-problem of change.197 
Admittedly, I find this train of thought quite interesting and, unfortunately given my 
sympathy  with perdurance, compelling. Therefore, I shall take advantage of how those 
precedents framed the problem but I shall also attempt to push their arguments a bit 
further, and to draw a slightly different conclusion; one which emphasises the fact that 
Leibniz’s Law looks at best like a law of logic - indeed it is customarily considered one 
of the principles governing the logic of identity - whereas in general the use of the 
principle by Heller and Sider as an argument for temporal parts and perdurance betrays 
a metaphysical use of Leibniz’s Law which is, firstly, never clearly announced, and 
secondly difficult to justify unless some other assumptions are made.
 For convenience’s sake, I shall not outline all the instances in the literature in 
which the use of Leibniz’s Law is called into question as the main reason why the 
puzzle of change is perpetrated whereas I shall briefly flag and register why  what I 
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197  Lowe, E.J. (1998). The Possibility of Metaphysics. Oxford: Clarendon Press,  Ch. 2, 4,  5; (2002). A 
Survey of Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press,  Ch. 2,  3, 4. Oderberg, D.S. (2004).  “Temporal 
Parts and the Possibility of Change”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69: 686-708. Hansson, 
T. (2007). “The Problem(s) of Change Revisited”. Dialectica 61: 265-74. Rychter, P. (2009). “There is No 
Puzzle about Change”. Dialectica 63: 7-22.
present is relevant as well as how it fits within the bigger picture. I shall commence 
once more with Oderberg: he focuses on Heller’s Little Markie/Dr. Mark argument 
outlined above and notes that the argument is ‘every bit as suspicious as it looks’198 
depending on an equivocation over the meaning of the phrase ‘differ in property’199, and 
over the proper formulation of the principle of the Indiscernibility of the Identicals. Two 
issues which happen to be more tied together than they look. Oderberg’s first  conclusion 
is that Heller’s argument is somehow circular: he begins from the evidence that Little 
Mark and Dr. Mark are indiscernible for they are identical over time. He then goes on to 
claim that they  are, as a matter of fact not so, but  clearly  this claim about their 
distinctness presupposes Little Markie and Dr. Mark’s distinctness as temporal parts 
which is what Heller is meant to prove.200
 The argument just given criticises the use of the principle of the indiscernibility  
of the identicals for being circular. The criticism could be made even more profound as 
not just the use but also the formulation of Leibniz’s Law appears troubling201:
“The principle [...] must mention the possession by objects of the same property at 
the same time. [...] for any two objects and any time, if the objects are numerically 
identical then they share all their properties at that  time. But it does not allow 
Heller to infer the distinctness of Little Markie and Dr. Mark because they differ 
with respect to having a beard at  distinct  times. The reason [Leibniz’s Law] needs 
to be formulated in terms of the times at which properties are possessed, and hence 
the reason it  is a basic metaphysical truth, is that  it is entailed by the Law of Non-
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198  Oderberg, D.S. (2004). “Temporal Parts and the Possibility of Change”. Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 69: 689.
199 Ibid.
200  Of course, Heller could complain that the opponent herself is presupposing the identity of Little 
Markie and Dr. Mark as the reason for claiming their being indiscernible, a presumption which in all 
fairness it would be somehow preposterous to call into question.  Any case, granting Heller’s rejoinder, 
what this situation shows is that perhaps the principle of the Identity of the Indiscernibles should not be 
used as a reason to assert distinctness or identity (over time) on pain of circularity. See Oderberg, D.S. 
(2004). “Temporal Parts and the Possibility of Change”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69: 
690.
201  A quick clarification may be required since it seems I have been switching between the two phrases 
‘the indiscernibility of the identicals’ and ‘Leibniz’s Law’ as if they were interchangeable. I take them to 
be so but I am aware that someone may disagree. For example, I have come across, mainly in 
conversation, with people who thought of Leibniz’s Law as the bi-conditional,  the principle of the 
indiscernibility of the identicals and the identity of the indiscernibles all in one. In this thesis, I shall 
follow Lowe’s formulation of the principle of the indiscernibility of the identicals and Leibniz’s Law as 
expressing ‘Whatever is true of a thing is true of anything identical with that thing, since anything 
identical with that thing is that very thing itself’. Lowe, E.J. (2002). A Survey of Metaphysics. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 23.
Contradiction. [...] the law [which] holds that nothing can both be and not  be at the 
same time and in the same respect.”202
Thus, if Oderberg’s argument is plausible, and I am inclined to believe it is, then the 
prima facie evidence for the generation of the problem of change from Leibniz’s Law 
waters down. More to the point, if Heller’s use and formulation of Leibniz’s Law were 
the basis for the generation of the problem of change then, given that the use is 
inappropriate and the formulation misleading, the conclusion to be drawn is that there is 
no evidence to support the traditional problem of change. So there seems to be no 
problem of change after all.
 Interestingly, the criticism can be sharpened and thereby  cut deeper as in 
Hansson’s revisitation of the problem of change. Once again, for Hansson the line of 
argument which leads to the conclusion that there is a problem of change is twofold: the 
argument from Leibniz’s Law and the argument from the Instantiation of Incompatible 
Properties (Lewis’ problem of temporary intrinsics). Hansson’s investigation is cogently 
pursued within the framework of the B-theory203 of time ‘because those who press the 
arguments into service are typically B-theorists’; but also, and more interestingly, those 
two arguments are generally put forth as evidence in favour of temporal parts. Given 
that perdurance is considered the doctrine of temporal parts as in Sider, then there is a 
sense in which perdurance is somehow the preferred view of persistence to go with the 
B-theory  (or eternalism as I shall argue in Part  II of the thesis) although the link 
between the two will have to be qualified further.
 In any  case, Hansson’s presentation of the argument from Leibniz’s Law follows 
the same lines as Heller’s and Oderberg’s so I shall omit most of the details and go 
straight to his conclusion.204 There is clearly  something contradictory going on since the 
inference begins by assuming an object (a candle) which persists by enduring and which 
changes one of its intrinsic properties (shape: from being straight to being bent) between 
two times. (Of course the object is taken as numerically identical at both times, which is 
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202 Ibid. 691.
203  Roughly by the expression B-theory Hansson means quite uncontentiously that “all times are to be 
understood as being ontologically on a par, properties such as being past, present or future are to be 
rejected, and verbs and copulas are to be regarded as tenseless.” Hansson, T.  (2007). “The Problem(s) of 
Change Revisited”. Dialectica 61: 265-6. More on the B-theory in chapter 2.2.
204  I shall omit to look at Hansson’s formulation of the argument from the instantiation of incompatible 
properties since I believe the case to be closed with the denial of Lewis’ commitment to modal realism 
and the relevant metaphysical worry.
the whole point  of persisting by enduring, as I understand it). Because of the application 
of Leibniz’s Law, contrary  to what  has been assumed in the premise, the conclusion 
must be that  the candle at  t1 which is straight is not numerically identical with the one at 
t2 which in fact is bent, ‘and if we must choose between Leibniz’s Law and the idea that 
objects persist by enduring, it is the latter that has to go.’
 According to Hansson, the argument is question begging in a sense which is 
reminiscent of Oderberg’s above but with a twist: the interesting observation which will 
turn out useful for my argument shortly  is that ‘Leibniz’s Law incorporates no 
restriction on the truths concerning the entity under scrutiny. All truths regarding the 
entities are relevant’; in fact, what the principle expresses is the idea that ‘if a and b are 
numerically identical, then whatever is true of a is true of b and whatever is true of b is 
true of a.’ We need now to remember that  the argument is pursued within the framework 
of the B-theory  so that the claim above about the fact that ‘All truths are relevant’ 
becomes ‘All tenseless truths are relevant’.205 According to perdurance, the entity  at  t1, 
say a candle, is straight so it is true to assert that the candle at t1 is straight. At t2 the 
candle is bent so it is not true of the candle at t2 that it is straight (and vice versa: the 
candle at t1 is straight so it is not true of it that at t1 is bent, etc.). If this is the case, then 
Hansson - regrettably for perdurance - asks a very cogent question: why should an 
endurance theorists accept that formulation of the candle changing shape from straight 
to bent? Unless the endurance theorist accepted temporal parts which would be bizarre 
(at least in the case of ordinary  material objects like candles whereas it may not be for 
other kinds of things, say events) if the candle is numerically identical between t1 and t2 
then there is no need for the endurance theorist  to grant that it is not true of the candle at 
t2 that it is straight. Actually, it would be false to say of the candle at t2 that it is not 
straight: it is straight since the candle as an enduring object is straight, as it is so at t1. In 
concocting his argument, Hansson interestingly draws upon an analogy  between spatial 
and temporal contexts:
“In the case of Jon, as long as he is (present tense) playing football at some place 
or another, the present tensed ‘Jon is playing football’ is true. In the case of the 
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205  In conversation, Dr. Francis Pearson called my attention to why this (‘All tenseless truths are 
relevant’) would be the case since many B-theorists still think that there are tensed truths, they just have 
tenseless thruth-makers,  so why the tensed ones be ignored? I am not sure in virtue of what Hansson 
claimed that, however I think that a B-theorist might take issue with Dr. Pearson’s ‘there are tensed truth’. 
It is true that the New B-theory of time gave up on linguistic reductions but still at the end of the day all 
there is is tenseless. So perhaps this is what Hansson meant by ‘All tenseless truth are relevant’.
candle, as long as it is (with the tenseless ‘is’) straight  at some time or another in 
B-time - i.e. somewhere in the B-series - the tenseless ‘the candle is straight’ is 
true. In order for the tenseless ‘the candle is straight’ to be false it  would have to be 
the case that  the candle is never, at any point in the B-series, straight. But it is a 
premise of the alleged reduction that the candle is straight  at [t1]. Thus, given that 
the expression [candle at  t2] picks out an enduring entity, as endurance theorists 
maintain, and given that  the enduring entity is straight  at  [t1], as an explicit premise 
of the argument has it, the tenseless ‘[candle at t2] is straight  has to be regarded as 
true, not false.”206
If Hansson’s argument makes sense then ‘there is no conflict with Leibniz’s Law. 
Everything that is true of candle at  t1 is true of candle at t2, and vice versa.’207 
Seemingly, endurance theorists have a great deal of evidence to claim that the argument 
from Leibniz’s Law is not sound. Hansson’s conclusion echoes Oderberg’s:
“By presuming that  it  is true of [candle at  t1] that  it  is straight and that  it  is not true 
of [candle at  t2] that it is straight, the argument presupposes that  we are dealing 
with two different entities - in effect, with stages, or temporal parts, trapped at  [t1] 
and [t2] respectively - and that  is to beg the question against those who insist that 
objects endure through change.”208
Once more, from a point  of view that is independent from Oderberg’s, there seems to be 
quite a good deal of evidence which casts doubt on the traditional formulation of the 
problem of change. Therefore, a tentative conclusion could be that the way  the problem 
(or puzzle) of change is traditionally  generated is suspicious at best, and question 
begging/circular at worst, if not simply invalid/unsound.
 I can see where Oderberg and Hansson209  are coming from and for argument’s 
sake I shall accept their conclusions. (Actually I find them quite compelling so it is not 
just about biting the bullet). However, I think that their criticism of this use of Leibniz’s 
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206 Hansson, T. (2007). “The Problem(s) of Change Revisited”. Dialectica 61: 267.
207  Ibid.  Admittedly, there is a sense in which Hansson’s point may sound like a flat contradiction. 
However, recalling how Hansson framed his argument, namely assuming the B-theory of time, it should 
help to wave the appearance off: as long as the candle is (tenseless) straight at some time or another in the 
B-series (say at t1) the tenseless sentence ‘the candle is straight’ is true. In order for the sentence‘the 
candle is straight’ to be false it would have to be the case that the candle is never, at any point in the B-
series, straight but this would contradict one of the premises of the argument which claimed that the 
candle is straight at t1 and successively bent at t2.
208 Ibid. 268.
209 And Rychter too, in particular section 1 and 2 of his piece. See Rychter, P. (2009). “There is No Puzzle 
about Change”. Dialectica 63: 7-22.
Law could be pushed even further, specifically  to a new level of generality as I shall 
shortly show.
 I shall start my argument looking at  the notion of identity. As I pointed out in the 
previous chapter, there seems to be two distinct senses of the word ‘identity’: the first 
one which singles out identity as a relation; the second one expresses identity as a 
name.210  For the purposes of my argument I shall focus mainly on the first sense, 
namely the relation which logicians standardly represent by means of the equality sign 
flanked by two terms.
 The first distinction I believe worth pointing out emerges in combination with 
the phenomenon at issue, namely  change. Recall what has been said previously about 
things changing over time: one and the same thing can be different at different times; in 
other words, one (and only one thing) can exhibit  discontinuous/incompatible intrinsic 
properties over time. But this, as we now know, has been deemed highly suspicious or 
even contradictory by philosophers of a certain bent. As a matter of fact, things seem to 
be not as negative as they look, as Lowe points out:
“[i]t may seem to be nothing short  of contradiction to say that  a thing can be both 
the same and different, that is, both the same and not the same. Here philosophers 
are always quick to draw a distinction between what they call numerical and 
qualitative identity. [...] when a thing changes, it  remains numerically one and the 
same thing but  becomes qualitatively different [...] Are there, then, two different 
kinds of identity, or two different senses of the word ‘same’? Most  philosophers 
and logicians would answer ‘No’ to this question. They would say that  when we 
speak of a thing becoming qualitatively different over time, we simply mean that 
this thing has numerically different  qualities at numerically different times [...] On 
this view, all identity is really numerical identity, but we have to distinguish 
between the identity of a thing and the identity of its qualities.”211
Therefore, the conclusion is that one and only one identity relation (numerical identity) 
applies to different kinds of things. In turn, numerical identity  can be defined as the 
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210  The distinction is important, and as Lowe puts it, the latter way in which identity is understood picks 
out what he calls the individual essence of something, that is its very being or what it is, as in Locke. In 
addition, these two ways of understanding identity play a crucial role when it comes to adequately 
distinguish between criteria of identity and principles of individuation.  See Lowe, E.J. (2010).  “On the 
Individuation of Powers”. In A. Marmodoro (ed.) The Metaphysics of Powers: Their Grounding and 
Their Manifestation. New York: Routledge, 8-26; (2009).  More Kinds of Being: A Further Study of 
Individuation, Identity, and the Logic of Sortal Terms. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, Ch. 1, 3, 4; (2003). 
“Individuation”. In M.J. Loux & D.W. Zimmerman (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, Ch. 3.
211 Lowe, E.J. (2002). A Survey of Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 23-4.
smallest equivalence relation satisfying or governed by Leibniz’s Law. An equivalence 
relation is one which is reflexive, symmetric and transitive. Such basic principles 
characterizing identity are:
 (i) Reflexivity or Self-Identity: x = x, everything is identical to itself;
 (ii) Indiscernibility of Identicals or Leibniz’s Law: x = y → (φx ↔ φy), if x 
  and y are identical then whatever is true of x is true of y and vice 
  versa;212
 (iii) Symmetry: x = y → y = x, (it follows from Reflexivity and the 
  Indiscernibility of Identicals taking φ to be the condition expressed by 
  “... = x”);
 (iv) Transitivity: x = y & y = z → x = z, (it follows from the Indiscernibility 
  of Identicals taking φ to be the condition expressed by “... = z”);
 (v) Identity of Indiscernibles: (φx ↔ φy) → x = y, which is the converse 
  of Leibniz’s Law, it claims that if everything true of x is true of y then 
  x is identical with y.213
 For completeness’ sake, another basic principle which we come across dealing 
with identity is Leibniz’s Substitutivity Principle which claims that if a and b are 
codesignators, if a = b is a true sentence of English (or of other language), then they are 
everywhere substitutable salva veritate. This principle seems to be highly problematic 
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212 On this formulation,  the Indiscernibility of Identicals is fairly uncontroversial, but often when “x” and 
“y” are restricted to objects and “what is true of x” and “what is true of y” to properties it suddenly 
becomes philosophically controversial. And this is where I will shortly level my objection at.
213  For concerns against the identity of indiscernibles one might look at Max Black, (Black, M. (1952). 
“The Identity of Indiscernibles”. Mind, 61: 153-64) who suggests that we might conceive of a 
symmetrical universe consisting solely of two qualitatively indiscernible spheres, hence it would follow 
that the principle is not necessarily true. Hacking (Hacking, I. (1975). “The Identity of Indiscernibles”. 
Journal of Philosophy,  72: 249-56) points out that Black’s situation might well be re-interpreted as one 
sphere immersed in a non-Euclidean space. On this view, what Black describes as a journey from one 
sphere to another qualitatively identical might by contrast be re-described as a journey around space back 
to the very same sphere. A further proposal instead, suggests that the sphere is one and the same but it 
happens to be bi-located (O’Leary-Hawthorne, J. (1995). “The Bundle Theory of Substance and the 
Identity of Indiscernibles”. Analysis, 55: 191-6). On the face of it, such a principle which seemed to be 
necessarily true but on Black’s view not quite, according to some other thinkers is not even contingently 
true.  For instance,  Steven French (French, S. (1989). “Why the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles 
is not Contingently True Either”. Synthese, 78: 141-66) urged that according to quantum mechanics the 
state of a system of n particles of the same kind is one in which there is no possibility of saying which 
particle is which. See also Forrest, P. (2010). “Identity of Indiscernibles”. In Stanford .Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (ed. Edward N. Zalta), Stanford: Center for the Study of Language and Information; and 
Hawley, K. (2009). “Identity and Indiscernibility”. Mind, 118: 101-9.
as Frege214  and Quine215  point out. However, what matters is that all the various 
explanations of the failure of the principle are not counterexamples to Leibniz’s Law 
above, given that they are two distinct principles. Leibniz’s Law does not say anything 
about substitutivity of codesignators.
 Having considered the logic of identity, I shall now proceed to devise my 
argument. A remark which is commonly brought up against Leibniz’s Law, as we are 
well aware by now, regards cases of change through time such as those considered 
above. Take Heller’s formulation of Leibniz’s Law: for any objects, x and y, if x and y 
differ in their properties, then x and y are not identical. An extremely popular way to 
formally translate that formulation of Leibniz’s Law is the following: (∀P)(∀x)(∀y)((x 
= y) → (Px ↔ Py)) whereby x and y (variables for individuals) range over individuals, 
and P (variable for properties) over properties. This being so, suddenly Leibniz’s Law 
becomes problematic: e.g. consider an object x (x is self-identical) at time t and t1 ; at t, 
x is F, whereas at t1 x is no longer F, say ¬F. According to Heller’s formulation of 
Leibniz’s Law, sameness of things gives sameness of properties. But there is no such 
thing as sameness of properties since it has been established that at t, x is F whereas at t1 
x is ¬ F with F ≠ ¬F therefore it cannot be one and the same object.
 The easiest rejoinder which rests upon the fact that the argument actually  
confuses numerical and qualitative identity  will not do: x and y are ‘one and the same’ 
object so they are numerically the same; but the properties of the one are different from 
those of the other, thus in this sense they are qualitatively different. Very recently 
Wasserman216 suggested that this line of argument ‘underestimates the problem’ for ‘it 
ignores the intimate relation between numerical and qualitative identity that is captured 
by Leibniz’s Law (LL): For any x and y, if x = y then x and y have all the same 
properties.’ Therefore, the bottom line is that ‘Change requires both numerical identity 
and qualitative difference. Yet numerical identity entails qualitative identity, which 
precludes qualitative difference.’ The failure of Leibniz’s Law is also envisaged as a 
powerful objection levelled against endurance since the whole point of persisting by 
enduring is for the persisting entity to be numerically identical at which time it exists no 
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214 Frege, G. (1969). “On Sense and Reference”. In P.  Geach and M. Black (Trans.) Translations from the 
philosophical writings of Gottlob Frege. Oxford: Blackwell, 56-78.
215 Quine, W.V.O. (1963). “Reference and Modality”. In From a Logical Point of View, New York: Harper 
and Row, 139-59.
216 Wasserman, R. (2006). “The Problem of Change”. Philosophy Compass 1: 48-57.
matter how much qualitative change the entity underwent.
 As we now know, there is a good deal of evidence against the soundness of the 
argument from Leibniz’s Law outlined above. Anyway, what I would like to redirect 
attention to is that  Leibniz’s Law is first  and foremost a principle of the logic of identity 
as we have seen above.217 As defined by Leibniz, the principle sounds pretty much like 
this: 
“Whatever is true of a thing is true of anything identical with that  thing, since 
anything identical with that thing is that very thing itself.”218
Quite uncontentiously, ‘thing’ in the phrase above stands for ‘entity’ in general in a way 
in which anything unrestrictedly could potentially  be. With this in mind, let us now 
recall my formulation of Leibniz’s Law: x = y → (φx ↔ φy). What is worth noting is 
that it seems to adequately  express Leibniz’s Law as quoted above without any explicit 
reference to either quantification in general or to the scope of the quantifiers, to wit over 
what kind of variables the quantifiers range (individuals and properties as in Heller’s 
formulation). The letters in my  formulation are mere place holders: x and y stands for 
entities in general whereas φ stands for the phrase ‘whatever is true of’. Therefore, as a 
law of the logic of identity, Leibniz’s Law is a formula which stresses the intimate 
relation between entities in general and what is true of them. Unlike Heller’s (et alii) 
formalisation of Leibniz’s Law in which admittedly  it  might not  be clear how the 
variables are used (in Classical Logic and mathematical reasoning, variables serve a 
dual function: sometimes they are used (i) as singular terms to denote specific, but 
unspecified/arbitrary objects; or (ii) to express generality  as in ‘For any x, there is a y, 
such that...’); in my proposed formulation there is no such ambiguity: x and y stand for 
anything whereas φ for anything which could be truly predicated of them.
 Let us now try to give formal rigour to the case of an object changing intrinsic 
properties over time, say Heller’s Little Markie/Dr. Mark example as well as Sider’s 
Long-Hair/Short-Hair one: as we know, Leibniz’s Law formulated as (∀P)(∀x)(∀y)((x 
= y) → (Px ↔ Py)) fails to obtain for the reasons advertised above. Curiously  though, if 
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217  By logic, I mean, perhaps less uncontentiously than above, a formal as well as normative discipline 
which studies the principles of correct reasoning. Thus, it seems that logic has to do with how 
propositions hang together - those offered as reasons are called premises, and the one which the premises 
are supposed to support are called the conclusion - to see if the overall argument (when some premises 
and a conclusion are combined together) is formally valid and sound.
218 Lowe, E.J. (2002). A Survey of Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 23.
we instead formalised Heller’s and Sider’s example according to the formulation of 
Leibniz’s Law I proposed, that is x = y → (φx ↔ φy), which reads ‘Whatever is true of a 
thing is true of anything identical with that thing, since anything identical with that 
thing is that  very thing itself’ the outcome is rather the following: whatever is true of a 
thing, say ‘Little Markie who was not bearded’ is true of anything identical with that 
thing, say ‘Dr. Mark who is bearded’ since anything identical with that thing (Dr. Mark) 
is that very thing itself (Little Markie).
 Now, is this an example in which Leibniz’s Law fails? Not quite. Is it perhaps an 
example which harbours a contradiction? Not really. In both cases, it  is perfectly 
legitimate to predicate truly  of Mark Heller that ‘Little Markie was not bearded’ and 
that ‘Dr. Mark is bearded’ because Mark Heller is Little Markie, Mark Heller is Dr. 
Mark, and Little Markie is Dr. Mark (transitivity of identity). This way, I find it quite 
difficult to see how Leibniz’s Law could generate a puzzle (unless of course we take 
Heller’s Little Markie/Dr. Mark to be not numerically identical to start  with but that 
would be question begging as Oderberg points out). In addition, I also find it difficult to 
see how Lewis’ problem of temporary intrinsics could be a problem (apart from the 
already mentioned line of argument, the one urging upon Lewis’ modal view and the 
metaphysical worry that comes with it) unless we carry on formalising Leibniz’s Law as 
Heller et alii have been doing. Is their interpretation the best way to formally  render 
Leibniz’s Law? Interestingly, at no point is this methodological question addressed by 
anyone of them who endorse the interpretation of the principle at  stake here. Is the 
version I proposed somehow better? I believe so, in particular if the aim is to be faithful 
to Leibniz’s original claim: ‘Whatever is true of a thing is true of anything identical with 
that thing, since anything identical with that thing is that very thing itself.’ Suppose we 
stipulate that the concern of being faithful to Leibniz’s dictum is not pressing, is the 
version I propose still somehow better? Yes it is, because it  is the most parsimonious 
one, and explanatory parsimony is largely  endorsed by  philosophers in Lewis’ wake. 
Secondly, it does not produce a puzzle which it then struggles to explain, and lastly it 
does not make any pronouncement on the scope of the quantifiers allegedly involved in 
the principle, and on how temporality  should be regimented. Actually, the way classical 
logic address quantification and regiments temporality might partly  bring about the 
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generation of the problem, all the same affecting the solution.219  As soon as 
quantification is restricted so that the quantifiers are said to range only over some kinds 
of things rather than others, as soon as temporality is treated as philosophers in Lewis’ 
wake did, clearly some metaphysical assumptions are smuggled in; assumptions that 
affect the overall principle which is no longer just a logical principle but it turns into a 
metaphysical one. A move which, most likely, brings with it a good deal of 
metaphysical disagreement.220 221
 Suppose for the time being that my argument is plausible; the question is then 
whether quantification for some reason needs to be restricted, and if it does why. I am 
not sure how to answer this question, perhaps the question has no easy answer. 
However, what I shall stress is that generally the inclination of a perdurance theorist is 
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219  It all needs to be taken with a grain of salt, in particular in the light of Lowe’s distinction between a 
Semantic and a Metaphysical problem which regards the attribution of temporary intrinsics. See footnote 
174 for an overview and references.
220  Here is what Armstrong says: “Here is an argument for saying that a person today and a person 
yesterday are not strictly identical: Strict identity is governed by a principle that is called the 
Indiscernibility of the Identicals.  This says that if a is strictly identical with b, then a and b have exactly 
the same properties. Sameness of things gives sameness of properties.  It is sometimes called Leibniz’s 
Law. (For those who find it helpful, it can be expressed is symbols: (∀P)(∀x)(∀y)((x = y) ⊃ (Px ≣ Py)), 
where P ranges over properties, and x and y range over all entities.” Armstrong, D.M. (1989). Universals. 
An Opinionated Introduction.  Boulder, CO.: Westview Press,  3.  Surely Armstrong talks the talk, and to 
some extent I agree with what he says,  but unfortunately how he then accounts elsewhere for temporal 
parts and perdurance (See for instance Armstrong, D.M. (1980). “Identity Through Time”. In P.  van 
Inwagen (ed.) Time and Cause: Essays Presented to Richard Taylor. Dordrech: Reidel, 67-78) betrays 
that he does not walk the walk after all.
221 As far as I understand this issue, there might be a further assumption, more or less explicit, that needs 
to be added to the mix, the fact that seemingly standard first-order logic carves reality at its joints, as it 
were. See for instance Sider: “My inquiry will be guided by logical conservatorism: for the most part I 
will not give serious consideration to views that challenge standard logic. [...] A related but more 
contentious assumption is that modern logic’s quantificational apparatus mirrors the structure of reality 
[...].” Sider, T. (2001). Four-Dimensionalism. An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, xvi. See also Lewis, D.K. (1968). “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic,” 
Journal of Philosophy,  65: 113-26. His attempt to preserve the apparatus of ‘all-purpose extensional 
logic’ when it comes to regimenting modal discourse is exemplary. Logical conservatorism has been 
extremely popular, say, in Quine’s wake (and even earlier). I shall address issues related to this as well as 
my skepticism in the third part of the thesis on existence. For the record, I am not quite sure that standard 
logic adequately carves reality at its joints; matter-of-factly there are some puzzling situations which I 
believe cannot be suitably addressed by that apparatus as I shall show later on.
quite permissive when it comes to setting up boundaries to quantification;222 but then 
for some reason I fail to grasp why quantification is then restricted so that  out of the 
blue there is a problem of change.
 I confess the situation is every bit as suspicious as it looks and I cannot help 
feeling that something has gone missing although presently I might not be able to point 
at any particular wrongdoing apart from those above. What I am certain of is that this 
traditional way  of generating the problem of change is not as clear or straightforward as 
perdurance theorists believe it is. As a perdurance enthusiast, I am convinced that the 
problem of change as traditionally generated is not a problem unless the aim is to make 
one up, and then to put forth temporal parts as a solution to it. Further to this, given that 
the problem of change has been used to show endurance’s intuitions about persistence 
contradictory (or to harbour a contradiction), that line of thought turned out extremely 
unfair towards endurance since it  showed it contradictory on the basis of unreliable and 
philosophically questionable arguments which I think is an instance of bad philosophy. 
To conclude, as pointed out above, there are better and even more intuitive ways of 
motivating perdurance. The notion of temporal parts makes good sense however the 
whole thing ought to free itself from the ghosts of its recent past in order to move 
forward.
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222  The question whether there is unrestricted quantification has recently received much attention, in 
particular whether it makes sense the idea of a quantification over a domain comprising absolutely 
everything there is. Quantification, as a ubiquitous feature of our language and thought,  is an extremely 
contentious topic which unavoidably I will touch upon in the third part of the thesis on existence. It is also 
a complex one since it is intimately related to other quite contentious issues in contemporary metaphysics, 
namely composition , vagueness, time, persistence, etc. For an overview of the recent debate see Florio, 
S.  (2014). “Unrestricted Quantification”. Philosophy Compass 9: 441-54. References relevant to the point 
I sketched above are: Lewis, D.K. (1991). Parts of Classes. Oxford: Basil Blackwell; (1998). Papers in 
Philosophical Logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sider, T. (2001). Four-Dimensionalism. An 
Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Clarendon Press,  xvi-xxiv; (2009). “Ontological Realism”. In 
D. Chalmers,  D. Manley & R. Wasserman (Eds.) Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of 
Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 384-423.
1.4 Part I: Conclusions
 To summarise: I began this first part of the thesis by  deploying my 
terminological commitments, talking about perdurance as the doctrine of temporal parts, 
whether instantaneous or short-lived. Thus, the expression ‘four-dimensionalism’ means 
the view that space and time are somehow alike - the alleged degree of similarity to be 
investigated in the next chapter - which is neutral regarding the question whether there 
are temporal parts or whether we shall reject them.
 I then started my  investigation into the relationships between perdurance and its 
branching off into theories of time and existence from the prima facie evidence that 
things change. The reason why  I decided to frame the investigation looking into 
persistence at first is because - to reiterate - the fundamental datum that we experience 
is the fact that things change, and that despite the fact that they change they still 
continue to exist as the same. In other words, they exist at more than one time 
notwithstanding the change they go through. This datum cannot be denied on pain of 
being preposterous and unreasonable.
 Upon careful analysis, that evidence seems to be able to ground both accounts of 
how things persist, perdurance and endurance; and as I pointed out later on in my 
argument, with some adjustments the playing field seems to be somehow levelled; both 
views can legitimately draw upon a good amount of intuitions and common sense 
considerations. The reason why I pursued that line of argument is because I believe that 
the evidence coming from intuitions and common sense considerations is an adequate 
(and perhaps the only, at least on my view of metaphysics) starting point if a philosophy 
is then to be constructed. Secondly, I believe it could be a suitable (if not the one only) 
way to gather agreement from both parties so that, most importantly, such evidence and 
agreement could be then communicated, something which the contemporary debate 
seems to have failed to achieve. If this line of argument is plausible, then it seems that, 
initially both parties, perdurance and endurance, know what the other is talking about, 
and that their opponents understand them. From there then, the harsh road of the 
philosophical regimentation of that  discourse, intuitions, and common sense 
considerations is open; in the case of perdurance, the fact that the attempt to develop a 
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definition of temporal parts which could be adequately grasped by the opponent turned 
out to be a failure might just be contingent; perhaps acknowledging what has been 
remarked above, and surely with more theoretical efforts an adequate definition could 
be forthcoming. If not, still the rock bottom of the idea of parts in time would still be 
understandable.223
 In the subsequent chapter, I looked into what David Lewis called ‘the principal 
and decisive objection against endurance’ which in turn seems a decisive argument for 
perdurance and temporal parts, namely the problem of temporary  intrinsics. At the 
outset, I showed that the problem is an instance of a major as well as long-standing 
philosophical issue, to wit the traditional problem of change. Looking at Lewis’ 
problem from the perspective of the problem of change enabled me to frame the debate 
along two distinct, although intimately related, strands: an argument for perdurance 
which draws upon the problem of the instantiation of incompatible properties, and a 
second one which relies on Leibniz’s Law. In both cases, there seems to be compelling 
evidence that  casts doubt on the established ways to frame and account for the problem. 
Regrettably, despite my sympathy for perdurance, I found that evidence quite 
compelling, and I had to acknowledge that that very line of argument could be furthered 
and strengthened to the conclusion that Leibniz’s Law generates a metaphysical 
problem which in turn requires metaphysical tools in order to be solved (as Lewis, 
Heller, and Sider claim) insofar as the principle itself is formulated and interpreted 
metaphysically  to begin with. But that could mean overlooking the true essence of the 
principle which is first and foremost a principle of the logic of the identity.
 If this line of argument is plausible then the myth of the problem of change is 
debunked, at  least as set  up in that paradigmatic way by perdurance. If there is no such 
problem then also Lewis’ ‘principal and decisive objection against endurance’ might 
well fade away. An objection which in the first  place boosted the doctrine of temporal 
parts but which now appears to lack any philosophical ground (or at least  it  looks as 
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223  Given Lowe & McCalls’ definition of endurance which claims that ‘An object endures iff (i) it lacks 
temporal parts, and (ii) it exists at more than one time’ I believe that there is a sense in which the 
definition could make sense only if the endurance theorist has somehow an understanding and 
appreciation of the notion of temporal parts.  Conversely, the cogency of the definition would be certainly 
weaker without such understanding, something like ‘An object endures iff (i) it lacks temporal parts - no 
matter what they are - and (ii) it exists at more than one time’. Generally, a denial which lacks prior 
understanding does not look to me fair or promising so I think that my remark that understanding and 
agreement could be gathered on what is on the background of the notion of temporal parts complies with 
the gist of a proper definition of endurance as I take it to be Lowe and McCalls’.
though it has been downgraded: from a metaphysical problem to perhaps a semantic one 
as Lowe points out to Lewis).
 To conclude, if we engage in how perdurance advocates have accounted for the 
theory  - namely defining temporal parts as in Sider, and finding support for it in the 
problem of change - then I believe the scenario does not look particularly  promising for 
perdurance: a case in which it is not clear what temporal parts are (at least  in a way in 
which it can be clearly communicated to the opponents) but also a case in which the 
principal argument (according to an eminent supporter of perdurance) showing what 
sort of philosophical work they  carry  out seems to vanish; so that in addition to the fact 
that it is not clear what they are, similarly  it is less clear what they do.224 However, even 
if temporal parts might not be univocally defined, and one of the main arguments in 
their favour might not be genuine, it  is still interesting to note that there are better, more 
intuitive ways, of motivating perdurantism, as pointed out in chapter 1.3.1.225
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224  Temporal parts are considered to carry out decisive philosophical work in respects other than just the 
problem of change. Recall for instance McGrath’s five points in favour of temporal parts: 1. Arguments 
from spatial analogy; 2. Arguments from relativistic considerations; 3. Arguments concerning the solution 
of the puzzles of coincidence; 4. Arguments concerning the explanation of intrinsic change over time; 5. 
Arguments from considerations of the vagueness of composition. Therefore, my argument against point 5 
is not meant to sink temporal parts as a philosophical device, rather to get things back into perspective. 
For an interesting overview of why/how temporal parts could be useful see Le Poidevin, R. (2000). 
“Continuants and Continuity”. The Monist 83: 381-98.
225  For some reasons that I cannot help, the situation reminds me of Bishop Berkeley’s argument against 
material substance: “The general idea of being [first strand to the meaning of material substance] seems to 
me the most abstract and incomprehensible of all. As for its ‘supporting qualities’ [second strand to the 
meaning of material substance]: since it cannot be understood in the ordinary sense of those words [...] it 
must be taken in some other sense; but we aren’t told what the other sense is.” and this it looks to me to 
mirror the criticism of the incomunicability of the notion of temporal parts. In addition, focussing on what 
philosophical work material substances carry out Berkeley had it that: “‘Even though external bodies 
aren’t absolutely needed to explain our sensations,’ you might think, ‘the course of our experience is 
easier to explain on the supposition of external bodies that it is without [...] So it is at least probable [that] 
there are [external bodies]. But this is not tenable either. The materialists admit that they cannot 
understand how body can act upon spirit,  or how it is possible for a body to imprint any idea in a mind; 
and that is tantamount to admitting that they don’t know how our ideas are produced. So the production 
of ideas or sensations in our minds can’t be a reason for supposing the existence of matter or corporeal 
substances, because it admittedly remains a mystery with or without that supposition.” Berkeley, G. 
(1901). “The Principle of Human Knowledge”. In A.C. Fraser (ed.) Berkeley’s Complete Works.  Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, London: Nelson, 266. Replace, in the first half of the quote ‘material substances’ with 
‘temporal parts’ whereas in the second what philosophical work material substances are supposed to carry 
out with the temporal parts’ one, and the conclusion will follow: it is not clear what they are; it is not clear 
what they do, philosophically speaking; therefore why and on what grounds should we posit them in our 
theory? 
1.5 Perdurance, Endurance, and Stage: towards a novel definition?
 Before moving to the next part of the thesis in which McGrath’s first argument 
for temporal parts will be explored, I shall make some brief considerations about the 
definitions of the two main contenders as theories of persistence considered so far (for 
completeness including the stage view) in the light of some notions spelt out in this 
chapter.
 We saw early  on how Lewis’ definitions of perdurance and endurance were 
prima facie a fair and plausible taxonomy of the debate over persistence at that point in 
time. The notion of endurance was probably the most contentious one, in particular 
because of Lewis’ reference to the expression ‘wholly present’, and how he then used it 
against endurance theorists (who by the way made the mistake of accepting Lewis’ 
definition of their own view). All this was common currency till 2009 when Lowe & 
McCall decided to re-establish some order crafting a new definition of endurance, as we 
now know in terms of a lack of temporal parts plus the usual formula of ‘existing at 
more than one time’. They also raised an interesting remark calling into doubt Lewis’ 
definition of persistence as a neutral word ‘something persists iff it exists at more than 
one time’ since the expression itself is not univocal: that is, what perdurance and 
endurance mean by the phrase ‘existing at more than one time’ is different (see Lewis’ 
‘partly’ or ‘wholly’).
 Be this as it  may, given all the considerations that  have been offered so far, I 
guess I might attempt to slightly tweak the notions of persistence, perdurance and 
endurance as to make clearer what they actually  mean, first and foremost to me, and 
perhaps if my understanding is correct, to others interested into the debate as well.
 In doing so, I shall take advantage of expressions like ‘bearer of properties’ 
which is hopefully uncontentious. I take to stand for ‘whatever entity exhibits whatever 
feature’ without any commitment whatsoever to any specific account of the nature of 
the bearer of properties or the properties. I shall also opt for the expression ‘direct’ as 
meaning something along the lines of ‘without appealing/depending on/being relative to 
anything else’. My understanding and use of ‘direct’ should not be assimilated to the 
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expression simpliciter which is widely as well as wildly used in the literature. 226  
Lastly, I shall employ  the expression ‘discontinuous’ in place of ‘incompatible’ since I 
think change is generally about things exhibiting different features at different times.
 So much so, the following reflects my personal understanding of what the 
different parties in the debate want to say and defend. I shall begin with Lewis’ neutral 
word:
 Persistence: The direct bearer of the discontinuous/incompatible227  properties 
 persists iff it exists at more than one time;228
 Perdurance: The direct bearers of the discontinuous properties perdure iff 
 they  are not numerically identical at each time it exists (temporal parts or stages) 
 whereas the indirect bearer of discontinuous properties is (worm or 
 aggregate).229
 Endurance: The direct bearer of the discontinuous properties endures iff it is 
 numerically identical at each time it exists.
 Stage Theory (Exdurance): The direct bearers of the discontinuous properties 
 (instantaneous temporal parts/stages) exdure iff although they are singly self- 
 identical they are not numerically identical one to the others at each time they 
 exist.
As mentioned above, these characterisations summarise my understanding of what’s at 
issue when those expressions - persistence, perdurance, endurance, and stage view - are 
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226 What simpliciter means for perdurance (or whether it makes any sense at all) is an interesting question. 
For instance, Sider considers simpliciter and atemporal to be synonymous. Sider, T. (2001). Four-
Dimensionalism. An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 57.
227 I this case by ‘discontinuous’ I primarily mean ‘different features at different times’.
228 I must confess that I am not particularly satisfied by this characterisation of persistence but at the same 
time I do not know how to pin down my intuitions and common sense considerations other than that. See 
also footnote 5 in McGrath’s piece on the issue whether Lewis’ definition of persistence begs the question 
against stage theory. McGrath, M. (2007).  “Temporal Parts”. Philosophy Compass 2: 744. Also, as I 
briefly mention in footnote 105, one way to go could be to disentangle the notion of persistence from the 
one of diachronic identity, if it makes sense at all.
229 Of course, the statement is vacuously true if by ‘numerically identical at each time it exists’ is read in 
terms of self-identity. Surely it is but the question is not about synchronic identity rather it is about how 
numerical identity is inflected, as it were, in a diachronic context. For the record, the first half of the 
definition happens to overlap with the definition of exdurance, and I think the overlap is the whole point 
of Sider’s book on four-dimensionalism. For the record, pace Lewis I can see very little room to 
accommodate the idea of temporary intrinsic properties qua intrinsic when predicated of the worm or 
aggregate: Lewis as a worm is straight in virtue of having a temporal part which is straight; similarly with 
his being bent.  On my view, this way of putting it falls prey of Lewis’  first (wrong) solution to the 
problem of temporary intrinsics: shapes become relational.  If this is plausible, and so is the consideration 
that shape cannot be relational, then I guess it looks like Lewis might be somehow compelled to revise his 
non-committal attitude towards the priority of the temporal parts over their aggregates and vice versa,  a 
question he never adequately addressed.
brought in. Nothing crucial depends on their being true or not; it was mainly an attempt 
to try and make clear some of the intuitions and considerations that they try to convey.
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Part II: Time
 The train of thought expounded in chapter 1.2 concluded suggesting that the core 
in the background of the notion of temporal parts relies on the further and slightly for 
the moment impalpable assumption that time and space are analogous in some respects, 
more or less decisive: mainly in respect to having parts but also in terms of the reality of 
distant objects and the relativity  of here and now, as in Sider. Acceptance of this seems 
to suggest that the analysis of the thesis that space and time are alike (henceforth the 
similarity thesis) which is seemingly implied by the idea of temporal parts must 
somehow come before the assessment of the notion of temporal parts itself, of what they 
are and whether there are any; as the analysis of the premises of an argument or 
inference precedes the assessment of the conclusion.
 Part I looked at a few issues concerning the nature and existence of temporal 
parts, with a view to shedding some light on the state of the play of the debate in the 
literature. The import of an exploration of the notion of temporal parts was revealed in 
its evincing that there is a solid bedrock to the notion consisting of intuitions and 
common sense considerations. Evidence which in turn seems to entangle the idea that 
space and time are similar in some respect, in particular relatively to how things take 
them up by having parts.
 Interestingly, in the literature there seems to be a strand of the relatively recent 
debate that looked into the topic of the similarities between space and time from a 
similar perspective: from our language and talk about things in space and time - a 
perspective which touches upon spatial and temporal parthood. Thus, I believe it might 
be helpful to examine, although briefly, what that debate was initially about, where it 
came from, and finally, if any, what the outcome was. A closer look could perhaps help 
to clear up our understanding of the similarity thesis itself, and in turn potentially shed 
light on the question about the nature as well as the existence of temporal parts.
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 The investigation into the similarity  thesis and how it affects the question about 
the nature of time will be pursued in this second part of the thesis which is dedicated to 
time. The outcome of the analysis of the debate on the analogies between space and 
time which began in the early  ‘50s will be found somehow unsettling. Although the 
main conclusion is still considered common currency nowadays, to wit the idea that 
time is a continuum, yet the feeling is that in the end, although quite a few interesting 
issues have been touched upon and uncovered, little theoretical gains have been 
achieved in the direction of what the similarities are as well as towards a clearer 
understanding of the nature of space and time.230 Surely, this does not mean that the 
exercise itself was in vain; there is a sense in which it furthers the understanding of 
what was at issue (space, time, and their analogies) but also enlightens the reasons why 
in the end the reader is left  wanting, in particular in the light of some achievements of 
the best philosophy of the sciences available.
 Following from this, since the investigation in some sense turned out wanting 
from the point of view of understanding and clarifying the similarity thesis, I shall 
endeavour myself to put forth a proposal. Drawing upon Lowe, and in keeping with 
Sider’s guidelines spelt out above concerning the respects in which space and time are 
alike, to wit parts, the reality  of distant  objects, and in terms of the relativity of here and 
now, I shall argue for a sense in which time could be likened to space (in order for 
things to take it up by having parts in it). Namely, in terms of co-existence of entities 
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230  One quick remark I shall bring up throughout this part of the thesis is that at no point have 
philosophers of a certain bent (naturalists and physicalists a là Quine and Armstrong) with an interest in 
these issues pursued an adequate philosophy of space and time. Perhaps they have. Perhaps their 
requirements for a philosophy of space and time are slightly different from what I think they should be 
and therefore such asymmetry is what brings about my remark above. However,  a common attitude 
ascertained in the literature is the idea that the best sciences available are, among other things,  the 
ultimative repository of what space and time are. Generally, by the best sciences available it is meant 
modern physics. (see for example Quine’s famous passage about naturalism as “the recognition that it is 
within science itself, and not in some prior philosophy, that reality is to be identified and described” in 
Quine, W.V.O. (1981). Theories and Things, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,  21. As for 
Armstrong, for an exceptional discussion to his naturalism and physicalism see Mumford, S. (2007) 
David Armstrong. Stocksfield: Acumen Publishing Ltd, Ch. 1) As I shall point out briefly towards the end 
of Part II, to consider the best sciences available those in charge of telling us what space and time are 
could be problematic for two reasons: (i) if the question which investigates the nature of space and time is 
genuinely metaphysical then an answer which comes straight out of the best sciences available might not 
be the most appropriate one; it could be if the question were scientific in the first place. And (ii) it is all 
but clear what time is in modern physics. Conversely, what seems to be clear is that there may be different 
(and sometimes incompatible) meanings of time according to the different domains in which the scientific 
investigation is pursued, to wit different physical theories.  See for example Rovelli, C. (1995). “Analysis 
of the Different Meaning of the Concept of Time in Different Physical Theories”. Il Nuovo Cimento 11: 
81-93; Callender, C. (2005). “Time in Physics”.  In D.M. Borchert (ed.) Encyclopedia of Philosophy,  2nd 
ed., 493-501. Skow, B. (2007). “What Makes Time Different From Space?”.  Noûs 41: 227-252; 
Callender, C. (2008). “What Makes Time Special”. Submission to FQXi essay contest; and “The 
Differences Between Time and Space”, Ch. 4 of Craig’s forthcoming book which Craig kindly sent me a 
preview copy of.
(points, objects, or events) along three directions of space and the one of time (instants, 
objects, or events) which is in turn what seemingly  makes them dimensions in which 
reality extends (although for my overall argument nothing crucially depends on it).231
 Successively, I shall apply the outcome of my argument which ventures space 
and time to be alike in terms of co-existence (of points/instants, objects, or events) to 
the initial intuitions and common sense considerations, those in the background of the 
notion of temporal parts to see how they hang together. As it  stands, they do hang 
together quite nicely; in particular the latter (the initial intuitions and common sense 
considerations in the background of the notion of temporal parts) seems to presuppose 
the former (time considered in terms of co-existence of instants, objects, or event) for 
things to have parts in time as they do in space. Eventually, for argument’s sake, I shall 
take space and time to be alike in terms of co-existence of points/instants, objects, or 
events along the three dimensions of space and the one of time.
 The next task will be to understand how the ontological implications of this 
picture of time coheres with those of the traditionally settled views in the philosophy  of 
time, therefore a brief overview of the contemporary debate in philosophy  of time will 
be offered. In addition to merely  spelling out the different views which liven up the 
debate, the focus of the outline will be assigned once again to the intuitions, 
assumptions as well as ontological implications which the different positions in the 
debate purport to defend. At the end of the exposition, my understanding of the 
similarity thesis as developed above (namely, venturing space and time to be alike in 
terms of co-existence of points/instants, objects, or events) will be applied to the current 
debate in the philosophy of time (at least to the brief overview that I will give) with a 
view to discovering which one(s) among the views outlined could suitably  be suggested 
by it. I shall argue for the conclusion that a view of time which is motivated by  those 
requirements is eternalism whereby all entities in time, either instants, objects, or events 
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See also “The Differences Between Time and Space”, Ch. 4 of Craig Callender’s forthcoming book (see 
footnote 232).
co-exist. Conversely, if the combination of eternalism and Sider’s third respect in which 
space and time are alike, to wit in terms of the relativity of here and now, gives rise to 
the B-theory of time as Sider himself claims,232 then I shall conclude that the view of 
time that seemingly conforms best with the picture of time which the similarity thesis 
conveys is the B-theory of time (although I shall show that such a commitment to the B-
theory might not be necessary).
 To conclude, if the initial intuitions and common sense considerations are taken 
seriously and to their conclusion, philosophically speaking; then there seems to be a 
sense in which the original core, to wit the fact that things seem to take up  time as they 
do space, motivates eternalism or the B-theory. In other words, that very core which has 
been established to bolster the notion of temporal parts and perdurance too (as the 
doctrine of temporal parts) turns out to branch into the philosophy of time motivating a 
specific view. So that it is plausible to conclude that assuming the core in the 
background of the notion of temporal parts, namely the evidence that things have parts 
in time as they do in space; and the fact that that core seems in turn to presuppose the 
similarity thesis, according to which space and time are alike in some respects, parts, 
reality  of distant objects, and in terms of the relativity of here and now; perdurance, as 
the doctrine of temporal parts, motivates an eternalist or B-theoric view of the nature of 
time. And this is where Part II ends.
 Part I began with an ordinary case of a composite object persisting through time 
undergoing change in parts and/or features; a situation employed in order to point out 
some intuitions I myself happen to have as well as to make some common sense 
considerations pertinent to that case. Part II shall not commence by urging upon 
intuitions or by making more or less common sense considerations: my intuitions about 
time happen to be quite flimsy, anything but strong and robust as in the case at the 
outset of the previous part of the thesis. I take the evidence that things change and some 
persist through it as an undeniable datum in metaphysics (if anything counts as datum in 
metaphysics). It is a basic experience of which we possess strong intuitions and we can 
make forceful common sense considerations which qua talis demand to be questioned. 
Conversely  though, I do not think the same awareness could be applied to the nature of 
time.
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 “Quid est ergo tempus? Si nemo ex me quærat, scio; si quærenti explicare uelim, 
nescio. Fidenter tamen dico scire me quod, si nihil præteriret, non esset præteritum 
tempus, et si nihil adueniret, non esset futurum tempus, et si nihil esset, non esset 
præsens tempus.”233 As Augustine wondered, my intuitions about time are not as robust 
as those I have about change. Time is elusive: I believe I know what time is but when 
one asks me to explain actually I do not. Interestingly though, according to the passage 
just quoted, there seems to be an intimacy between time and notions like ‘passing 
away’ and ‘coming to be’ which as I point out in this thesis qualify as a variety of 
change. So time and change are closely tied and between the two change, according to 
my intuitions, is what seems to be clearer and more powerful.
 In any case, there is at least one respect  in which I think time is somehow as 
familiar as change: more often than not it  can be represented spatially  (or better the 
passage of time can be represented spatially). For instance, take one of those diagrams 
which purports to show the variation of the velocity of an object over an interval of time 
(generally  a two dimensional diagram, with one axis representing time, the other space, 
for the sake of simplicity). Actually, there is no need to add complexity  drawing upon 
examples from the sciences; ordinary experience is full of examples which suggest 
something along the same lines. Take a clock, one of those old fashioned ones usually 
hanging in train stations; the two hands representing hours and minutes respectively 
span across the body of the clock (which by the way extends in two dimensions) and in 
so doing they measure time: “a ‘long’ time is one which a slow-moving body takes to 
cover a standard distance and a ‘short’ time is correspondingly one which a fast-moving 
body takes to cover the same distance.”234 Since I believe that my  grasp of this feature 
of time (or of its representation) is quite vivid, I shall keep it at the back of my mind in 
the following of the investigation but yet time is not as easily intelligible as change is.
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temporal representation in Le Poidevin, R.  (2008).The Images of Time: An Essay on Temporal 
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2.0 The Similarity Thesis
Space and time have been considered to have striking similarities since the early  days of 
the Analytic enterprise235, but  only in the mid-1950s a significant philosophical debate 
sparked from two articles by Richard Taylor.236  The dispute that followed saw well-
regarded scholars joining forces for and against Taylor’s project.237  To outline the 
traditional view on the analogy between space and time, I shall draw upon Richard 
Taylor’s project of ‘showing that temporal and spatial relations [...] are radically 
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alike’238  in his startling article Spatial and Temporal Analogies and the Concept of 
Identity. The debate flared and although many  rejected Taylor’s extreme approach, some 
accepted ‘various aspects of Taylor thesis.’239 The debate gradually faded away without 
establishing or rejecting Taylor’s visionary proposal, and by the beginning of the 1980s 
it was replaced by new disputes, for example over the status of material beings, and 
their persistence conditions. However, the idea that space and time are somehow alike 
lingered on, and curiously  the new philosophical trend briefly spelt out above ended up 
employing the terminological as well as conceptual apparatus of that  tradition. Perhaps 
space and time were not identical in almost every respect but yet not dramatically or 
fundamentally different: temporal parts were looming large.
 For convenience’s sake, the analysis of the similarity thesis shall mainly  be 
limited to Taylor and Schlesinger’s contributions, although I will highlight  interesting 
points brought up by others insofar as deemed conspicuous and relevant to the purposes 
of this chapter overall. I shall then begin outlining Taylor’s project:
 “Unlike space [...] time has always been regarded [...] as a dark subject  of 
speculation, fundamentally enigmatic, even incomprehensible. [...] I want to 
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Complete Similarity of Space and Time, and claimed it to be flat-out false, nevertheless appreciated that 
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counterparts, do have them.’  Therefore, he cannot avail Taylor’s thesis because ‘there are necessarily true 
temporal propositions which do not have true spatial counterparts.’
remove some of this mysteriousness by showing that temporal and spatial 
relations, contrary to much traditional thought, are radically alike; [...] that  (1) 
terms ordinarily used in a peculiarly temporal sense have spatial counterparts and 
vice versa, [...] (2) many propositions involving temporal concepts which seem 
obviously and necessarily true, are just as necessarily but  not  so obviously true 
when reformulated in terms of spatial relations; or, if false in terms of spatial 
concepts, then false in terms of temporal ones too.”240
 This is Taylor’s Doctrine of the Complete Similarity of Space and Time 
(DCSST)241. After outlining the basic concepts employed, such as ‘place’, ‘distance’, 
‘being present’, ‘length’ or ‘extension’, ‘part’, ‘direction’, ‘physical object’ or ‘event’, 
with the proviso that all of them can be either spatial or temporal, the procedure 
followed is 
“to state, in the form of objections, propositions which are commonly thought  to be 
obviously true, and a radical difference between space and time.”
For each proposition, Taylor then claims
“in the form of a reply, that  no such difference is expressed, that is, that  no such 
proposition is, under similar interpretations, true of time and false of space or vice 
versa.”242
The objections Taylor deals with are seven: i) ‘An object cannot be in two places at 
once, though it  can occupy two or more times at only one place’; ii) ‘Time, unlike 
space, is an essential ingredient of motion and change, of coming to be and passing 
away’; iii) ‘Things can change their spatial positions, but not their temporal ones, these 
being, once given, fixed eternally’; iv) ‘But time is something moving, or flowing, in a 
fixed direction from future to past and at an unalterable rate; space on the other hand, is 
everywhere the same and unchanging’; v) ‘While time may not then in any clear sense 
be moving, yet everything in time moves from the future through the present and on 
into the past’; vi) ‘But two things can move closer together or farther apart in space; 
they  cannot do so in time’; vii) ‘A thing can move back and forth in space, though it 
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cannot do so in time.’ Statements vi) and vii), perhaps the most obvious, and 
contentious to dispel, receive further clarification a few years later, in 1959, with the 
article Moving About In Time, in which Taylor shows that, as a matter of fact, things can 
be move about in time as freely as in space. 
 Intriguing and ambitious, Taylor’s plan was doomed. As Schlesinger noticed, the 
seed of Taylor’s failure lies in claim (2) above: he maintains that  many propositions 
involving temporal concepts which are true in spite of appearances, have corresponding 
true propositions involving spatial concepts - but  not all of them.243 If many but not all, 
then space and time are identical in many respects but not in all; therefore Taylor’s 
project is in peril. Curiously though, Schlesinger believes that Taylor is entirely 
successful in showing in each case that the lack of parallelism is illusory  [...]’; that is, 
those (and only those) temporal propositions outlined above which are true but whose 
spatial counterparts do not  seem to be so, are indeed true as well but they are not all the 
propositions that there are.244
 In a sense, Schlesinger’s paper runs with the hare and hunts with the hounds. On 
one hand, DCSST is claimed not to be exhaustive but he is willing to acknowledge 
Taylor’s achievements; on the other, Schlesinger’s paper purports to contend Taylor’s 
thesis that space and time are alike. Let us see how.
 Since there are some temporal propositions which fall outside Taylor’s complete 
translations’ scheme, it is vital to understand:
“[at first] what criterion are propositions involving temporal concepts divided into 
the class the members of which remain true when formulated in terms of spatial 
relations and the class the members of which cease to be true when formulated. 
[and secondly] why all those true temporal propositions which do have true spatial 
counterparts, do have them.”245
In other words, what properties space and time share, and why the possessing of such 
properties is sufficient to secure the existence of true spatial counterparts. Such new 
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knowledge will allegedly turn out to increase our understanding of the nature of space 
and time.
 After briefly spelling out what it takes for a given true temporal statement to 
have a true spatial counterpart, i.e. to change each temporal term in a temporal 
statement into the corresponding spatial one no more no less than as in Taylor, 
Schlesinger warns against three cases of misfire of the translating procedure:
 i) When the terms involved do not seem to refer immediately  to temporal or 
spatial predicates but still they do, via such predicates being somehow built in. 
Therefore, more true temporal statements which happened to fail to be true in spatial 
terms, could now easily go through the translating process.246
 ii) The problem of the best candidate for the translation of a true temporal 
statement into a true spatial one. The process of replacing temporal terms with spatial 
one is not an algorithm: some statements must be tweaked heavily  in order for the 
translation to carry through. But once each spatial counterpart is suitably chosen, 
nothing prevents the resulting spatial statement from being true.
 iii) The difference in dimensionality between space and time: the former being 
three-dimensional while the latter is one-dimensional. For instance, it seems to be quite 
plausible to say that if an object occupies times t1 and t2, it also occupies all the 
temporal positions in between. In space instead, if a body occupies place p1 and p2, it 
does not necessarily follow that it occupies all the points in between. It occupies only 
the points on one of the infinitely  many  lines connecting p1 and p2. Thus, Schlesinger 
claims that for the thesis that space and time are alike to fall through there would need 
to be a case in which the translation failed even in one-dimensional space.
 As far as I can see, what in Taylor and Schlesinger’s project seems to truly  resist 
the desired outcome is a difference in the number of dimensions between space and 
time. Although this may seem to undercut the thesis that space and time are indeed 
radically alike, Schlesinger triumphantly  observes that ‘everyone will acknowledge that 
there is a certain disanalogy  between space and time but it is of a kind which cannot 
serve as a counter-example to the thesis that space and time are radically alike.’247
 To clarify, the three reasons above determine the conditions which, incidentally, 
could lead the translating process to a breakdown. Once met, the translation may  still 
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fail to convey a true spatial proposition. The failure, Schlesinger reassures, affects 
neither the soundness of the translating process nor does it flat-out undermine the thesis 
that space and time are radically  alike (although it is far from being clear, in 
Schlesinger’s argument, the reason why this happens to be the case). So much so, on top 
of the difference in dimensionality (iii), there seems to be two more reasons to deny the 
analogy, in fact  given by Schlesinger as reasons why the translation might mistakenly 
be thought to fail are:
 iv) ‘Temporal positions happen to be ordered, therefore time has a direction.’ 
Such a statement can hardly  be dismissed as false; however, its spatial counterpart, i.e. 
spatial positions are ordered, therefore space has a direction, is false. Schlesinger 
observes that a consideration of this sort is usually bolstered by the fact that what 
provides time with a direction is somehow connected with some physical facts, for 
instance the fact that entropy increases. Thus, the opponents of the analogy thesis may 
well have some room to crack the project. But as Schlesinger puts it, it would be a 
mistake to take this feature of entropy, i.e. the fact that physical states with increasing 
amount of entropy are associated with increasingly more advanced position in time, as a 
feature of the nature of time; ‘it is not the case that time as such is different from space 
but rather that entropy is differently  related to time than to space.’248 This is just one of 
a number of cases which reveal a difference in how the laws of physics operate with 
respect to time and to space but what really  matters is that this difference by no means 
entails an intrinsic difference between time and space. Again, apart from negligible 
details, space and time are yet radically alike.
 Lastly, v) the difference in the role played by spatial and temporal parts 
respectively when theoretically a reduction or truncation of either the temporal duration 
or the spatial extension of a material being is carried out. Sure enough, in the temporal 
case the outcome would be nothing but a short-lived piece of that  machinery, perfectly 
functioning as the original but just a bit shorter in time. Also, the temporal remainder, 
i.e. the temporal portion that by stipulation was chopped off, would not be affected by 
the reduction, indeed it would still be a proper functioning piece of machinery. By 
contrast, this may not happen in a spatial case where we try to reduce the amount of 
space taken up by a table, depriving it of some of its spatial parts. The outcome would 
surely affect the object as whole as well as the spatial remainder, which would hardly 
135
248 Ibid. 166.
look like and function as the original table. Thus, a profound difference between 
temporal and spatial parts clearly comes out of this last case. Once more though, 
Schlesinger points out that  ‘it  seems clear that most people would not interpret this as a 
manifestation of a fundamental difference in the nature of space and time itself.249 They 
would think of the difference as a consequence of the peculiar nature of the composite 
object; of how the difference affects its parts’ hanging together and its relations to time 
and space.
 According to Schlesinger, the reason why the considerations above do not harm 
the similarity thesis is simple: apparently there are cases exactly  conversely 
asymmetrical with respect to space and time to those advertised above: cases in which 
removing a number of temporal parts would affect the object in a way in which a 
reduction in spatial parts would not. The existence of these two kinds of cases is what 
guarantees the lack of fundamental disanalogy between space and time. Once more, 
nothing prevents space and time from being radically alike.
 So much for what it takes for the translations to go through. The obtaining of 
true spatial propositions from true temporal ones does not flat-out  bolster DCSST 
though. Simply, not all of the true temporal statements have a true spatial translation. 
Therefore DCSST is false. However, this fact does not imply that DCSST will not be 
defended by  some. Schlesinger in fact offers three arguments to defend it, though these 
all fail to establish their purpose. 
 vi) The first  argument, by analogy with iv), exploits the idea that there are cases 
in which there is a difference in the relationships that an object bears in respect to time 
and to space. However, Schlesinger notes, if this argument were employed to defend 
DCSST, it would render the thesis itself vacuously  true: each counter-example to the 
thesis could be explained away  in terms of the relationships the object in question bears 
to time or space rather than as indicative of some sort of real difference between space 
and time.
 vii) The second argument that Schlesinger offers hinges upon i), to wit the 
instances of misfire of the translating procedure: instances due to the fact that some 
terms in a temporal (or spatial) statement have temporal (or spatial) terms built in; such 
that some instances which count as counter-examples to DCSST are so because they 
contain terms or expression which covertly  refer to time (or space). As we now know 
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from i), this attempt proves to be a dead-end for even once all the terms in the true 
temporal statement are indeed replaced with ‘terms which are unquestionably free 
entirely of all temporal reference’250 this fails to deliver a true spatial statement.
 viii) Lastly, the reason why the spatial counterparts (of temporal statements) 
which are not true do not violate DCSST could be that the thesis refers only to 
similarities in properties which are necessarily possessed by time, rather than properties 
possessed only contingently. According to Schlesinger, then the question becomes the 
following: are temporal order and direction necessary properties of time? As pointed 
out above, entropy does not seem to qualify as a logical law, therefore at some stage it 
may  turn out false or at least  conceivably so. This would then imply that a process 
which is now directed in one way, could be reversed and run the other way round. 
Although quite plausible in the case of entropy, it may not hold as well for time:
“it  is not easy to say [...] how far we can go on depriving time of properties it has 
by virtue of the fact  that  laws of physics happen to be what they are and it would 
still continue to retain its conceptually essential features of temporality. [...] there 
must be a limit  to this process somewhere and if we went  on depriving time of too 
many properties associated with it we would end up with something we would no 
longer recognise as time. [...] if the law concerning the increase of entropy of 
closed systems had few exceptions this would not  yet  drastically transform the 
nature of time, however, we could not  dispense with all those phenomena which 
endow time with a direction and be left  with what would still recognisably be 
time.”251
Thus, what seems to be contingent is that particular processes are ordered in time, and 
their different temporal parts suggest the order the moments they occupy are in. What is 
necessary  is that ‘there are phenomena which endow time with order and direction, for 
otherwise our familiar concept of time would break down.’252
 Schlesinger claims that in addition to ‘order’ and ‘direction’, time seems to 
possess two other necessary features, although presumably derived from the two above, 
temporal relations like ‘before’ and ‘after’. In turn, somehow depending on ‘before’ and 
‘after’ there seems to be other notions which play a role in the concept of time, the 
notions of past, present, and future, and the flow of time, to wit the appearance of the 
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present continually shifting. Therefore, the statement that ‘Time has an order and 
direction’ is not only to be considered true but also necessarily true. The lack of those 
properties just  spelled out would crucially  affect the concept of time. A time without 
order, direction, temporal relations, past, present, and future, and the flow would be no 
longer recognised as time.
 In conclusion, Schlesinger briefly mentions two last counter-examples to 
DCSST: ix) the fact that time is somehow ontologically more fundamental and 
indispensable than space, and x) that everything in time is temporally  related to 
everything else in time (unity  of time). Both seem to count as counter-examples to 
DCSST since the true statements in which those ideas are expressed once the temporal 
terms are swapped with the spatial ones do not seem to preserve the truth of the 
resulting statement. The former is rendered by the fact that there seems to be objects 
which have temporal position and extension but no spatial position and extension. 
However, the spatial counterpart of it  does not seem to be as plausible, i.e. things that 
have spatial positions and extension without temporal position and extension. As for the 
latter, the idea that everything else that is in time is temporally  related to everything else 
in time seems to be a true statement. If so, its spatial translation does not.
 Therefore, as Schlesinger finally but reluctantly admits at the beginning of 
section IV, ‘on a proper understanding of the matters it becomes fully  evident [...] that, 
with the exception of certain respects, time and space should differ from one another in 
indefinitely many ways.’253 Although this may  indeed turn out to be the case, the truth is 
that such dissimilarities are outweighed by a striking resemblance which makes space 
and time radically alike. Thus, what are the properties space and time share, responsible 
for such conspicuous similarities? And, why must there be such a class of properties 
with respect to which space and time cannot fail to be fully analogous? As Schlesinger 
triumphantly claims:
“Space and time are both continua [my italic] and possess therefore all the 
properties continua in general possess [...] Any statement which is true about an 
occupant  of a pair of [general] continua X and Y must  be translatable into a pair of 
true statements (and not just into a single true statement  since X and Y are 
interchangeable) specifically referring to space and time. [...] if there is a true 
statement asserting that an occupant  which has a specified relation R to any 
continuum X which it  occupies must have a specified relation S to any second 
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continuum Y which it  also occupies, then it must  be the case that  it  is true of some 
occupant  of space-time that if it  has relation R to time then it  has relation S to 
space and also true of some occupant  that  if it has relation R to space then it has 
relation S to time.”254
Which amounts to saying that a true temporal statement is true, if true at all, not in 
virtue of any peculiar time-like property of time or similarly  by  virtue of some space-
like property of space, rather by those features of time and space which they  possess, 
necessarily, since each one of them constitutes a continuum, and therefore it  must have 
a spatial counterpart for both space and time are continua to equal degree.
 However, in addition to these shared properties, recalling what Schlesinger only 
reluctantly acknowledged a few lines above, time and space possess an ‘indeterminate 
number of extra properties’, in virtue of which space and time are specifically  space and 
time and not just instances of a continuum. Therefore, insofar as:
“we are dealing with continuum properties, we are dealing with what constitute a 
common denominator of space and time and hence we shall find space strictly 
resembling to time. But  as soon as we consider the time-like properties of time, i.e. 
properties which are not imposed upon time simply because it  is a continuum but 
are those by virtue of which time becomes the unique continuum it  is, and as soon 
as we consider the space-like properties of space, there is no reason whatever why 
there should be, and consequently we should not  expect at  all to find, similarities 
between the two.”255
In the light of the above, to test  if any true temporal statement whatsoever could have a 
true spatial counterpart would not  be particularly challenging: firstly, to reformulate the 
original statement in pure continuum terms, a universal statement about any continuum 
if the statement is about time alone, or any pair of continua if it refers to space and time. 
To achieve this, temporal terms like ‘duration’ amount to ‘extension’; ‘to occur at t’ to 
‘to be at point t‘; ‘to be simultaneous with’ to ‘to be at t the same point as’, and so on. 
Secondly, when all the terms are translated, then we would need  to see if the continuum 
statement is necessarily  true of all continua. If it is then the true temporal statement has, 
necessarily, a true spatial counterpart; if it is not then it does not.
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 Therefore, following Schlesinger, we can conclude that space and time are 
fundamentally alike insofar as both are continua.256 In all of the other respects, they are 
trivially not. Thus, the analogy thesis remains unscathed, space and time necessarily 
alike (as long as they are instances of a continuum).257
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256  But they might not be, in particular if the theory of loop quantum gravity (LQG) is correct. For an 
instructive overview see Smolin, L. “Atoms of Space and Time”. Scientific American. January 2004: 
66-75.
257  The debate about the analogies between space and time lingered wearily for more than thirty years, 
and so the issues covered are surely wider than just those highlighted in chapter 2.0. Curiously, some of 
the most interesting contributions made did not regard the topic of the analogies between space and time; 
rather they ended up shedding light on the notion of temporal parts, their individuation, as well as the 
concept of object. See for example Thomson, J.J.  (1965).  “Time, Space, and Objects”. Mind 74: 1-27; 
Meiland, J.W. (1966).  “Temporal Parts and Spatio-Temporal Analogies”. American Philosophical 
Quarterly 3: 64-70; and Butterfield,  J.  (1985). “Spatial and Temporal Parts”.  The Philosophical Quarterly 
35: 32-44.
2.1 What Time Would Be Like If It Were Extended: A Proposal
 The aim of the previous chapter was to look at a strand in the contemporary  
debate in analytic philosophy  which investigated the similarity thesis with a view to 
understanding what the analogies between space and time looked like as well as making 
sense of perdurance’s alleged commitment to a picture of reality which claims space and 
time to be similar in some respects.
 The idea that space and time are alike comes hand in hand with the claim that 
time, like space, is somehow extended, and for some reasons that will be clearer later on 
qualifies as a dimension; the fourth, in which reality  is in turn extended. It goes without 
saying that such a case may well require an analysis of space and time which singles out 
space’s features against time’s ones in a way which could help  to accommodate Sider’s 
claim that space and time are alike in three respects: in respect to parts, to the reality  of 
distant objects and in terms of the relativity of here and now. The investigation pursued 
in the previous chapter shed some light on a few issues underlying the debate about the 
similarity thesis which could have interesting bearings on the notion of temporal parts. 
However, it did not fully  address the question about what time would be like if it had to 
be alike space in the three respects just mentioned.
 Therefore, in this chapter I shall endeavour to address that question - what would 
time look like if it had to be analogous to space in respect to parts, the reality of distant 
objects, and the relativity  of here and now? For my argument, I shall assume Sider’s 
formulation of the similarity thesis in his 2008 piece quoted quite a few times early on, 
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and see how it hangs together with an argument Lowe devised to show in what sense 
time could be considered a dimension in which reality is extended.258
 By now, we are familiar with how Sider formulated the similarity  thesis thus I 
shall begin briefly recalling his points before outlining Lowe’s argument. The first clue 
regards parts:
“Temporal parts theory is the claim that time is like space in one particular respect, 
namely, with respect to parts. First think about  parts in space. A spatially extended 
object  [...] has spatial parts [...] Likewise [...] a temporally extended object has 
temporal parts.”259
For example, a bike generally  has a frame, two wheels, a saddle, and other components 
each one of which legitimately  qualifies as one of its spatial parts. Take the same bike, 
suppose it  was put together before the 1998 Tour of Italy, it  was then ridden during the 
same race, and in four weeks time eventually  employed to ride the Tour de France. 
There is then a part of that bike limited to the three weeks of the Tour of Italy, another 
one when the bike sat in a warehouse for the following four weeks, and lastly  a third 
part twenty one days long during which the bike starred at the Tour de France. Each one 
of which legitimately  qualifies as one of the bike’s parts in time. The second clue 
concerns the reality of distant objects:
“The existence of temporal parts is just one way that I believe time to be like space. 
Here are two others [...] 1. Time is like space regarding the reality of distant 
objects. Spatially distant objects, such as objects on Mars, are just as real as objects 
here on Earth. The fact that Mars is far away doesn’t  make it any less real [...] 
Likewise [...] temporally distant  objects, such as dinosaurs, are just  as real as 
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258  Sider,  T. (2008). “Temporal Parts”. In T. Sider, J. Hawthorne & D.W. Zimmerman (eds.) 
Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics. Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 241-62. See also Conee,  E. & Sider, T. 
(2007). Riddles of Existence : A Guided Tour of Metaphysics.  Oxford: Clarendon Press,  Ch. 3. Lowe, E.J. 
(2006). “Endurantism Versus Perdurantism and the Nature of Time”. Rivista di Filosofia Neoscolastica 4: 
713-27. Of course Lowe at no point would endorse that view of time. In fact, he challanges it suggesting 
that: “The implication is that things that exist at different times need not in any sense co-exist. There is no 
sense , for example, in which I co-exist with Julius Caesar. This, at bottom, is why I deny that time is a 
dimansion of reality, in the way that the spatial dimensions are: for if entities are differently located along 
some real dimension, they must stand in certain real (external) relations to one another,  which they can do 
only if they are in some sense co-existent. For a real relation can obtain only between entities all of which 
exist together.” Lowe, E.J. (2006). “How Real is Substantial Change”. The Monist 89: 275-93. However, 
his formulation turned out quite promising for the purposes of my argument, and this is why I decided to 
take advantage of it.
259  Sider,  T. (2008). “Temporal Parts”. In T. Sider, J. Hawthorne & D.W. Zimmerman (eds.) 
Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics. Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 241-62.
objects we experience now. The fact that a dinosaur is far away in time doesn’t 
make it any less real.”260
Sider’s example is instructive enough without me adding any further gloss to it. I 
believe what he is appealing to by claiming that spatially and temporally distant objects 
‘are just as real’ as objects here on Earth and those we experience now is simply  that 
they  both exist as those existing on Earth. So that the former exist in the same way as 
the latter do whether close or further away in space or in time. Lastly, the third clue for 
the similarity thesis:
2. Time is like space regarding the relativity of here and now. When speaking to my 
brother in Chicago, if I say “here it is sunny” and he says “here it is raining”, we do 
not really disagree. What  is called “here” changes depending on who is speaking 
[...] There is no one true here [...] the word ‘now’ works analogously [...] There is 
no one true now. What is called “now” changes depending on who is speaking.”261
Again, the last clue is fairly self-explanatory so I believe it does not require any further 
addition on my part. Anywhere is ‘here’ and anytime is ‘now’ from some perspective. 
Thus, supposing the clues to be fairly clear, and the image that they  yield to 
understandable, it  is fair to say that no massive theoretical gap needs to be closed in 
order for this picture to be intelligible.
 What has to be done now is to draw an account and develop it of what time 
would look like if it had to incorporate those clues; and in doing so I shall take 
advantage of the argument Lowe constructed to show in what sense time could be 
considered a dimension in which reality is extended.262 First things first, looking for a 
suitable instance of ‘dimension’ Lowe notes that:
“Our obvious and indeed only paradigm for a dimension in this sense is provided 
by the three dimensions of space [...] The ‘three-dimensionalist’ of space does not 
consist  in there being three distinct spatial dimensions, each distinguished from the 
others by some intrinsic features [...] space and its material contents are three-
dimensional inasmuch as they are extended in three independent, if exactly similar, 
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262  Lowe, E.J.  (2006). “Endurantism Versus Perdurantism and the Nature of Time”.  Rivista di Filosofia 
Neoscolastica 4: 713-27.
ways - and these ‘ways’ of being extended we can call the three different 
dimensions of space.”263
Thus, what Lowe claims is that when it comes to speculating around the notion of 
dimension in regards to time, it is legitimate to draw upon space as a guideline, for 
space is the ‘obvious and indeed the only paradigm for a dimension in this sense.’ A 
second, but not less important hint that we can take from Lowe’s passage is the link 
between ‘dimension’ and ‘being extended’: a dimension is a way  of being extended. 
Surely we need more but for the time being let us just keep it at the back of our mind.
 Lowe notes that time is commonly represented spatially (see the example of the 
two-dimensional diagram cited in the first chapter of Part II) but some other things 
could be as well (for instance, the evolution of a gas in terms of its pressure and 
temperature). Lowe’s point is that although they  may appear similar situations (all the 
temperature and pressure’s values are lined up in a continuum, each being assignable in 
principle a real number as in the velocity graph), in the latter case when we say  that  the 
gas is at temperature T1 and pressure P1 what we actually  mean is not that  temperature 
and pressure are strictly speaking dimensions as in the other case. When we say that the 
gas is at temperature T1 and pressure P1 we mean that  ‘the word at here is not to be 
thought of as assigning the object a location along some dimension.’ To be at  a greater 
temperature (or pressure) is not like to be at a greater distance.
 So much so, what we still need to figure out is in what sense then ‘to be at a 
greater distance’ is somehow peculiar; in other words, ‘what it is that qualifies some 
feature of reality  as a dimension, in the same sense in which the three dimensions of 
space do.’ Lowe’s proposal is as follows:
“A set of relations [spatial or temporal] serve to distribute the entities related by 
them along one or more dimensions only if there is a sense in which entities 
standing in those relations must coexist.”264
In the case of space, for instance considering relations of distance (Lowe includes 
direction and betweenness too but for simplicity I shall limit the example to distance) 
the idea is that:
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“one object or event can be, in a direct  or non-derivative sense265, at a certain 
distance from another [...] only if the objects or events in question coexist  in 
time.”266
The reason why ‘to be at  a greater distance’ is somehow different from ‘to be at a 
certain temperature/pressure’ is the following:
“According to my proposal, the reason is that  objects need not  coexist in order to 
differ in temperature [or pressure].”
Briefly, the metaphysical reason in the background of the difference between relations 
of distance and those of temperature/pressure is that the former is an instance of an 
external relation whereas the latter a case of internal ones267 and ‘it is at most only 
external relations that require the coexistence of their relata.’
 Thus to say  that Durham is 17.000 km distant from Sydney implies that both 
Durham and Sydney coexist: there are two points/regions of space 17.000 km apart one 
of which is called Durham whereas the other one Sydney.268 Suppose, that  the city  of 
Sydney does not exist (arguably  a case in which we will have to amend the world map). 
Would it still be intelligible to claim that Durham and Sydney are at a certain distance 
from one another, say  17.000 km?269 Apart from a sort of manner of speech sense (we 
commonly talk about non-existing things in a way which sounds perfectly fine; and we 
are also able to achieve practical purposes with it) I think it would make little sense 
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265  As Lowe notes, if space is absolute, namely consisting of points always standing in the same spatial 
relations to one another then there is an indirect sense in which two objects or events not coexistent in 
time could be at a certain distance from one another since both coexisted in time with a certain absolute 
position in space and these two positions have always stood at a certain distance one another. Mutatis 
mutandis,  the same applies even if space is not absolute but there are objects since an object could 
function as a frame of reference. For instance, if an object o coexisted with e1 at t1 and with e2 at t2 then 
there might be an indirect sense in which relative to o’s frame of reference e1 and e2 are at a certain 
distance.
266 Ibid.
267 Roughly speaking, by internal relation it is usually meant one which supervenes upon intrinsic features 
of its relata whereas by external relation one which does not. See Armstrong, D.M. (1978).  Universals 
and Scientific Realism: A Theory of Universals Vol. II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 84-90; 
and (1997). A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Ch. 2. 
268 Objects or events would do too.
269 Either tenseless or a present tense are, my feeling is that it will not matter to the outcome.
since it would amount to saying that Durham is 17.000 km far from something that does 
not exist.270
 Along the same lines, it seems plausible to claim that coexistence in time looks 
like a plausible condition for relations of (temporal) distance to obtain. Likewise, 
exploiting Lowe’s example, to say that the event of my birth is in a certain temporal 
relation with the death of Julius Caesar, roughly 2021 years distant from one another 
(which is pretty much the same as saying that  the event of my birth is later than the 
event of Julius Caesar’s death) means that both the relata of the putative external 
relation must coexist. Conversely, supposing that my birth and Julius Caesar’s death do 
not coexist, say the latter does not exist; this would amount to saying that one of the 
relata of the temporal relation is lacking. My birth would then be 2012 years distant 
from nowhere (or that the event of my birth is later than nothing). Again, Lowe’s point 
sounds plausible to me.271
 Of course, as Lowe notes, a twist has to be added to this already intricate 
scenario: the putative likelihood of this scenario (whether or not temporal relations 
serve to distribute the entities related by  them along a dimension of time and whether 
their relata must coexist) is surely  affected by  a certain debate in the philosophy of time 
(which will be tackled in the next chapter). The question whether two temporally distant 
events must coexist for the supposition of their being one later than the other to be 
intelligible can have two different answers depending on our understanding of time 
(whether static or dynamic272):
“[...] the dynamic theorist  will, or at  least should, say that the answer to this 
question is ‘No’. Clearly, [the two events] do not coexist in time, because, by 
hypothesis, the time at which [one] exists is earlier than the time at which [the 
other] exists. [...] Such theorist should therefore say that  [one] has ceased to exist 
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that would either imply that space is absolute or that is not but there are objects; namely, the two 
situations outlined above by Lowe in which two objects not coexistent in time could be distant from one 
another, a sense of being distant which is indirect. See footnote 269.
271  I spoke of coexistence at the same time in the spatial case but not in the temporal one; if time were a 
dimension requiring coexistence, then there would be coexistence between temporally and spatially 
distant objects. However, this does not vitiate what I just said about space, it merely points out how the 
notion of coexistence could be expanded if one adopted eternalism.
272  See Gale’s distinction between static and dynamic temporal. Gale, R.M. (1968). The Philosophy of 
Time. London: Lowe & Brydone, Ch. 2.
simpliciter by the time at  which [the other] exists. For such a theorist, there is no 
totality of coexisting entities which includes both [events]”273
Whereas,
“[...] for the static theorist, there is a sense in which [both events] coexist, even 
though they do not exist  at  the same time. For such a theorist, there is a totality of 
coexisting entities which includes both [events], namely, the totality of all events 
spatiotemporally related to either [one] or [the other]. If we want a term to 
characterise this sense of coexistence, we could say that [...] all these events coexist 
in actuality, or are coactual.”274
To conclude, for the static theorist there is (tenselessly) a totality  of all existing events 
which includes the event of my birth and the event of Julius Caesar’s death. Those 
events are all somehow lined up or distributed in one direction, to wit along a 
dimension, the supposed fourth dimension of time. For this very reason, we can then 
sensibly say  that  the former is later than the other (which is a roundabout way of saying 
that they are 2021 years distant from one another).
 I shall employ  this picture of time devised by Lowe, for the purposes of my 
argument which, as I shall briefly recall, purports to find a link between what has been 
previously  claimed in the thesis and the current debate in the philosophy of time, with a 
view to seeing which one, if any, of the different positions in the philosophy  of time 
could best accommodate the picture of time which comes out of Lowe’s argument. (The 
relevant previous claims of the thesis being: the fact that  a core of intuitions and 
common sense considerations about things and their parts in space and time seems to lie 
in the background of the notion of temporal parts; if this evidence is plausible then it 
seems to call for an analogy between space and time; and if the analogy is fully 
explored then it seems to suggest a view of time as extended and as a dimension in 
which reality  is extended, in the sense disentangled just above). The feeling is that that 
picture of time could be best accommodated within an eternalistic or the B-theoretic 
view of time.
 However, before highlighting the different views in the contemporary debate in 
the philosophy of time, what still needs to be done is to see if Lowe’s picture of time 
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Neoscolastica 4: 719.
274 Ibid.
can accommodate Sider’s three respects in which time is said to be similar to space: in 
respect to parts, reality of distant objects, and the relativity of here and now; as well as 
the one that came out from the investigation into the similarity thesis: to wit the thought 
of time as a continuum.
 Could Lowe’s picture of time qualify as an instance of a continuum? Lowe 
himself gave us a clue when comparing a bi-dimensional diagram which represents the 
evolution of the velocity of a body  (v=s/t) with a graph representing the relations 
between temperature and pressure in a gas. Temperature and pressure can indeed be 
represented in the same way as space and time are since ‘the possible values of pressure 
or temperature belong to a continuum, each being assignable in principle a real number 
given some suitable choice of a unit of measurement.’ Or more perspicuously, and with 
some additional technicality:
“Time, we ordinarily suppose, is not  composed of discrete moments, each having 
both a unique predecessor and a unique successor. Rather, between any two 
moments there is always a third. That  is what  it  is for time to be dense. Now, 
arguably at least, time is not merely dense but continuous. That  is, the series of 
instantaneous temporal moments is isomorphic to the real-number series.275
Formally,
“A cut S, S’ in the time series is the division of the series at some point  to yield two 
series, S and S’, such that any moment is in either S or S’ but  not both. Time is 
continuous if, and only if, for any cut S, S’, there is either a last  moment  of S but  no 
first moment of S’ or a first moment of of S’ but no last moment of S.”276
To conclude:
“It  is standardly assumed that time is continuous, rather than dense and non-
continuous.”277
Going back to Lowe’s picture of time, there is clearly  nothing which hinders it  from 
being continuous; therefore, it seems plausible to say  that it complies with the 
requirement which resulted from the analysis of the similarity thesis.
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276 Ibid. 384. As Le Poidevin points out, if time were just dense then there would be a cut such that there 
would be neither a last moment of S nor a first moment of S’.
277 Ibid.
 Further to this, Lowe’s picture of time seems consistent with Sider’s three 
respects in which space and time are alike: parts, reality of distant objects, and in terms 
of the relativity  of here and now. First, in terms of parts: a spatially extended object has 
spatial parts likewise a temporally extended object has temporal parts, as Sider put it. 
Lowe’s picture assures that time is extended as well as a dimension in which temporally 
extended objects extend. A temporally extended object has parts in time thus it seems 
plausible to conclude that Lowe’s picture of time complies with Sider’s first  respect in 
which space and time are alike.278
 As for the second respect, the reality  of distant  objects, spatially distant objects, 
say the planet Mars, are just as real as objects here on Earth. ‘The fact that Mars is far 
away doesn’t make it any less real’. Likewise ‘temporally distant objects, such as 
dinosaurs, are just as real as objects we experience now.’ ‘The fact  that they are far 
away in time doesn’t make them less real.’ As Lowe puts it, instants, objects, or events 
in time are all coexistent; they all exist in the same fashion, none of them is less real 
then another. For example, past and future instants, objects, or events are as real as 
present ones. Future outposts on Mars coexist with dinosaurs and the chair I am now 
sitting on, they all exist  in the very  same way; they just happen to be located at different 
times. This being so, it  looks plausible to conclude that Sider’s second respect in which 
space and time are alike fits nicely within Lowe’s picture of time.
 Lastly, space and time are alike in respect to the relativity of here and now. ‘if I 
say ‘here it is sunny’ and he says ‘here it is raining’, we do not really  disagree. What is 
called “here” changes depending on who is speaking’. Which means that ‘there is no 
one true here.’ More importantly, ‘the word “now” works analogously.’ ‘What is called 
‘now’ changes depending on who is speaking.’ so that again ‘there is no one true now.’ 
In other words, if all there is to time is this continuum made up by coexisting entities, 
there is a sense in which anywhere is here (or that anywhere has a good deal of claim to 
count as ‘here’) and anytime is now (or similarly that anytime has a perfectly good 
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find it quite difficult to think of something non-extended which has nonetheless parts. For an overview on 
the debate see Markosian, N. (1998). “Simples”. The Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76: 213-29. 
Parsons, J.  (2000). “Must a four dimensionalist believe in temporal parts?”. The Monist 83: 399-418. 
Markosian, N. (2004). “Simples, stuff and simple people”.  The Monist 87: 405-21. Simons, P. (2004). 
“Extended simples: a third way between atoms and gunk”. The Monist 87: 371-85. Braddon-Mitchel,  D. 
& Miller,  K. (2006). “The Physics of Extended Simples”. Analysis 33: 222-26. McDaniel, K. (2007). 
“Extended Simples”. Philosophical Studies 133: 131-41.
claim to be considered ‘now’), according to some perspective.279  Therefore, Lowe’s 
picture of time seems to comply with Sider’s third respect too.
 If this is the case, then what we have here is an account of what time would be 
like so that things could take it  up by having parts in it, for temporally distant objects to 
be real in it, and lastly for an indexical term like now to be relative in it. In addition, as 
we saw early on, this picture seems to fit quite nicely with the outcome of the analysis 
of the similarity thesis, namely the fact that time is an instance of a continuum.
 So much so, the next thing I shall attempt to do is to see which one, if any, of the 
views that have been animating the current debate in the philosophy of time is able to 
best accommodate such a picture. Before doing so, a brief overview of the state of play 
of the debate in the philosophy of time seems to be required.280
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280 Inevitably, the overview will have to be coincise. It will be well beyond the remit of this work to give 
a thorough exposition of the state of the play of the current debate in the philosophy of time. 
Nevertheless, the presentation of the issues brought up will be driven by the relevance to the overall aims 
of the thesis which once again will focus on the element of intuitions and common sense considerations 
that a view of time more or less covertedly endeavours to defend. In addition, once such assumptions 
have been untangled, the next task shall be to show whether and how different views could be nonetheless 
intertwined at that level of understanding.
2.2 Metaphysics of Time: The Current State of Play
 This chapter presents an overview of the most common views in the philosophy 
of time, focussing, as usual, on the intuitions they endeavour to defend as well as the 
interplay, if any, between different theories. I shall emphasise that the same approach 
deployed in the first part  of the thesis will be used again here: at no point will the task 
be to adjudicate among different theories; preferably, the aim will be to unveil the 
assumptions, interrelations, and commitments lurking in the background of different 
theories with a view to seeing whether and in what respects theories seemingly at odds 
may actually  share a common ground. As pointed out at  the outset, this survey will be 
concise (but hopefully rigorous), since a thorough presentation and disentanglement of 
the many issues in contemporary philosophy of time would exceed the remit  and the 
purposes of this work.
 First, some preliminary remarks. Despite being different in several respects, all 
the views presented shortly ultimately  concern what exists. They  all attempt to unravel 
and establish the temporal as well as the ontic structure of the world.281  The fact that 
time and temporality are defended in various ways (sometimes at odds with one 
another) does not amount to undermining such a basic ontological awareness. Secondly, 
it shall be noted that often in the literature when presentism, eternalism, and the like, are 
introduced, the definition goes, tentatively, along with expressions like roughly 
speaking which in a sense seems to give the pulse of the situation: it  may  be 
controversial whether such views could be exhaustively defined at all. Whether or not, 
the general consensus seems to be that the different names devised to classify  the 
various views are labels to some extent ambivalent: there may be no one view that 
epithets like ‘presentism’ or ‘eternalism’ reliably  single out. Ideally, they  should be 
perhaps seen as umbrella terms under which a cluster of views variously nuanced 
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Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 211-45; and Rea, M.C. (2009). 
“Four-Dimensionalism”. In M.J. Loux & D.W. Zimmerman (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press: 246-80. Although Rea’s four-dimensionalism amounts to my 
eternalism.
falls.282  With this in mind, I shall proceed to introduce the first group  of terms: 
Presentism, Eternalism, Growing Blockism, and The Moving Spotlight theory.
 Presentism is generally defined as the thesis that  only the present moment, 
objects, or events exist. Which instant, object, or event is present changes from one 
moment to another.283  Thus, presentism so defined consists of two theses: one 
ontological, concerning what exists, namely  the present moment, objects, or events; and 
a dynamical one, which claims that the totality of what exists changes over time.284 A 
different moment, set of objects or events take over as a new present moment comes 
into existence, whereas the previous moment, set of objects or events goes out of 
existence as soon as that moment ceases to be the present. Provisionally, it  seems 
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282  The situation is comparable to the aftermath of Lewis’ definition of perdurance and endurance. For 
instance, Jonathan Lowe who was a keen endurantist adversed Lewis’ definition in terms of wholly 
present. As we know, he indeed produced a definition of endurance which did away with that phrase 
which was guilty of being exceedingly obscure. In respect to the philosophy of time, it may be instructive 
to see what Lowe himself claims regarding his alleged presentism: “Some may merely want to claim for 
the present and presently existing things some kind of ontological distinctiveness which is still consistent 
with acknowledging the reality of the past and perhaps of the future. This, indeed, is the only variety of 
‘presentism’ that I would be prepared to subscribe myself.” Lowe, E.J. (2006). “Endurantism Versus 
Perdurantism and the Nature of Time”. Rivista di Filosofia Neoscolastica 4: 713-27. For the record, Lowe 
had to slightly revise his commitment to presentism in the aftermath of The Four-Category Ontology as a 
consequence of his new view of existence and change according to which all change is existential change. 
See Lowe, E.J. (2004). The Four-Category Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Ch. 12.
283  For an exposition of presentism from a presentist point of view (which includes objections and 
answers) see Crisp, T.M. (2003). “Presentism”. In M.J. Loux & D.W. Zimmerman (eds.) The Oxford 
Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 211-45. See also Lowe, E.J. (2011). 
“Presentism and Relativity: No Conflict”. In R. Ciuni, K. Miller & G. Torrengo (eds.) New Papers on the 
Present. Philosophia Verlag. McKinnon, N. (2011). “Characterising Presentism”. In R. Ciuni, K. Miller & 
G. Torrengo (eds.) New Papers on the Present. Philosophia Verlag. Bourne, C. (2006). A Future for 
Presentism. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Markosian, N. (2006). A Defense of Presentism”. In S. Haslanger 
& R.M. Kurtz (eds.) Persistence: Contemporary Readings.  Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press: 307-42. 
Le Poidevin, R.  (2005). “Presentism”. In E. Craig (ed.) Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: 
Routledge. Merricks, T. (1999). “Persistence, Parts and Presentism”. Noûs 33: 421-38; and (1995). “On 
the Incompatibility of Enduring and Perduring Entities”. Mind 104: 523-31. For a critical analysis see Le 
Poidevin,  R. (1991). Change, Cause and Contradiction.  New York: St Martin Press, 36. Sider, T. (2001). 
Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time.  Oxford: Oxford University Press,  Ch. 2.  On 
the modal/temporal analogy see Lowe, E.J. (2006). “Endurantism Versus Perdurantism and the Nature of 
Time”. Rivista di Filosofia Neoscolastica 4: 719. Craig, W.L. (2002). “Presentism: A Defense”. In Q. 
Smith & A. Jokic (eds.) Time, Tense and Reference. Cambridge,  MA: MIT  Press, 391-408. Lowe, E.J. 
(2001). A Survey of Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 42-3 & 131-3. Lewis, D.K. (1986). 
On the Plurality of Worlds.  Oxford: Blackwell. Adams, R.M. (1974). “Theories of Actuality”.  Noûs 8: 
211-31. Reprinted in M.J. Loux (ed.) The Possible and the Actual: Readings in the Metaphysics od 
Modality. Ithaca,  NY: Cornell University Press, 190-209. On the alleged clash between presentism and 
SRT  see Putnam, H. (1967). “Time and Physical Geometry”. Journal of Philosophy 64: 240-7. Godfrey-
Smith, W. (1979). “Special Relativity and the Present”. Philosophical Studies 36: 233-44. Hinchliff,  M. 
(2000). “A Defense of Presentism in a Relativistic Setting”. Philosophy of Science 67: 575-86. Savitt, S. 
(2000). “There’s no Time Like the Present (in Minkowsky Spacetime)”. Philosophy of Science 67: 
563-74. For a new perspective on presentism (and whether it squares with the A-theory) see Tallant, J. 
(2013). “Defining Existence Presentism”. Erkenntnis 79: 479-501; and (2012). “(Existence) Presentism 
and the A-theory”. Analysis 72: 673-81.
284 See Baron, S. & Miller, K. (2013). “Characterising Eternalism”. In R. Ciuni, K. Miller & G. Torrengo 
(eds.) New Papers on the Present. Philosophia Verlag: 31-67. Miller, K (2013) “The Growing Block, 
Presentism and Eternalism”. In H. Dyke & A. Bardon (eds.) A Companion to the Philosophy of Time. 
Wiley-Blackwell: 345-365.
plausible to say that the picture just outlined looks as though it complies quite nicely 
with our common sense understanding of time and what exists: our world dynamically 
changes over time, new things come to be whilst old ones pass away.285
 On the other end of the spectrum, eternalism claims that past, present, and future 
moments, objects, or events exist.286 Eternalists often go on and add that what exists or 
occurs at one time is analogous to what  exists or occurs at another place, space and time 
being similar under this respect.287  Thus, eternalism consists of two theses: an 
ontological thesis, according to which all moments, objects, or events - past, present, 
and future - exist or occur in a four dimensional block of space-time; and a static thesis, 
in which the present moment does not move since there is no turnover of entities, as it 
were. Which moment is the present moment does not change.288 Interestingly, according 
to eternalism, dinosaurs and future Mars outposts exist as much as I do right now whilst 
writing this chapter up. Also the general consensus is that it  gets on quite well with what 
the best sciences currently available claim, to wit modern physics. Lastly, and curiously 
enough, it seems to accord with a peculiar feature of our common sense representation 
of time, namely  the fact that more often than not we happen to measure or represent 
time spatially, e.g. analog clocks or sundials.
 The two remaining theories of time, the moving spotlight and growing blockism 
(or the growing block theory), may fit  in between the two ends of the virtual spectrum: 
the former holding that past, present, and future moments, objects, or events exist and 
that there is an objective property - presentness - which moves across the block universe 
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285  This does not mean to say that presentism fits the bill with common sense, period.  Arguably, 
presentism does not seem to fit nicely with common sense insofar as we believe, as we ordinarily do, the 
past and the future seem to have a distinct status - i.e. the past is gone forever, it cannot be affected or 
modified by the present; whereas the future is the realm of possibility, open and to a certain extent likely 
to be affected by what happens in the present - which is something that presentism seems to force us to 
deny. Past and future do not exist, as simple as that. See also footnote 286.
286 Miller, K (2013) “The Growing Block, Presentism and Eternalism”. In H. Dyke & A. Bardon (eds.) A 
Companion to the Philosophy of Time. Wiley-Blackwell: 345-365. For the possibility to disentangle 
eternalism from the B-theory see Baron, S. & Miller, K. (2013). “Characterising Eternalism”. In R. Ciuni, 
K. Miller & G. Torrengo (eds.) New Papers on the Present. Philosophia Verlag: 31-67. Dyke, H. (2011). 
“Metaphysics of Time”. In E. Craig (ed.) Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge. 
Tallant,  J. (2008). “What is it to ‘B’ a relation?”. Synthese 162: 117-32; (2007). “What is B-time?”. 
Analysis 67: 147-56.
287 Miller, K (2013) “The Growing Block, Presentism and Eternalism”. In H. Dyke & A. Bardon (eds.) A 
Companion to the Philosophy of Time. Wiley-Blackwell: 345-365.
288 Ibid.
lighting up different times, objects, or events.289 By contrast, the latter claims that past 
and present moments, objects, or events exist but future do not. The present moves so 
that what moment is the present moment changes and the past grows.
 It is now interesting to note that the moving spotlight and growing blockism to 
some extent square with presentism and eternalism. It looks as though the moving 
spotlight would happily accept the Eternalism Ontological Thesis290 combined with the 
Presentism Dynamic Thesis291. If so, a world in which the moving spotlight were true 
would be one in which all moments, objects, or events - past, present, and future - exist 
(or are located) in a four dimensional block of space-time; a space-time in which there 
is objective becoming though: namely, which moments, objects or events would be 
present changes from one moment to another.292  By contrast, although growing 
blockism seems to reject flat-out  both presentism as well as the eternalist’s ontological 
committments nevertheless it seems to comply  with some of the two theories’ more 
elementary beliefs. Like presentism, the growing block theory takes it that present 
moments, objects, or events do exist whilst future moments do not, but alike eternalism 
it holds that past as well as present moments, objects, or events exist. A growing 
blockist world would be one in which every moment, object, or event on the four 
dimensional block would be located in the past except for those occurring on the three 
dimensional slice at the very end of the growing block which would be in the objective 
present. Adding a new slice would push the one previously at the very end of the block 
off the objective present so that it becomes part  of the objective past, but unlike 
presentism without passing out of existence.
 Suppose we would want to visually  represent these four views, for example 
lining them up along a spectrum with presentism at the far left and eternalism at the 
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289 See for example Skow, B. (2009).  “Relativity and the Moving Spotlight”. Journal of Philosophy 106: 
666-78. See also Merricks, T. (2006). “Good-Bye Growing Block”. In D. Zimmerman (ed.) Oxford 
Studies in Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 103-11.
290 All moments, objects, or events, past, present, and future, exist or occur in a four dimensional block of 
space-time.
291  The totality of what exists changes over time, and a different moment, set of objects or events take 
over as a new present moment comes into existence. Conversely,  the previous moment, set of objects or 
events goes out of existence as soon as it ceases to be the present.
292 If Presentist Dynamic Thesis  is defined as above as the claim that the totality of what exists changes 
over time, then there is a clear sense in which the moving spotlight would not agree with it. The 
Eternalism Ontological Thesis requires that the totality of what exists is fixed since past, present, and 
future moments, objects or events all exist (or coexist). Therefore, the Presentism Dynamic Thesis must 
be restricted to what presently exists.
opposite end. Surely, there might not be an easy answer as to say where and why the 
moving spotlight view and growing blockism should be placed. Tentatively, I shall 
venture that the moving spotlight would fit nicely  by  eternalism for its full committment 
to the Eternalism Ontological Thesis, in addition to taking on board a presently-
restricted version of the Presentism Dynamic Thesis. Growing blockism would instead 
sit by presentism for it accepts a concoction of elements from the Presentism 
Ontological Thesis and the Eternalism Ontological Thesis , in addition to the Presentism 
Dynamic Thesis. Interestingly, three out of four views, presentism, the moving 
spotlight, and growing blockism, preserve the idea of objective becoming as a real and 
distinctive features of time (perhaps one of the most distinguishing features): namely, 
the fact that the present moment changes from one moment to another and the totality of 
moments, objects, or events that presently exist changes accordingly.
 So much for the four most popular accounts of time.293 Before bringing forward 
and looking into a couple of more crucial terms in the metaphysics of time - i.e. A-
theory  and B-theory - I shall briefly pause and take stock on the existential 
commitments of the theories outlined above. As I made clear in the Introduction, 
existence as a philosophical notion is a decisive part  of this research project therefore it 
may  be convenient  to spend some time in advance looking at a few issues which could 
turn out relevant for the next part of the thesis. (The next part of the thesis will in fact be 
devoted to singling out how what has been achieved up to the end the second part  of the 
thesis hangs together with the philosophical debate about the notion of existence).
 As mentioned at the outset, what all these views have in common is that they are 
ultimately  theories about what exists: they  all endeavour to untangle the temporal as 
well as the ontic structure of the world. For this reason, presentism, eternalism, growing 
blockism and the moving spotlight generally consist of an ontological claim plus 
another one which tells if the theory accepts a dynamic view of the present. Let us stick 
to the ontological claims. Briefly, existence is generally rendered in the language of the 
first-order quantified logic by the existential quantifier ∃. A first crucial question 
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293  In conversation, Dr. Francis Pearson called my attention to the fact that there actually are more 
ontological possibilities than those advertised in the main text: (i) past, present, and future (instants, 
objects, or events) exist (eternalism, the moving spotlight); (ii) only past (instants, objects, or events) 
exists; (iii) only present (instants, objects, or events) exists (presentism); (iv) only future (instants, 
objects, or events) exists; (v) just past and present (instants, objects,  or events) exist (growing blockism); 
(vi) just present and future (instants, objects, or events) exist; and lastly (vii) only past and future 
(instants, objects, or events) exist. However, the key point is that the only satisfactory views for 
accommodating the picture of time devised above seem to be those which have an ontology where past, 
present, and future (instants, objects, or events) all exist.
concerns the scope of such a quantifier, that is what are the entities we can legitimately 
quantify over and say  that they exist. However, a second one and allegedly more 
difficult regards how the truth of such existentially  quantified statements is affected by 
the context in which the statements are made. Suppose that a presentist and an eternalist 
utter the following negative existential claims:294  (i) ‘There are no dinosaurs’, (ii) 
‘There are no outposts on Mars’, and (iii) ‘There is no cake’. Suppose also that when 
they  utter such claims both are in an assembly room during a meet  and greet event to 
welcome new students for the 2014 academic year. When they utter (i), (ii) and (iii) they 
are clearly  saying something true; in fact in 2014, (i’) dinosaurs no longer exist (they 
are extinct); (ii’) Mars’ outposts belong to fiction’s books and movies, and (iii’) 
regrettably, during the welcome party for the new students all the cake stored in the 
assembly  room ran out. To recap, in 2014 (time) and in the assembly room (place), for 
both presentists and eternalists (i), (ii), and (iii) would all be true. By contrast, suppose 
the presentist and eternalist claim the very same negative existentials but without the 
emphasis on when and where: (i) ‘there are no dinosaurs’, (ii) ‘there are no Mars’ 
outposts’, and (iii) ‘there is no cake’ at  all anywhere and anytime. Arguably, from the 
point of view of the presentist nothing would change: (i’) dinosaurs are extinct, (ii’) 
Mars’ outposts belong to fiction and, (iii’) at the meet and greet party  cake ran out. 
Curiously, the situation would be slightly different in the eternalist’s case. For an 
eternalist, presumably (i), (ii), and (iii) would be all clearly  false: if past, present, and 
future moments, objects, or events all exist then there is a time (located in the past) 
where dinosaurs exist; there is a time (located in the future) where Mars’ outposts exist; 
and there is a place (somewhere in space-time) where there is plenty of cake, given the 
eternalist’s persuasion that space and time are alike such that what exists or occurs at 
one time is analogous to what exists or occurs at another place.295
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294 Dinosaurs, Mars’ outposts, Santa Claus, etc. are all recurrent examples in the relevant literature as well 
as in ordinary life of things which generally do not exist. Of course, dinosaurs did (at least according to 
what paleontologists say). Perhaps, outposts on Mars will. Arguably, Santa Claus never did, does, or will.
295  In conversation, Dr. Pearson called my attention to the following: if I drop the restriction to the 
assembly room (negative existential (iii)) as I do discussing eternalism, then by analogy I should drop it 
when discussing presentism given that there is likely cake somewhere else in the world at the time of the 
meeting; in which case (iii) seems to come out false for the presentist too.  To address Dr. Pearson’s 
objection, I will have to amend the last sentence as follows: ‘and there is a place - which given eternalism 
would be equivalent to ‘there is an instant’ - (somewhere in space-time) where there is plenty of cake. Of 
course, ‘space’ in the expression ‘somewhere in space-time’ will have to be restricted to the the assembly 
room, so that in the same place (the assembly room) but at another time (earlier or later ) the sentence 
‘There is no cake’ is false.
 So much for presentism and eternalism. How about the moving spotlight theory 
and growing blockism? As in the first case scenario (with spatio-temporal restrictions, 
say in 2014 and in the assembly room), the moving spotlight theory and growing 
blockism’s upshots would somehow square with presentism and eternalism. 
Unrestrictedly  instead (anywhere and anytime), according to the moving spotlight 
theory, (i), (ii), and (iii) would all be false because the theory  shares the Eternalism 
Ontological Thesis. As for the growing block, (i), (ii), and (iii) would be false but only 
(i) and (iii) for eternalist’s reasons; whereas (ii) would be so because of the theory’s 
commitment to the non-existence of future moments, objects, or events. To recap: there 
are some statements whose natural reading tacitly restricts the domain of quantification; 
something we experience on a daily  basis, for instance when we claim that ‘All the 
students passed the exams’. Surely, what we mean is not that  all the students anywhere 
anytime passed all the exams anywhere anytime. Instead, we mean a relevant subset of 
the set of all the students as well as a relevant subset of the set of all exams. However, 
there are others which do not: for example, ‘There is no Santa Claus’, anywhere or 
simpliciter.296
 Thus, when quantification is suitably restricted presentism, eternalism, growing 
blockism, and moving spotlight agree that it  is true that (i), (ii), and (iii), when it is not 
then the disagreement exacerbates. This seemingly  bizarre outcome has led some 
interpreters to wonder whether presentism and eternalism (setting aside growing 
blockism and the moving spotlight for what holds for presentism and eternalism 
generally  holds for them as well as they share some important ontological features, as 
argued for above are just employing ‘exists’ in a different fashion and thereby are not 
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296  See Hirsch on quantifier variance versus quantifier restriction: “Lewis points out that if, looking into 
the refrigerator,  I assert, “There is no beer”, I am restricting the quantifier to (the domain of) what is in 
the refrigerator. The unrestricted quantifier, by contrast, says what exists ‘strictly’ or ‘simpliciter’. That 
the quantifier is often contextually restricted in the way that Lewis says may be granted by all. The 
question of quantifier variance, however, pertains to the unrestricted quantifier, to our concept of 
‘existence simpliciter’”. Hirsh, E. (2002). “Quantifier Variance and Realism”. Philosophical Issues 12: 
51-63. See also Hirsh, E. (2002). “Comments on Theodore Sider’s Four-Dimensionalism”. Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research 68: 658-64; and Sider, T. (2001). Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of 
Persistence and Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press, xxi-xxiv. Sider argued that some quantifier 
meanings are more natural than others thereby cutting reality better at its joints. For the record, Hirsh’s 
contention that the dispute is at the end of the day verbal applies mutatis mutandis to the perdurance 
versus endurance controversy. See Hirsh, E. (2005). “Physical-Object Ontology, Verbal Disputes, and 
Common Sense”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70: 67-97; and (1982).  The Concept of 
Identity. New York: Oxford University Press, 188-92.
really disagreeing but just talking about different subjects, whilst believing that they are 
talking about the same thing).297
 A concise and perhaps a bit too quick overview of the discussion is as follows: 
presentism and eternalism agree about the totality  of moments, objects, and events that 
existed, exist and will exist. Eternalists use ‘exists’ as to quantify over past, present, and 
future moments, objects, or events. Presentists refuse to quantify over past and future 
moments, objects, or events (on their view it would amount to quantify over non-
existing entities) since there are no such things. Thus, presentists speak truly when they 
claim that  only present moments, objects, or events exist whereas eternalists speak truly 
when they say that past and future moments, objects, or events exist. What do we make 
of this? Following from the distinction between restricted and unrestricted domains, one 
option may be to say  that they both mean the same by ‘exists’ but one party - presentists 
- is restricting the domain while the other - eternalists - is not. They  agree when they 
speak restrictedly, they do not when they speak unrestrictedly. However, presentists, 
given the definition of presentism, would not be so inclined to accept that they are 
tacitly restricting the domain; their domain is indeed unrestricted, there is only ‘the 
present’ and within it there is no restriction at all. Therefore, back to the drawing board. 
A second option would be to maintain that presentist’s and eternalist’s domains of 
quantification are the same but ‘exists’ is used in different senses; namely doing away 
with extensionality  and pointing at intensionality. Arguably, if ‘exists’ can have different 
meanings, it does so in presentism and eternalism - though it is hard to believe it given 
the understanding of ‘existence’ outlined above whereby an ambiguity in the meaning 
has to be discarded.298
 A further issue closely related to the previous one is the suggestion that no 
matter how the predicate ‘exists’ is interpreted, it will always end up rendering 
presentism and eternalism equivalent or the former trivially  false. Presentism has it that 
only present moments, objects, or events exist. One possible interpretation of this 
existential claim could be that only present things exist now. But this is no big deal and 
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297  See footnote 300. For a different way to frame the dispute between eternalism and presentism and 
thereby argue for the lack of a genuine disagreement see Craig Callender’s example of a four-dimensional 
manifold of point events each one of which carrying a lightbulb. Callender, C.  (2000). “Shedding Light 
on Time”. Philosophy of Science 67: 587-599.
298  Sider, T. (2009).”Ontological Realism”. In D. J. Chalmers, D. Manley & R. Wasserman (eds.) 
Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 
384-423; and (1999). “Presentism and Ontological Commitment”. Journal of Philosophy 96: 325-47.
consistent with eternalism. A second interpretation could be that only presently existing 
moments, objects, or events exist, existed and will exist. But this is false since it implies, 
contra presentism, that only one set of objects and/or events is all that ever exists.
 Before moving to the next two theories of time included in the current overview, 
I shall address a remark, raised in conversation by Robin Le Poidevin, according to 
which my understanding of eternalism is ‘not-standard’ since it includes the view that 
time does not pass which is a distinctive element of the B-theory rather than eternalism. 
Le Poidevin has it that standardly eternalism is taken to be the assertion that all (instants 
of) time(s) (objects, and events) are equally real. If what Le Poidevin means by ‘real’ is 
what I mean by ‘exist’ then this amounts to what I called the Eternalism Ontological 
Thesis. For argument’s sake, suppose that  Le Poidevin means this (he could not have 
done otherwise as I shall point out shortly). As advertised above, and as Le Poidevin 
adamantly stressed in conversation, there is a sense in which eternalism is an element of 
the moving spotlight view which in addition includes an element of the A-theory  of time 
as we shall shortly see. If this is the case then, he concludes, there are two separate 
debates here: (i) one over whether all times are real, only some, or just one (which is 
what has been pursued so far in this chapter); and (ii) a second one over whether time 
passes.
 In pointing this out, Le Poidevin accepts what I named the Eternalism 
Ontological Thesis but at the same time he rejects the Eternalism Static one according 
to which the present moment does not move, which moment is the present moment does 
not change since it would entail the thesis that time does not pass which is the whole 
point of Le Poidevin’s objection. Now, what I think needs to be clarified in order to see 
if eternalism does or not entail a denial of the passage of time is, at first, what the phrase 
‘passage of time’ means. Recall what the moving spotlight theory  claims: exactly one 
time has the intrinsic property presentness, presentness is the ‘spotlight’ that shines on 
just one time. Which time is present or has presentness changes. Some time has it now, 
later times will have it, and earlier times have had it. The spotlight moves along the 
series of times and it is this continual change in which time has presentness that 
constitutes the passage of time, or ‘objective becoming’ (when a B-theorist denies that 
the passage of time is a real phenomenon what she means is to refute that there is such a 
moving property that is instantiated first by earlier and then by later times).
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 Suppose this is what the passage of time consists in; the question is now whether 
eternalism does exclude it or not. Eternalism, as claimed above maintains that past, 
present, and future moments, objects, or events exist which plausibly  corresponds to Le 
Poidevin’s assertion that all times (objects, and events) are equally real. It does 
correspond since the expression ‘all times (objects, and events)’ could only  mean ‘past, 
present, and future moments, objects, or events’ whereas by  ‘real’ we stipulated that it 
amounts to ‘exist’. I shall take it as my working hypothesis. There seems to be passage 
of time because instants, objects, and events which were once future are now present 
and later on will be past. What does this mean? One way to put it could be the 
following: e.g. an A-theorist (and only an A-theorist  could since the thesis that time 
passes is genuinely A-theoretic), as we shall shortly see, will probably say  that pastness, 
presentness, and futurity are monadic properties which are instantiated by instants, 
objects, or events. In addition to this, and this is the interesting point, an A-theorist will 
also likely claim that those distinct properties denote crucial ontological differences 
between past, present, and future: e.g. the future is open, somehow changeable, the 
realm of possibilities whereas the past  is closed, immutable. Conversely, the present 
includes what is actual, namely a sort of limit between the two. If she does not express it 
in this way, it would then be sufficient to point out that those properties of pastness, 
presentness, and futurity are themselves subject to the eternalism ontological thesis.
 If this is the case, then it seems that for the passage of time to be what is 
supposed to be, it somehow implies a change in which instants, objects, or events are 
present or instantiate the property  of presentness: some instants (objects, or events) has 
it now, later instants (objects, or events) will have it, and earlier instants (objects, or 
events) have had it. This idea, a genuine element of the A-theory as Le Poidevin noted, 
in turn implies that such a difference in pastness, presentness, and futurity brings about 
decisive ontological differences between past, present, and future. One way  to see what 
the ontological differences are could be in terms of Le Poidevin’s ‘being real’: what is 
past is no longer real, what is present is what is real whereas what is future will be real. 
Thus, the passage of time seemingly implies that there are differences in the reality of 
instants, objects, or events which curiously is what eternalism denies. Another way to 
put it could be in terms of ‘existence’: what is past is what no longer exists, what is 
present is what exists, whereas what is future is what presumably will exist. Once again, 
it seems that the passage of time somehow implies there are differences in term of 
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‘existence’ (ontological differences) between past, present, and future instants, objects, 
or events which is what eternalism denies. Therefore, whether we take eternalism to be 
the thesis according to which all times (objects, or events) are real or that  past, present, 
and future moments, objects, or events exist there is a sense in which it  clashes with the 
ontological implications of the thesis that the time passes.
 To conclude, a proper understanding of the A-theory is that there is an 
ontological difference between the past, present and future in the sense that what  is 
future, and only what is future has the property of being open and changeable. If this is 
the case, then we do get a conflict with eternalism, specifically because there is a 
conflict between eternalism and the idea that some things are open or changeable in the 
sense just mentioned. In short, the moving spotlight theory, if it is an A-theory, says that 
some things are open/changeable. Eternalism denies that any things are open/
changeable, therefore, eternalism is incompatible with the moving spotlight theory.
 If this line of argument is plausible, then eternalism seemingly include the idea 
that there is no passage of time in the sense that some ontological consequences of the 
thesis that time passes contravene the core of eternalism. This being so then, contra Le 
Poidevin, it is legitimate to claim that eternalism consists of two theses, one ontological 
which claims that all times, objects, or events are real or exist; and a static one 
according to which the present moment does not move, which moment is the present 
moment does not change. Whether this conclusion highlights as a consequence a 
potential clash between the two distinctive features of the moving spotlight theory, that 
is the acceptance of the Eternalism Ontological Thesis and the Presentism Dynamic 
Thesis is something I shall not pursue further in the thesis.
 So much for presentism and eternalism’s existential issues. For the time being, I 
shall leave it like that but  more light will be shed in Part III of the thesis on existence. 
Perhaps, to clarify further what is going on here we may have to introduce few 
additional concepts such as the A-theory and the B-theory of time.
 A familiar point in philosophy of time has it that eternalism, rejecting the 
Presentism Dynamic Thesis, usually endorses the B-theory. According to the B-theory, 
the world is a static block of moments, objects, or events, ordered by the earlier than, 
later than, and simultaneous with relations (B-type relations, or B-relations). Which 
moment is the present moment does not change, past, present, and future do not pick out 
special features of the world, they are all on a par and expressions like ‘now’ and 
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‘present’ are indexical terms, like ‘here’ and ‘there’ in spatial cases. Presentism is 
instead usually coupled with the A-theory. According to the A-theory, in addition to B-
type relations there are monadic properties like pastness, presentness, and futurity (A-
type properties, or A-properties) which are held by different  sets of moments, objects, or 
events at different times. 299  300  Unlike B-type relations, A-type properties single out 
specific metaphysical features of the world. To recap: presentists tend to endorse the A-
theory  for they  claim that it is a genuine feature of a presentist  world which moment is 
present and this fact changes over time to the extent that different moments, objects, or 
events are present at different times. To say  that presentism endorses the A-theory is to 
say once more that it endorses the dynamical thesis.301
 A better understanding of the A- and B-theory  is found in McTaggart’s famous 
argument for the unreality  of time. Reference to McTaggart will also turn out useful in 
showing how the A- and B-theory relate to two other popular disputes in the philosophy 
of time, the dynamic versus static view of time as well as the tensed versus tenseless 
view of time. McTaggart’s famous paradox, first published in 1908302, is a prominent 
feature of the contemporary debate about time for almost all the thinkers with an 
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299  By the phrase ‘which are held by different sets of moments, objects,  or events at different times’ I 
mean the A-theory’s idea that a-properties change; to wit the possession of a-properties change. For an 
attempt to an eternalist A-theory see Zimmerman, D.W. (2005). “The A-theory of Time, The B-theory of 
Time, and ‘Taking Tense Seriously’”. Dialectica 59: 401-57. See also Lowe, E.J. (1998). The Possibility 
of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity and Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Ch.4. 
300  This last statement might not sound strictly true. One might be an A-theorist without believing in 
monadic properties. I must confess,  unhelpfully however, that I do not know a good alternative 
characterisation. Perhaps, a distinction between the A- and the B-theory (as I shall argue later on) could 
be made by saying that the tensed language captures something about the world not captured by tenseless 
language. In any case, I am fully aware that the distinction might not be exhaustive; for example Michael 
Tooley seems to fall in neither camp, but still I believe my characterisation does capture important views 
and is arguably sufficient for the purposes of my argument.
301  There may be a sense in which presentism and the A-theory actually clash: given the definition of 
presentism, it may be difficult to say which moment, object, or event would be the one exhibiting the A-
type properties of pastness or futurity. As there are no other moments, objects, or events apart from those 
presently existing, arguably if they exhibit any of the monadic properties (pastness, presentness,  and 
futurity) the one must be the property of being present since by definition only what is present exists. I 
find it hard to think of something which is present (and so it exists) and at the same time it exhibits the 
property of being past (or future).
302  McTaggart, J.E. (1908).”The Unreality of Time”.  Mind 17: 457-74; (1927).  The Nature of Existence, 
Vol. II.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Ch. XXXIII. Hereon, I shall refer to the 1927 version of 
the argument. See also Le Poidevin,  R. (1998). “The Past, Present,  and Future of the Debate about 
Tense”. In R. Le Poidevin (ed.) Questions of Time and Tense. Oxford: Clarendon Press: 13-42.
interest in time have to come to terms with it. As Gale303  put it, arguably  fallacious, 
McTaggart’s argument is so, if at all:
“in such a deep and basic way that  an adequate answer to it must supply a rather 
extensive analysis of the concept of time, along with a host of neighbouring 
concepts that  are themselves of philosophical interest, such as change, substance, 
event, proposition, truth, and others.”304
Setting aside the alleged fallaciousness of the argument305 the interesting issue here is 
what Gale labelled time’s ‘neighbouring concepts’: change, substance, event, 
proposition, truth, and others, perhaps the likes of existence (and to some extent 
identity); and the need to look into them. To stress it once more, this is what the whole 
project is about: the need to explore basic concepts of our ordinary experience such as 
persistence, change, existence, and time in this case with a view to understanding how, 
if at all, they square and hang together.
 So much so, let us begin distinguishing between two different although 
intimately  related ways we ordinarily talk and thereby conceive of time. The first one by 
means of the distinction of past, present, and future emphasises the change, flux and 
transiency. Future instants, objects and events, those which are not yet, become less 
future towards their happening; they then come into existence in the present, and when 
they  cease to occur they become past, and progressively more and more past. Such a 
feature is rendered in our language by means of the tenses such as, in modern English 
(in the simple or progressive form), past perfect, simple past, present perfect, simple 
present, simple future, future perfect. This view of time relies on the notion of temporal 
becoming and embodies a feature of some views of time that has been previously named 
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303  Hereon, I shall draw upon Gale’s Introduction to Ch. II ‘The Static Versus the Dynamic 
Temporal’ (Gale, R.M. (1968). The Philosophy of Time. London: Macmillan.) since I believe it is still 
these days one of the most perspicuous accounts in the literature of the dispute between the dynamic and 
the static view of time although it may not be particularly up-to-date. Even so, I shall keep it as a 
reference point throughout this chapter and revise it whenever required. 
304 Gale, R.M. (1968). The Philosophy of Time. London: Macmillan.
305 I shall not pronounce myself on the validity and soundness of McTaggart’s argument. The literature is 
immense already without me adding any further gloss to it. Personally, I believe that the argument is 
somehow valid but unsound but I will not defend my claim further.  For an overview of the discussion, in 
addition to the references in footnote 306, see Lowe, E.J. (1987a). “The Indexical Fallacy in McTaggart’s 
Proof of the Unreality of Time”. Mind 96: 62-70. Le Poidevin, R. & Mellor, D.H. (1987). “Time, Change 
and the ‘Indexical Fallacy’”. Mind 96: 534-8. Lowe, E.J. (1987b). “Reply to Le Poidevin and Mellor”. 
Mind 96: 539-42. Le Poidevin, R. (1991). Change, Cause and Contradiction: A Defence of the Tenseless 
Theory of Time. London: Macmillan. Lowe, E.J. (1993). “McTaggart’s Paradox Revisited”. Mind 101: 
323-6. Le Poidevin, R. (1993) “Lowe on McTaggart”. Mind 102: 163-70. Mellor, D.H. (1998). Real Time 
II. London & New York: Routledge, Ch.7.
the dynamic or tensed view (which is supposedly  grasped by the Presentism Dynamic 
Thesis). By  contrast, the second one has it that instants, objects, or events are laid out in 
a permanent/static order governed by ‘earlier than/later than/simultaneous with’ 
relations. Such order does not admit of any temporal becoming, they are given all at 
once in a nunc stans. For instance, Bradley Wiggins’ 2012 Tour de France win and 
Marco Pantani’s 1998 stand in such a relation that it  is always the case (and it  is never 
going to be otherwise) that the former is later than the latter, and the latter is earlier than 
the former. Curiously though, these two apparently  opposite views of time seem 
somehow to cross paths: there is a cogent sense in which the static view is implied by 
the dynamic one, as McTaggart rightly points out in his infamous argument, and as we 
shall see. Although unproblematically (at this level) related, these two radically  different 
ways of talking and thinking of time become a problem when we try to work them out 
philosophically.
 Following Gale’s analysis, McTaggart’s argument for the unreality  of time may 
be condensed into two theses: one positive (i) which offers the correct  analysis of the 
concept of time, and a negative one (ii) which claims that such an analysis of time 
harbours a contradiction. In general, contradictions are never true of reality therefore if 
time is contradictory then time is unreal.
 Thesis (i) is unpacked in the following fashion: McTaggart’s analysis of the 
concept of time appeals to two different types of temporal facts: (iα) temporal facts 
about precedence and subsequence between events (B-facts recalling the definition of 
the B-theory above), and (iβ) facts about past, present, and future (A-facts recalling the 
definition of the A-theory given above).
 Events are ordered according to different series with respect  to (iα) and (iβ): an 
ordering of events (McTaggart’s B-series) running from earlier to later altogether with 
the generating relations of ‘being earlier/later than’ and ‘simultaneous with’ corresponds 
to (iα); whereas an ordering of events (McTaggart’s A-series) which runs from the past, 
through the present, to the future corresponds to (iβ). The relations generating the B-
series (‘earlier/later than’ and ‘simultaneous with’) are often named B-relations, 
whereas the monadic properties of pastness, presentness, and futurity are known as A-
determinations.
 As touched upon above, the only series which allows for a change in an events’ 
position within the series is the A-series: what was future becomes present and it will be 
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at some point further down the line past. By contrast, events cannot change their 
respective positions in the B-series: Wiggo is the first British cyclist to have won La 
Grande Boucle thus the event of any other British rider winning that competition will 
always be later than Wiggo’s. In turn, Wiggo’s win will always be earlier than any other 
Brit’s winning.
 Apparently, according to McTaggart, although the only  correct analysis of the 
concept of time (McTaggart’s positive thesis above) involves both the series, 
nevertheless the A-series (and the A-determinations) is actually more basic than the B-
series for the B-relations (and the B-series accordingly) can be easily  reduced to A-
determinations but not vice versa; in fact, as McTaggart remarks, without the A-series, 
the B-series will not be a temporal series at all. The reason for this conclusion is that 
change is crucial to time, and the B-series without the A-series does not involve genuine 
change since the events in time themselves do not change, and the positions in the B-
series are fixed once and forever,306 whereas the positions in the A-series are constantly 
changing, as pointed out early  on. Thus, if the A-series is contradictory then ipso facto 
time is contradictory and thereby unreal.
 So much for the positive thesis. The negative thesis’ aim is to demonstrate the 
conditional statement above. The reason for the alleged contradiction in the A-series lies 
in the fact that each event in the A-series has the three A-determinations: pastness, 
presentness, and futurity which are mutually incompatible.307 When put to the test, the 
objection goes, McTaggart’s does not really  seem to be the case for the A-
determinations are had by each event only successively: for example, Wiggo’s Tour the 
France win was once future, then in the summer of 2012 became present, and finally in 
2014 it  belongs to the past, and it will be more and more past as time goes by. Although 
quite plausible, this line of reasoning does not seem to cut it, in fact McTaggart rejoins 
claiming that what the objection really  says is that an event “is present at a moment of 
present time, past at some moment of future time, and future at some moment of past 
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306  It is not just the fixidity of the B-positions but also the idea that the events in those positions cannot 
change either: The death of Elizabeth was and always will be the death of a Queen and this event cannot 
have changed any of its characteristics as it went from future to past. Otherwise it would not have been 
the same event.
307 “And this exclusiveness is essential to change, and therefore to time.” McTaggart, J.E. (1927). The 
Nature of Existence, Vol. II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 20.
time.”308; something which clearly leads into an infinite regress that, according to 
McTaggart is vicious.309
 The contradiction is allegedly  waved off by appealing to a second-order time 
series: if each event in the first-order time series possessing all the three A-
determinations has them successively rather than all at  once, it  has them successively at 
moments of time only in relation to a second-order time series. But since the second-
order time series is by definition a time series then its members must form an A-series, 
so the contradiction rises back up again. Thus, in order to rid it from the second-order 
time series we would have to appeal to (or to posit) a third-order A-series. Iterating such 
a pattern of explanation, the contradiction never resolves, it  merely transfers to a further 
A-series.310
 In a nutshell, this is what I believe of McTaggart’s argument is relevant to my 
purposes. In the following of the chapter, I shall outline two strands of reply  which 
might help to characterise the A- and B-theory of time. Although at odds, there is 
something that both the A- and the B-theory share: the belief that regardless of the 
validity  of McTaggart’s argument, it is somehow unsound. Therefore time is all but 
unreal. There must be something which is time after all. Despite this initial agreement, 
what both theories clearly do is to explain such evidence in radically distinct ways. The 
B-theory  of time claims that McTaggart’s B-series alone is sufficient to render an 
adequate account of time. Denying what Gale named McTaggart’s positive thesis, such 
a view denies that the A-series is by any means necessary for the reality of time.
 For completeness’ sake, in the endeavour to articulate the B-theoretic answer to 
McTaggart’s argument, I shall present two versions of the theory, the Old, and the New 
B-theory  of time. The differences reside in what theses an Old B-theorist and a New B-
theorist of time are inclined to accept.
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308  Ibid. 21. McTaggart’s question is: “But what is meant by ‘has been’ and ‘will be’[as in ‘the event M 
will be past, and has been future’]? And what is meant by ‘is’ [as in ‘the event M is present’], when, as 
here, it is used with a temporal meaning, and not simply for predication?”
309 Ibid. 22. “The attribution of the characteristics past, present, and future to the terms of any series leads 
to a contradiction,  unless it is specified that they have them in relation to terms specified as past, present, 
and future. These again, to avoid the contradiction,  must in turn be specified as past, present,  and future. 
And since this continues infinitely, the first set of terms never escapes from contradiction at all.”
310 See footnote 313.
 Gale had it that the Old B-theory 311 of time can be easily epitomised with the 
following three theses:
 The Reducibility Thesis which consists of two claims:
 (α) The Linguistic Reduction: the A-series is reducible to the B-series in 
  virtue of the fact that the A-determinations can be analysed in terms of 
  B-relations;
 (β) The Psychological Reduction: the A-determinations involve a 
  B- re la t ion to a perce iver the re fore t empora l becoming 
   is psychological;
 The Objectivity Thesis: the B-series is objective, all events in the series are 
 equally real;
 The Nature of Change Thesis: Change is analysable in terms of B-relations 
 between qualitatively different states of one single thing.
(α) The linguistic reduction thesis claims that an event is not intrinsically  past, present, 
or future. Rather, it  bears a B-relation to a given event, generally a linguistic one such as 
an utterance of a tensed statement about the event at stake: for instance, ‘Wiggo’s Tour 
de France win is past’ means that the occurrence of the event of Wiggins’ Tour the 
France win is earlier than the utterance (or the token) of that sentence. A-statements or 
tensed statements are somehow perspectival in revealing the speaker’s temporal relation 
to the event reported by their statement. A-statements are token-reflexive (or self-
referring), they bring out “the linguocentricity and therefore the subjectivity  of the A-
determinations.”312  Tenses are hence disguised B-relations between the event reported 
by the statement and the occurrence of the tensed sentence token reporting the event. 
Similarly, A-statements are subject to change in their truth value: ‘Wiggo’s Tour de 
France win is present’ if uttered on July, 22nd, 2012 is true but before or after that date is 
false.313
 One very popular way to transform a tensed statement into a tenseless one would 
be to ascribe a date: it  is always true that ‘Wiggo wins (tenselessly) the Tour de France 
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311 For the record, what Gale addressed as the B-theory of time is what nowadays is known as the Old B-
theory of time. The New B-theory of time was yet to come when Gale’s book was published (1968). For a 
more recent characterisation of the Old B-theory of time see Smith, Q. (1994).  “Introduction: The Old 
and New Tenseless Theories of Time”. In Oaklander, N.L. & Smith,  Q. (eds.) The New Theory of Time. 
London, New Haven: Yale University Press, 17-22.
312 Gale, R.M. (1968). The Philosophy of Time. London: Macmillan, 296.
313  By contrast,  B-statements being tenseless are not subject to such variations in truth value; which 
incidentally sounds like a very good reason to think that the two are not inter-translatable: something 
cannot be translated by something which has a different truth-value to it.
on the 22nd of July 2012’. It  appears that the language of logic, mathematics, and 
physics is tenseless therefore, arguably, it seems that such B-theoretic translations of A-
statements comply impeccably with the best sciences available (in a way so that such a 
compliance is considered a clear advantage for the B-theory). Such linguistic reduction, 
if feasible, has to square with a couple of more or less tacit assumptions which, in all 
fairness, may call for further explanations: the first one has it that however A-statements 
are translated into B-statements, the procedure is legitimate since detensing can be 
easily achieved without any loss of meaning. Secondly, because the language of the best 
sciences available seems to speak tenselessly then, arguably, what is good for them must 
be good for other disciplines too (for example metaphysics).
 (β) The psychological reduction strengthens and supplements what the linguistic 
reduction has achieved, if anything. A-determinations are situational, they depend on 
and express the peculiar state of belief of the utterer.314 In a world without utterers or 
perceiving beings, seemingly, there would be no A-determinations. But there is a further 
twist to this: temporal becoming depends on A-determinations (recall McTaggart’s 
argument above); since A-determinations depend on the psychological states of a 
perceiver - as the psychological reduction seems to have established - then the temporal 
becoming may well be analysable in psychological terms as well, to the conclusion that 
there is no such thing as temporal becoming (or if there appears to be then it is illusory). 
The bottom line of the twofold reduction is that the A-series is not an objective element 
of the furniture of reality: regrettably, A-determinations cross-refer either to a language 
user or to a perceiver. Had there not been any language users or perceivers, there 
wouldn’t have been any A-determinations, and any A-series at  all. However, still there 
would have been a B-series since all the events would yet hold on their mutual positions 
cashed out in terms of B-relations.
 As a natural consequence, the objective thesis seemingly  follows from the 
twofold reduction. A-determinations are not objectively part of the furniture of reality, 
they  are indeed relative to somebody’s perspective (temporal) therefore there might be a 
sense in which they qualify as subjective. Whereas B-relations, not involving such 
perspectival reference, would still hold in a world devoid of perceiving subjects or 
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314  For example, when I believe that Wiggo won, this is a matter of my belief about Wiggo coming later 
than his winning.
language users. In such world there would still be a wealth of objective relations (B-
relations) between events.
 Finally, the thesis concerning the nature of change. Let us recall the distinction 
between change of time, and change in time. Arguably, the former refers to changes in 
the events’ A-determinations and so does it convey the idea of temporal becoming; 
whereas the latter specifies the qualitative and quantitative changes of things. The B-
theory  claims that the B-series is sufficient to account for both kinds of change. As for 
change of time, since there is no authentic temporal becoming then any  change in the A-
determinations is perfectly reducible to B-relations talk without loss of meaning 
(Linguistic Reduction). Qualitative and quantitative change is likewise analysed in 
terms of B-relations: a concrete thing is reducible to a series of successive events 
(something along the lines of a process taking up  time), being the events composing the 
series reciprocally interconnected by spatial and causal relations in a way in which any 
two members belonging to any two different series are not. Thus, change in time 
amounts to the turnover of B-relations between events within the series (the series 
which represents a sequence of B-ordered events taken as events of one thing, to wit the 
history of that single thing) without appealing to any further notion of temporal 
becoming.
 So much for the old B-theory  of time. Hereon, by  the expression ‘B-theory’ I 
shall mean the new B-theory of time.315 As Smith claims, the old B-theory of time has 
been abandoned as a consequence ‘of advancements in the philosophy of language’316, 
in particular by abandoning what Gale named the linguistic reduction. One of the 
cornerstones of the old B-theory of time was, as we know, the firm belief that detensing 
was an absolutely  safe procedure to put in place since it preserved the meaning of a 
tensed sentence when translated into a tenseless one. Regrettably, it was successively 
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315  For a formulation of the New B-theory of Time see Smart, J.J.C. (1980). “Time and Becoming”. 
Philosophical Studies 19: 3-15. Mellor, D.H. (1981). Real Time.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
Ch. 5. Oaklander, N.L. (1984). Temporal Relations and Temporal Becoming. Lanham, MD.: University 
Press of America, Ch. 4.
316  Namely, following from the development of the the New Theory of Reference initiated by Ruth 
Barcan Marcus and applied to indexicals by David Kaplan. See Barcan Marcus, R. (1961). “Modalities 
and Intensional Languages”. Synthese 13: 303-22; and Kaplan, D. (1989). “Demonstratives”. In J. Almog, 
J. Perry & H. Wettstein (eds.) Themes from Kaplan. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 481–563. However, 
various B-theorists ended up drawing upon different theories, for example Donald Davidson’s, 
Castañeda’s, so on and so forth.
shown that when the procedure is applied to sentences containing indexical terms like 
‘now’ the corresponding tenseless sentence failed to preserve the meaning, so that: 
“This idea lies at  the basis of the new tenseless theory of time, namely, that tensed 
sentences (as uttered on some occasions) are untranslatable by tenseless sentences, 
but that  it  is nonetheless the case that  tensed sentences ascribe no temporal 
determinations not ascribed by tenseless sentences.”317
The contention that tensed sentences’ import is negligible when it comes to the 
ascription of temporal properties is then cashed out variously  by different 
philosophers.318 319  To conclude, what allegedly  discriminates between the old and the 
new B-theory of time is the rejection of one of the two claims of which the reducibility 
thesis consists in, to wit  the linguistic reduction. Thus, whether tensed language is 
needed, it is so insofar without having any crucial import to the ontology  of time, 
tenseless talk is all there is (and needs to be) to it.
 As for the psychological reduction, the objectivity, and the nature of change 
theses, it  looks as if the new B-theory would fit in quite comfortably with all of them. 
Tensed language seems to play a sui generis role at the level of ordinary language 
(which is tensed) thereby  bringing up the logical connections among ordinary language 
tensed sentences. This picture is indeed nothing more than a picture since it does not 
mirror the underling nature of time: the B-series is objective, all instants, objects or 
events in the series are equally  real, B-facts are all there needs to be to account for the 
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317 Smith, Q. (1994). “Introduction: The Old and New Tenseless Theories of Time”. In N.L.  Oaklander & 
Q. Smith (eds.) The New Theory of Time. London, New Haven: Yale University Press, 17-22.
318  For example, the indexical ‘now’ is believed to refer directly to the time of the utterance without any 
ascription of the property of presentness. In a sentence containing ‘now’, say, Wiggins says ‘it is now 
time to go out for a quick spin’ the indexical refers directly to the time of utterance, say 22nd of July 2012 
but the whole translation procedure which characterised the old version of the B-theory fails. To be 
translated, Kaplan argues it will require sameness of meaning and semantic content, the meaning being 
the rule of use of the sentence.  Because ‘it is now time to go out for a quick spin’ and ‘3.02 pm the 22nd 
of July 2012 is time to go out for a quick spin’ have different rules of use and thereby meanings then one 
cannot be translated into the other. However, if ‘now’ refers directly then the ‘now’ in ‘it is now time to 
go out for a quick spin’ directly refers to ‘the 22nd of July at 3.02 pm’ without ascribing any additional 
temporal property to reality (additional in the sense that they are not already ascribed by the relevant 
tenseless sentence) then the work carried out by tenseless sentences is enough to account for that 
evidence.
319  For instance, Hugh Mellor believes that tensed talk is indeed not translatable into tenseless language 
without a loss of meaning; however, when it comes to the truth conditions of tensed sentences, they can 
easily be given in a tenseless language so that these tenseless truth-conditions sentences are all that is 
needed to account for the nature of time. See Mellor, D. H. (1994). “The Need for Tense”. In N.L. 
Oaklander & Q. Smith (eds.) The New Theory of Time. London, New Haven: Yale University Press, 
23-37. Nathan Oaklander instead distinguishes between a language suitable for analysing ordinary 
language which happens to be tensed and calls it ‘logical language’, and an ‘ontologically adequate 
language’, a tenseless language which accounts for time only in terms of B-relations. See Oaklander,  N.L. 
(1991). “A Defense of the New Tenseless Theory of Time”. The Philosophical Quarterly 41: 26-38.
nature of time; a thing’s change is the result of different B-relations entertained by 
qualitatively different states of it. Lastly, since there is no real procession from the 
future through the present and to the past (tensed sentences do not ascribe temporal 
determinations) then temporal becoming has no objective ground, objective in the sense 
of being rooted in the way time is, therefore if there is anything complying with those 
features it must be as a result illusory.
 So much for the distinction between the old and the new B-theory of time. To 
conclude, the B-theoretic answer to McTaggart’s paradox should be clearer now. 
McTaggart positively  claims the A-series to be necessary for time and for change. In a 
world in which the B-series were the only one temporal series change would be 
impossible. Therefore, the only  possible change is a change in the A-determinations. 
The B-theorist objects that McTaggart is mainly concerned with change in events 
overlooking changes in things. Because of the B-theorist’s thesis of the nature of 
change, change in things (change in time) requires the B-series only. Thus, the reality  of 
time does not require the existence of the A-series.
 Curiously, the B-theory of time, although it denies the objectivity of the A-
series, still it cannot support McTaggart’s negative thesis according to which the A-
series is contradictory. In fact, as B-theorists claim, the A-series is analysable in B-
theoretical terms and thereby reducible to the B-series. Had the A-series been 
contradictory, the B-reduction would have been hardly  feasible. The reduction can be 
accomplished for the A-determinations are just disguised B-relations. The risk of 
contradiction is avoided. There would be a contradiction if an event  had at least two of 
the B-relations to one and the same event but McTaggart never showed this to be a 
possibility (for instance, Wiggo’s Tour de France win being earlier than and later than 
Pantani’s, but this hardly makes any  sense). Therefore, there is a sense in which the B-
theory  should deny McTaggart’s argument as a whole, the positive thesis as well as the 
negative one.
 In addition to the approach spelt out above, the relevant literature on time offers 
an alternative, devised once more to address and contain McTaggart’s argument: the A-
theory  of time. Alike the B-theory, a cluster of ideas fall under the label of the A-theory 
of time. The A-theoretic approach may then be summarised in the following three 
theses:
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 The Reducibility Thesis: the B-series is reducible to the A-series since B-
 relations can be analysed in terms of A-determinations;
 The Objectivity Thesis: (γ) The A-series is objective, temporal becoming is 
 intrinsic to all events, and therefore (δ) there are significant ontological 
 differences among past, present, and future;
 The Nature of Change Thesis: Change requires the A-series (change of 
 time).320 321
 Let us begin from the A-theory’s Reducibility  Thesis. A-theorists agree with 
McTaggart’s positive thesis that the A-series is both necessary  and fundamental to time 
since, as Broad claims322, what makes the B-series a temporal series (or B-relations 
temporal relations) is that its members form an A-series (or their relata have A-
determinations) and change in respect to them. In developing this argument, Broad 
claims that: (i) a temporal series differs from a non-temporal one for although both have 
an intrinsic order, only the former has an intrinsic direction or sense; a claim which can 
be easily granted by  the B-theorists (direction is guaranteed by B-relations); and (ii) that 
the direction or intrinsic sense of a temporal series is due to the fact that its members 
undergo temporal becoming; a claim that no B-theorist would be likely to subscribe to.
 (i) The reason why a linear, unidimensional spatial series has an intrinsic order is 
quite simple: given any three members of this series (points/positions in space, etc.), 
one will always appear to be between the other two irrespective of the angle they are 
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320  A-theorists include Broad, C.D. (1923).  Scientific Thought. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Prior, 
A. (1957). Time and Modality. Oxford: Clarendon Press; (1967). Past, Present and Future. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press; Gale, R. (1968). The Language of Time.  London: Routledge & Kegan Paul (Gale has 
since repudiated the A-theory).  Prior, A. (1968). Papers on Time and Tense.  London: Oxford University 
Press. Schlesinger,  G. (1980). Aspects of Time. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co. Smith, Q. (1993). 
Language and Time. New York: Oxford University Press.  McCall,  S. (1994). A Model of the Universe. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. Bigelow, J. (1996). “Presentism and Properties”. In J.  Tomberlin (ed.) 
Philosophical Perspectives: Vol. 10. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 35-52. Zimmerman, D. W. (1996). 
“Persistence and Presentism”. Philosophical Papers 25: 115-26. Lowe, E.J. (1998). The Possibility of 
Metaphysics: Substance, Identity and Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  Zimmerman,  D.W. (1998). 
“Temporary Intrinsics and Presentism”. In P. van Inwagen & D.W. Zimmerman (eds.) Metaphysics: The 
Big Questions. Malden, MA.: Blackwell, 206-19. Merricks,  T. (1999). “Persistence, Parts and 
Presentism”. Noûs 33: 421-38.  Craig, W.L. (2000). The Tensed Theory of Time. Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
Markosian, N. (2004). “A Defense of Presentism”. In D.W. Zimmerman (ed.) Oxford Studies in 
Metaphysics: Vol. I. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 347-403. Zimmerman, D.W. (2005). “The A-theory 
of Time, The B-Theory of Time, and ‘Taking Tense Seriously’”. Dialectica 59: 401-57.
321  In Gale’s formulation,  the three theses are meant to reflect the layout of the B-theory above so that 
each tenet is either the contradictory or contrary of the corresponding B-theoretic thesis. I am inclined to 
disagree with Gale since to my understanding there is no clear one-one mapping between the two groups; 
rather it seems that some overlapoing between different tenets.  For instance, the A-theoretic Objectivity 
Thesis is allegedly the contradictory or contrary of the corresponding B-theoretic one but not only: the 
objectivity of the A-series also denies part of what the B-theoretic Reducibility Thesis claims, to wit the 
Psychological Reduction.
322 Broad, C.D. (1938). Examination of McTaggat’s Philosophy: Vol. II, Part I. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
viewed from (for this reason spatial betweenness is fundamental whilst temporal 
betweenness is not as we shall see). However, this spatial series will not have any 
intrinsic direction since to decide which member is to the right or left  to another one is 
instead a matter of the position from which the members are viewed. Therefore, its 
order is extrinsic to the series. To recap: spatial relations like ‘to the right of’ or ‘to the 
left of’ are three-place: they  include a third relatum, a point/position in space, an angle, 
etc. from which one member is to the right or to the left of another. Such series has no 
asymmetric dyadic relation intrinsic to it.
 Along the same lines, in addition to having an intrinsic order, a temporal series 
has an intrinsic direction or sense for each of the generating relations ‘earlier than’ and 
‘later than’ do not involve any  reference to some third term; they are asymmetric dyadic 
relations. If Marco Pantani’s 1998 Tour de France win occurs earlier than Bradley 
Wiggins’ 2012 win, then there is no need to say from which alleged third position or 
angle such wins are considered; they stand in such a relation so that it is always the case 
(and it is not going to be otherwise) that the happening of the former is earlier than the 
latter, and that the occurring of the latter is later than the former.
 (ii) The claim that  the direction or intrinsic sense of a temporal series depends on 
its members undergoing temporal becoming is more controversial. Broad secures time 
to becoming in a way that without becoming or what he calls the ‘transitory aspect of 
temporal facts’, a temporal series would not have an intrinsic direction and so would be 
indistinguishable from a spatial one. Insofar as the members of a B-series undergo 
temporal becoming, then the series in question is temporal and can be distinguished 
from a non-temporal one. Curiously, the reason for this commitment seems to lie in 
what characterises the B-theory generative relations of ‘earlier than’ and ‘later than; to 
wit their logical properties of irreflexivity, asymmetry, and transitivity  which as they 
stand, may well characterise non-temporal relations as well notwithstanding the 
difference that  actually it looks like we seem to know quite well that a non-temporal 
series is essentially  different from a temporal one. Thus, on Broad’s view, what 
sanctions the distinction or the breaking down of the analogies between space and time 
is indeed temporal becoming. In short, if the B-series has an intrinsic direction, as it 
does, it  can only  be because of the temporal becoming for if a direction has to be 
introduced into a one-dimension ordered spatial series, it has to be done extrinsically.
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 No B-theorist would perhaps find (ii) attractive in the slightest, for it  links a 
genuine time series to temporal becoming in a way  that without the latter the former 
would not  be temporal. Clearly, any B-theorist would consider any B-series temporal 
without having to subscribe to temporal becoming. She would agree that the generating 
B-relations ‘earlier than’ and ‘later than’ are indeed dyadic and that a B-series is 
temporal but she would deny their dependence upon temporal becoming. What confers 
direction or sense to a series, replacing ipso facto the need to postulate the temporal 
becoming, are instead certain physical facts to be found as intrinsic to the B-series of 
physical events.323
 In addition to what has been said so far, there is another way available to the A-
theorist to argue against the B-theoretic Reducibility  Thesis, one which hinges upon 
language. Turning on its head the B-theory’s Linguistic Reduction Thesis (α), the A-
theorists claim that not only  is the A-series necessary  but it also happens to be 
fundamental since, at  rock bottom, the B-series is reducible to the A-series. Take a 
tenseless statement like ‘Marco Pantani’s Tour de France win is earlier than Bradley 
Wiggins’’; from an A-theoretic point of view the meaning of the statement would be 
something like this: ‘When Marco Pantani’s win is present, Wiggo’s win is future, and 
when Wiggo’s win is present, Marco Pantani’s win is past’. Since B-relations are 
analysable in terms of A-determinations (and thereby reducible), then, contra (α), A-
statements cannot be adequately translated into B-statements without any  loss of 
meaning. And the reason seems to be that  what the B-statement does not assert is the 
fact that the reported event is past, present, or future as the A-statement evidently does. 
Arguably, there is a loss of meaning in the translation and more to the point an 
asymmetry in the information conveyed between an A- and a B-statement. When we say 
that Marco Pantani’s win is present while Wiggo’s win is future we automatically claim 
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323 Or as Nancy Cartwright objected in conversation: “the eternalist can claim that the generative relations 
just are different from other ordering relations like ‘larger than’. And it is the fact that these are temporal 
relations that makes the series temporal.” I am not sure but I think there might be a sense in which 
Nancy’s point sounds somehow circular. The problem seems to be what makes a temporal series 
temporal,  to wit why a temporal series has a direction.  Therefore the analyses offered by Broad and by the 
a B-theorist purport to account for what makes this the case. In both cases,  the account consists in 
breaking down the temporal series as to pick out what could be a good canditate to discriminate between 
a temporal series and one which is not.  To claim that this happens in virtue of the B-theoretic generative 
relations which are in principle temporal and for that very same reason the overall series results temporal 
sounds like postulating what should instead be demonstrated. In addition, there is the question whether 
the B-theoretic generative relations can actually be temporal in their own right, namely if they are able to 
confer a direction to a series making it ipso facto temporal. And as Broad remarks, looking at their logical 
properties (irreflexivity, asymmetry, and transitivity) they may not be unique to temporal relations. 
Actually, they happen to characterise non-temporal relations as well we seem to know quite well that a 
non-temporal series is different from a temporal one.
that the former comes earlier than the latter, but when it is said that Marco Pantani’s win 
is earlier than Wiggo’s nothing is said of their status in terms of past, present, and 
future. Detensing the language fails.324  Ordinary  language is tensed, and referring 
expressions are among the elements of it; elements that only  a tensed language can 
suitably render. When we speak, we are the centre of orientation both of space and time 
so that the question whether the object of our attention and awareness exists is always 
crucial. For this reason, the attempt to assimilate tensed existential statements to the 
tenseless framework of existential quantification employed in logic and mathematics 
seemingly falls through.
 At last, another aspect  of the B-theoretic Linguistic Reduction which could be 
attacked by the A-theorist is the token-reflexivity, or the alleged self-referring of A-
statements.325  Even though A-statements were token-reflexive326, Broad claims, this 
would not eliminate a reference to any event’s A-determinations: suppose on the 22nd of 
July 2012 we utter ‘Wiggo’s Tour the France win is present’, this would likely be 
translated into ‘Wiggo’s Tour the France win is simultaneous with this utterance’. 
However, it is clear that  the translation leaves something behind: there is still a 
reference to an A-determination of the event since the expression ‘this utterance’ 
175
324 In the light of what has been pointed out above about the differences between the old and the new B-
theory of time, I shall assume the statement in the main text as uncontentious. Perhaps, after the new B-
theory of time distanced itself from the language reduction, the remark made by the A-theorists may 
sound petty. However, in the hindsight of how the dispute unwound, the A-theorists were urging on quite 
a good point.
325  “A token-reflexive expression is one like ‘I’, ‘here’, ‘now’, whose essential occurrence in a sentence 
renders that sentence capable of bearing different truth-values according to the circumstances of its 
utterance - by whom, when, and where it is uttered, to whom it is addressed, with what gestures it is 
accompanied, and so forth.” Dummet, M. (1978). Truth and Other Enigmas. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 353. For a quick overview of the dispute see Mellor, D.H. (1981). Real Time. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 101. Lowe, E.J. (1998). The Possibility of Metaphysics: 
Substance, Identity and Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 89-96.
326 Which does not seem to be a big deal: “there is no inconsistency in adhering to a tensed view of time 
while also endorsing a token-reflexive account of the truth-conditions of tensed sentences. There would 
only threaten to be an inconsistency here if one were to suppose that tensed sentences can be given 
tenseless token-reflexive truth-conditions. [...] if one uses tenses in giving the truth-conditions of tensed 
sentences, there is a sense in which such an account of their truth-conditions cannot be fully explanatory 
of their meaning. But this is a familiar feature of truth-conditional semantics quite generally: for instance, 
quantifier phrases are standardly used in giving the truth-conditions of quantified sentences, on both 
objectual and substitutional accounts of the semantics of quantifiers. [...] We have to live with the fact that 
certain notions are so fundamental that no reductive account of them can be supplied: the notions of 
existence and identity are plausible candidates, but so too, I would urge, are the notions of past, present, 
and future. I take this irreducibility claim to be part of what the tensed view of time is committed to.” 
Lowe, E.J. (1998). The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity and Time. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 91.
means327  ‘the utterance we are presently making (or making at present)’. If tensed 
utterances are intrinsically tensed (past, present, or future) then events bearing B-
relations to these utterances are clearly intrinsically tensed.
 It is worthwhile to note that the Objectivity Thesis consists of two strands: (γ) 
the objectivity  of the A-series and temporal becoming; and (δ) the fact that there are 
important ontological differences among past, present, and future.
 (γ) From the A-theoretic reduction thesis it follows that the A-series is objective 
for it  does not depend upon a language user or a perceiver. Another objection which can 
easily be levelled against the B-theoretic psychological reduction (and consequently 
against the reduction of A-determinations to B-relations) is that the series of 
somebody’s mental events that runs in conjunction with the series of her physical events 
forms an A-series. Mental states evolve over time, if for this reason they are intrinsically 
past, present, and future, then the corresponding objects of these states which are 
concurrent with them must be past, present, and future as well. If temporal becoming is 
intrinsic to the former, as it doubtlessly, then it must be likewise intrinsic in the latter.
 (δ) From the objectivity of the A-series and temporal becoming, generally  A-
theorists claim that there are crucial ontological differences between past, present, and 
future. The future is open, somehow changeable, the realm of possibilities par 
excellence whereas the past is closed, immutable. The present is a sort  of limit between 
the two. These ontological differences reflect logical and semantic ones: for instance, in 
their logical form, while statements about the future must be general, those about the 
past can be singular; and whilst all statements about the past are either true or false, 
some about the future are neither true nor false.328
 Finally, the nature of change thesis. The A-theory challenges the B-theoretic 
analysis of change in time as a change in the B-relations between events or states 
belonging to the history  of a single thing. Given the A-theoretic reduction thesis, B-
relations are dependent upon A-determinations; thus, A-theorists agree with B-theorists 
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327  This might not be accepted by all, and some, following Kaplan, might think that the content and the 
character of a demonstrative can be given tenselessly.
328  See footnote 289.  Identifying the A-theory with presentism (or the idea that they overlap to a great 
extent) is misleading. The A-Theory claims that past,  present, and future have crucial ontological 
differences. Presentism claims that only the present is real which implies that the past and the future do 
not. If so, then there is a sense in which there is a crucial difference between the present, and the past and 
the future, as the A-theory wants to claim. The former exists, the latters do not. However, this attitude 
denies the difference in the ontological status between the past and the future which reflects the logical 
and semantical differences.
that change in time necessarily  involves B-relations between events, however they 
disagree on which ones are fundamental. From this it follows that  there cannot be 
change in time without the A-series. Consequently, the attempt to reduce or represent 
change of time (temporal becoming) as change in time is doomed. If temporal becoming 
is represented by analogy with some sort of motion along a line or a one-dimensional, 
ordered, spatial series then it may well be reduced to change in time. But it is argued 
that the manoeuvre would be somehow vicious: if the present is considered a spotlight 
moving along a line this would imply the further question of how fast the spotlight 
moves. Therefore, all representations of temporal becoming in terms of some kind of 
change in time would fall afoul since motion presupposes becoming.
 To conclude, the A-theory  agrees with McTaggart’s positive thesis: the A-series 
is necessary and fundamental to time, but it disagrees with his negative thesis: the A-
series involves a contradiction. McTaggart’s failure to combine the B- with the A-series 
and the static with the dynamic view exemplified by the two series is caused by 
McTaggart’s substantialisation of the events in the B-series which in turn caused him to 
think of temporal becoming as a sort of motion, the A-series moving up the B-series. 
The cause of McTaggart’s mistaken substantialisation is that he thought of the events in 
the B-series as if they must always coexist due to the timeless nature of the B-relations. 
Such B-theoretical events are treated as existing before as well as after their quick 
lighting up in the present of the spotlight. But this brings about several problems as in 
the attempt to reduce change of time (temporal becoming) to change in time. For an A-
theorist, at  rock bottom, there is no incompatibility between temporal becoming and the 
permanent nature of B-relations.
 As for the inherent contradiction that each event has all three mutually  exclusive 
A-determinations, clearly the A-theory could not employ the B-theoretic approach 
appealing to the reducibility of A-determinations to B-relations. Rather, the A-theory 
claims that because change of time is intrinsic to all events, there is indeed no 
contradiction that requires to be explained away. There would be a contradiction only if 
in a single utterance an event would be said to have two or more A-determinations, as in 
‘Wiggo’s tour the France win is present and future’ but there is no evidence in our 
experience that this can be significant.
 A-determinations are primitive and not further analysable. The meaning of 
‘Wiggo’s win is present’ can entail ‘Wiggo’s win is present at a moment which is 
177
present’ without meaning it. Therefore McTaggart’s alleged infinite regress, if there is 
one, is not vicious: a regress of entailing not meaning. There is no need to recur to a 
second-order A-series to explain an event having A-determinations.
 So much for this quick fly-by over some issues which have been heating the 
contemporary  debate about time. On pain of repeating myself, the overview is far from 
being exhaustive or systematic; admittedly, at no point  completeness or a systematic 
investigation have been among the desiderata to be achieved in the chapter. On the 
contrary, the attempt has been to tease out, quite broadly, some of the issues which have 
kept philosophers of time busy  in the recent years (issues relevant to the purposes of the 
argument I have been trying to devise in this thesis) but at the same time enough fine-
grained to actually see if and where in the current debate about theories of time, a view 
of time like the one ventured in chapter 2.2 could fit in.
 This analysis of the different views of time has been pursued with an emphasis 
on fleshing out what intuitions and assumptions were lurking in the background as well 
as what implications and commitments they happen to have. This was done in a manner 
in keeping with Lowe’s claim quoted in the chapter mentioned above (the distinction 
between a static and a dynamic view of time and how Lowe’s hypothesis of time as 
extended and a dimension in which reality is extended would then be evaluated from the 
two perspectives).
Apart from the mere recognition that intuitions and common sense considerations 
turned out to be a leimotiv  all along the thesis, the reason for such an attentive approach 
is basically  to see how far the intuitions I happen to have as well as some common sense 
considerations I happen to make, which led to the account of time built in chapter 2.2, 
square or hang together with those that different theories of time allegedly try to 
preserve. This is also why the brief outline of theories of time above has been framed 
drawing upon Baron & Miller’s way  of presenting the debate329 , to wit  parting 
ontological theses from others which urge on different  elements of time, e.g. static 
versus dynamic aspects.
 My personal feeling is that, if we weight the account of time envisaged in 
chapter 2.2 in the light of the ontological theses outlined above as well as the static and 
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329  Baron, S.  & Miller, K. (2013).  “Characterising Eternalism”. In R. Ciuni, K. Miller & G. Torrengo 
(eds.) New Papers on the Present.  Philosophia Verlag: 31-67. See also Miller, K (2013) “The Growing 
Block, Presentism and Eternalism”. In H. Dyke & A. Bardon (eds.) A Companion to the Philosophy of 
Time. Wiley-Blackwell: 345-365.
dynamic theses that the contemporary theories of time seem to be committed to then it 
seems that that account of time would fit quite nicely with an eternalistic view of time 
whereby past, present, and future moments, objects, or events all exist; or as Sider 
claims,330  if such an eternalistic account of time is combined with a ‘reductionist 
account of tense’ then perhaps the view of time which could at best accommodate the 
account of time developed in chapter 2.2 could be the B-theory of time.331
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330  Sider,  T. (2001). Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time.  Oxford: Oxford 
University Press,  14. Although Sider himself employs the expression ‘reductionism about tense’, still 
there may be a sense in which the phrase could sound clashing with how I framed the distinction between 
the old and the new B-theory of time; namely, the fact that the new B-theory of time refutes the linguistic 
reductionist thesis. If this is the case, then either Sider has in mind the old B-theory of time which would 
sound a bit preposterous at that point in time, or he is simply referring to the fact that although the old 
way of the translation of tensed sentences into tenseless fails, still at rock bottom tensed sentences do not 
carry out any additional philosophical work to what tenseless sentences already provide. Therefore, in this 
sense the B-theory of time could be reductionist.
331 To summarise: we have seen that the idea that time is a dimension can be made use of through the idea 
that different times coexist. There is a wide variety of different views in the literature as I tried to point 
out, some of which share this ontological thesis, and some which do not. It appears that eternalism and 
the moving spotlight do share it, whilst presentism and growing blockism do not. Further, it seems that 
eternalism is accommodated by the B-theory, but not by the A-theory. In short, we can make sense of time 
as perdurance would require it, and such a view of time can be found in eternalism and the B-theory. For 
the record, there are another couple of views which do not neatly map into my distinction; for example, 
McCall’s Shrinking Block according to which there is a tree of possible futures which loses branches as 
time progresses (McCall, S. (1994). A Model of the Universe: Space-Time, Probability, and Decision. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.); and Michael Tooley’s idea that reality consists merely of tenseless 
facts, the future is unreal whereas past and present are real (a somehow intermediate position between the 
tenseless and the tensed theory of time. See Tooley, M. (1997).  Time, Tense & Causation. New York: 
Oxford University Press.). However,  what matters is that both do not comply with the ontological thesis; 
since they do not then they are not compatible with perdurance.
2.3 Part II: Conclusions
 Let us begin recalling the issue that this second part of the thesis on time was 
supposed to address. The aim was to test the initial core of intuitions and common sense 
considerations which seem to sit in the background of the notion of temporal parts, to 
wit the evidence that things seem to have parts in time as they do in space; and to see 
how it influenced the philosophy of time, through moving us to consider space and time 
as similar in some respects. To that extent, in chapter 2.2 I ventured a picture of time 
which, drawing upon Sider’s three respects in which space and time are alike and 
Lowe’s account of time as extended (and considered as a dimension in which reality is 
extended), could comply with that core of intuitions and common sense considerations. 
The presumption is that such an initial core, if developed as in Part I and II of the thesis, 
could motivate a view of time the likes of eternalism and/or the B-theory.
 Admittedly, in order to reach this stage the argument turned out quite laborious. 
Starting with the analysis of the similarity thesis which the core of intuitions and 
common sense considerations above mentioned seem to yield to (chapter 2.1). Followed 
by the attempt to sketch a picture of time which could in turn comply  with the similarity 
thesis on the one hand, and the core of intuitions and common sense considerations 
itself on the other (chapter 2.2). Finally, giving a brief overview of the state of the play 
of the current debate in philosophy of time of which only a few issues have been singled 
out; that is, those somehow relevant to the aims of my argument (chapter 2.3).
 If the three previous chapters focussed, say, on analysis (of the similarity  thesis, 
of how time would look if things were to take it up by having parts in it, and of some 
issues in the current debate in philosophy of time); the aim of this last one would be 
ideally  to synthetise, indicating whether and how a view of time like the one tentatively 
developed in chapter 2.2 would fit within the plethora of views about the nature of time. 
In the light of the conclusions of the previous chapters, there seems to me a robust  sense 
in which the picture of time in question motivates an eternalist and/or B-theoric view of 
time. I shall show why I think this to be the case in the following of this chapter.
 First things first, I shall recall the conclusion of chapter 2.2, namely what time 
would be like if things were to take it up by  having parts in it (as they do in space): (i) it 
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would have to be extended, somehow qualifying as a dimension;332  (ii) it would be a 
continuum333  (although nothing crucial depends on it for the conclusion of my 
argument); (iii) all the instants, objects, or events past, present, and future must 
coexist;334  and lastly which follows from (iii), (iv) anytime in the series could be 
‘now’ (from some perspective, as anywhere is here).
 Let us now ask, given this picture of time, what theory  of time among those 
highlighted in the previous chapter would be suggested by such a view. To answer this 
question, I believe it would be best to recall the distinction between the ontological on 
one hand, and the static/dynamic theses on the other, illustrated in the chapter above: the 
Eternalism Ontological Thesis335, the Presentism Ontological Thesis336, the Eternalism 
Static Thesis337, and the Presentism Dynamic Thesis338. Since all the instants objects, or 
events past, present, and future must coexist as in (iii), then clearly this picture of time 
would hang together with the Eternalism Ontological Thesis quite nicely. For the same 
reason, it would not fulfil the conditions posited by  the Presentism Ontological Thesis; 
it is true that the present moment, objects, or events exist however, they are not the only 
things to exist. Past and future instants, objects, or events exist as much as the present 
ones. If compliance with the Eternalism Ontological Thesis sounds plausible, then we 
will have to decide which one would be the best candidate between eternalism and the 
moving spotlight theory since both, as we established, endorse the Eternalism 
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332  “A set of relations [spatial or temporal] serve to distribute the entities related by them along one or 
more dimensions only if there is a sense in which entities standing in those relations must coexist.” Lowe, 
E.J.  (2006). “Endurantism Versus Perdurantism and the Nature of Time”. Rivista di Filosofia 
Neoscolastica 4: 719.
333  “we are dealing with continuum properties, we are dealing with what constitute a common 
denominator of space and time and hence we shall find space strictly resembling to time.” George 
Schlesinger. See Schlesinger, G. (1975). “The Similarities Between Space and Time”. Mind 84: 162.
334 “There is a totality of coexisting entities [...], namely, the totality of all events spatiotemporally related 
[...] If we want a term to characterise this sense of coexistence, we could say that [...] all these events 
coexist in actuality, or are coactual.” Lowe, E.J. (2006). “Endurantism Versus Perdurantism and the 
Nature of Time”. Rivista di Filosofia Neoscolastica 4: 719.
335 The eternalism ontological thesis claims that all moments, objects, or events - past,  present, and future 
- exist or occur in a four dimensional block of space-time.
336 The presentism ontological thesis claims that only the present moment, objects, or events exist.
337 The eternalism static thesis claims that the present moment does not move since all the entities - them 
being instants, objects, or events - coexist, which implies that there is no turnover of entities. Which 
moment is the present moment does not change.
338  The presentism dynamic thesis claims that the totality of what exists changes over time. A different 
moment, set of objects,  or events take over as a new present moment comes into existence, whereas the 
previous moment, set of objects or events goes out of existence as soon as that moment ceases to be the 
present.
Ontological Thesis. In fact, the moving spotlight theory  holds that in addition to what 
the Eternalism Ontological Thesis expresses, there is an objective property, presentness, 
which moves across the block universe lighting up different  times, objects, or events. 
Following from this, clearly the picture of time drafted in chapter 2.2 cannot suggest a 
view of time like the growing block theory since according to the latter past and present 
moments, objects, or events exist but  future do not. Also, the present moves so that what 
moment is the present moment changes.
 Thus, if the evidence suggests dismissing both presentism and the growing block 
theory  (for the reasons offered above) then it all seems to come down to eternalism and 
the moving spotlight  theory339. As soon as we redirect our attention away from the 
ontological theses and towards the dispute between the static versus dynamic ones then 
the balance may well tip for one or the other. Between the Eternalism Static Thesis and 
the Presentism Dynamic Thesis, the one which seems to represent at best the 
ontological implications of the picture of time ventured in chapter 2.2 is the former, 
according to which the present moment does not move, which moment is the present 
moment does not  change; whereas, what the Presentism Dynamic Thesis claims is that a 
different moment, set of objects or events take over as a new present moment comes 
into existence, whereas the previous moment, set of objects or events goes out of 
existence as soon as that moment ceases to be the present.340  Therefore, it  can be 
concluded that between the two, eternalism and the moving spotlight theory, the one 
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339  A world in which the moving spotlight were true would be one in which all moments,  objects, or 
events - past, present, and future - exist (or are located) in a four dimensional block of space-time; a 
space-time in which there is objective becoming though: namely, which moments,  objects or events 
would be present changes from one moment to another.
340 See Baron, S. & Miller, K. (2013). “Characterising Eternalism”. In R. Ciuni, K. Miller & G. Torrengo 
(eds.) New Papers on the Present. Philosophia Verlag: 31-67. Miller, K (2013) “The Growing Block, 
Presentism and Eternalism”. In H. Dyke & A. Bardon (eds.) A Companion to the Philosophy of Time. 
Wiley-Blackwell: 345-365. In conversation, Dr. Pearson called my attention to the fact that the moving 
spotlight theory may not actually claim what all that the Presentism Dynamic Thesis entails. Rather, what 
it requires is merely the property of presentness to move; in which case there is no clash with the idea that 
all moments coexist. I take the point, and perhaps I should amend the Presentism Dynamic Thesis in 
terms of presentness rather than existence (but of course from a presentist point of view they tend to 
coincide). What is at stake is that the moving spotlight theory fails to comply with Sider’s third respect in 
which space and time are alike, namely in terms of the relativity of here and now (everywhere is here, 
anytime is now). Arguably, a moving property of presentness seems to yield a difference in the status of 
instants,  objects, or events which are present compared to those which are not such that ‘now’ is not 
‘anytime’  but rather ‘now’ is whatever instant which is currently lit by the property of present.  The same 
instant will cease to be present and thereby ‘now’ as soon as the properties of presentness moves on.
which is motivated by that picture of time elaborated above is the former rather than the 
latter.341
 Unfortunately, it appears that we cannot rest content with this answer alone. 
There might well be a further question lurking underneath, in particular in the light of 
the distinction between the A- and the B-theory  of time raised above, altogether with 
what Sider claims to be the third respect in which space and time are alike, i.e. the 
relativity of here and now, and lastly considering Sider’s comment that this latter 
element, together with eternalism yields the B-theory  of time.342 If Sider is right, then 
apparently  the theory of time whichis motivated by the picture drafted above is the B-
theory.
 Sider may well be right, however it seems to me that there might  be a sense in 
which we could do away with committing to the B-theory.343 For example, given that 
the Eternalism Ontological Thesis and the Eternalism Static Thesis is all there is to 
eternalism, there seems to be a sense in which the thesis of the relativity  of here and 
now as broadly put forth by Sider is somehow included in both (likewise the thesis that 
time does not pass, as argued above). If all the instants, objects, and events (say past, 
present, and future) coexist (the Eternalism Ontological Thesis), and the present 
moment does not move, change, or light up  different times, objects, or events 
(Eternalism Static Thesis); then it seems to me that there is a sense in which any point 
whatsoever in the series is here and any  time is now. As there is no privileged point in 
space to be considered the ‘here’, so there is no privileged instant of time to be 
considered as the ‘now’.
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341 The reasons which motivate the rejection of the Moving Spotlight theory are elaborated in detail on p. 
159-61.
342 “[...] if I say “here it is sunny” and [my brother in Chigago] says “here it is raining”, we do not really 
disagree. What is called “here” changes depending on who is speaking: I mean New Jersey, he means 
Chicago. There is no one true here. [...] the word ‘now’ works analogously. Imagine [a] dinosaur [...] 
saying “It is now the Jurassic Period”. I, on the other hand, say “It is now 2006”. According to the 
relativity of ‘now’, the dinosaur and I do not really disagree.  There is no one true now. What is called 
“now” changes depending on who is speaking: I mean 2006, the dinosaur means the Jurassic Period.  The 
combination of this theory of the function of ‘now’ and eternalism is often called the “B-theory of time 
[my italic]”. Sider, T. (2008).  “Temporal Parts”. In T. Sider, J. Hawthorne & D.W. Zimmerman (eds.) 
Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics. Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 241-62.
343  The B-theory comes with a whole lot of additional commitments the likes of The Psychological 
Reduction (the A-determinations involve a B-relation to a perceiver therefore temporal becoming is 
psychological); The Objectivity Thesis: (the B-series is objective,  all events in the series are equally real); 
and The Nature of Change Thesis: (Change is analysable in terms of B-relations between qualitatively 
different states of one single thing); and perhaps,  we might not be so willing to take them onboard. Also, 
eternalism might well be liable of an A-theoretic reading as in Zimmerman, D.W. (2005). “The A-theory 
of Time, The B-theory of Time, and ‘Taking Tense Seriously’”. Dialectica 59: 401-57.
 Thsi being so, then we may  well conclude that according to the picture of time 
tentatively  formulated in chapter 2.2 (as a result of the previous investigation of what 
lies in the background of the notion of temporal parts, namely the evidence that things 
have parts in time as they uncontentiously do in space) the view of time in the 
contemporary  debate in philosophy of time which is motivated by it is, minimally  in the 
sense of avoiding unneeded commitments, eternalism.
 Granting the conclusion just stated above, what seems to be interesting is to see 
if this commitment to eternalism can in turn result in a further commitment to a specific 
view of existence. As remarked above, the dispute among different theories of time is 
first and foremost a controversy about what exists; they  all attempt to unravel and 
establish the temporal as well as the ontic structure of the world. If this is the case, it 
then seems to me fairly  plausible to suppose or speculate that perhaps a combination of 
a view of persistence like perdurance and a view of time like the one elaborated above 
might motivate a specific view of existence. And this is exactly what shall be 
investigated in the third and last part of this thesis.
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Part III: Existence
 As mentioned in the Introduction, existence appears to be crucial and conducive 
to a correct understanding of persistence, in Lewisian terms. Recalling his definition, 
‘something persists iff, somehow or other, it exists at various times’: clearly, an entity 
must exist at all for it to exist at one time, and then, allegedly, at  others. Existence 
appears also to play a decisive role when it comes to the correct understanding of some 
decisive issues in the philosophy of time, as pointed out in chapter 2.2. Therefore, 
following from the evidence spelt out early on in the thesis, it  seems legitimate to 
conclude that existence deserves to be investigated.
 Thus, I shall start  off this chapter with a brief overview of some issues, relevant 
to my purposes, which have been characterising the philosophical debate about 
existence, at least in more recent times. For considerations similar to those advertised in 
Part I on the topic of persistence, and in Part II regarding time, I will not attempt a full 
exposition of the topic. Instead I will highlight various themes, most of which tracing 
back to Aristotle, Kant, Frege, Russell, Quine. For example: existence as a first-order 
vs. second-order predicate; the claim that being is the same as existence and so 
existence is univocal; the fact that such a univocality  is at best captured by  the 
existential quantifier of the standard quantificational logic; and finally  that the objectual 
is the most adequate interpretation of quantification. The aim of the brief overview will 
be to point at a view of existence which is motivated by the combined outcome of the 
investigations pursued in Part I and II: as for the former, the evidence that the notion of 
temporal parts rests on a solid basis of intuitions and common sense considerations, 
namely the fact that things seem to take up time as they take up space by having parts in 
it, which in turn appears to convey  the idea that space and time are alike in some 
respects. As for the latter, the fact that the theory of time which seems to comply  with 
the picture of time ventured drawing upon Sider’s three respects in which space and 
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time are alike, and Lowe’s argument to the conclusion that time is extended (and a 
dimension in which reality is extended) only if instants, objects, or events in time 
coexist. The view that I have in mind which can be motivated by  this is a view of 
existence a là Quine. In other words, the question is, given a certain view of persistence 
and time, perdurance and eternalism, which view of existence is suggested by them or 
less cautiously which view of existence are we committed to?
 Further to this, I shall also flag en passant a related issue: whether the apparatus 
of standard first-order predicate logic is seemingly  the best suited tool to carve reality at 
its joints (such a view has been called into question earlier on at the end of chapter 
1.3.4). I shall again call this view into question presenting some contentious 
implications of some features of the contemporary Quinean second-order predicate view 
of existence, and secondly pointing out their philosophical, semantic, and common 
sense entailments.
 As in Part I (and contrary  to Part II), in Part III my overall attitude and approach 
will perhaps appear overly  critical. This is the consequence of my strong intuitions 
about change as advertised at  the outset of Part I: change is a pervasive feature of 
reality, a metaphysical datum, which can hardly be downplayed. Similarly, existence, 
given its intimacy  with persistence (and thereby change) as argued at the outset of this 
chapter as well as in the Introduction, seems so too. Things change, some things go out 
of existence, some others come into existence: if I run over a banana with my bike, what 
is left  smashed on the ground is no longer a banana. Some things carry on existing 
despite the turnover in some of the features that they exhibit: a banana is green but then 
it becomes yellow when it ripens. Something about that banana which was green is no 
longer so (perhaps it went out of existence) but something else took over (perhaps 
coming into existence) so that the banana turned yellow.
 This awareness will affect the following exposition of existence as it affected the 
presentation and discussion of temporal parts. If it was not so much of an influence on 
the investigation in Part II, this was surely  because my intuitions about time are less 
vivid and robust than those I have about change and existence. Hopefully, the critical 
attitude will yield to a constructive investigation of existence with a view to teasing out 
some of the commitments of Quine’s view, those which, I believe, could potentially end 
up clashing with the original and undeniable metaphysical datum according to which 
things change which moved the whole investigation in the first place.
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3.0 The Notion of Existence
 The statement that existence is a predicate (and a property)344  is quite 
uncontentious in the philosophical literature, however as soon as we attempt to qualify 
it further - asking e.g. what kind of property  existence is, and if a property  at all, what 
are the bearers of such a property, or if there are entities that lack it - then the debate 
becomes heated. Before tackling the issue whether existence is a first- or second-order 
predicate, I shall briefly  outline in what sense existence could be seen as a property. 
Take the uncontentious sentence ‘Mars is red’. The planet Mars exhibits the property  of 
being red. Mars is allegedly an individual substance345  which instantiates the property 
‘being red’ although it (Mars) is not itself instantiated by anything else.346 Take now the 
as much uncontentious sentence ‘Mars exists’. Let us say that in this case the planet 
Marts instantiates the property ‘existing’. If so, then an interesting question to ask 
would be whether existence is a property  similar to redness (and ‘exists’ a predicate like 
‘is red’), and whether or not it can be instantiated by individuals like the planet Mars. 
Perhaps, a sound assessment of such a questions would presuppose a preliminary 
appreciation of a more intricate issue, to wit a theory or conception of properties; an 
issue which in turn may well affect the logic of sentences like ‘Mars exists’: e.g. 
whether the logical form of such a sentence is really subject-predicate as we ordinary 
believe, and thereby if ‘exists’ is really  a predicate of individuals. I shall attempt to 
make clearer some, although not all, of these issues and their interrelations in the 
following of this chapter.
 There is a distinguished and quite elaborated line of thought which, drawing 
upon Aristotle’s contention that there seems to be nothing more to existence than 
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344  Perhaps it is the word ‘existence’ which is a predicate whereas existence itself (what the word 
indicates) is a property. 
345  I take quite uncontentiously the expressions ‘individual substance’ and ‘bearer of properties’ to be 
synonymous; in the sense that they are characterised by properties but not themselves characterising.
346 I shall remain metaphysically neutral about what an individual substance is.
essence347  - a position questioned later on by Saint  Thomas Aquinas348- denies that 
existence is a property  of individual substances. Such denial can be motivated in two 
distinct ways: the first one (i) draws upon Kant and the question of what existence 
would add to an object. The status of existence as a predicate, as in “Mars exists”, was 
exemplary  called into doubt when the philosopher from Konigsberg remarkably stated 
(while arguing for the fallacy of the infamous Ontological Argument) that ‘existence is 
not a real predicate’; that is, the concept of existence does not  add anything to the 
concept of the subject  in a subject-predicate sentence. There is no difference in content 
between 100 thalers and 100 existing thalers.349 In Kant’s words:
 “[W]hen I think a thing, through which ever and however many predicates I like 
[...] not the least bit gets added to the thing when I posit in addition that thing is. 
For otherwise what would exist would not  be the same as what I had thought in my 
concept, but more than that, and I could not  say that the very object  of my concept 
exists.”350
In order to be red, Mars must exist, for only existing things can instantiate properties: 
existence is conceptually prior to predication.
 The second way (ii) hinges upon the problem of negative existentials. Frege351 
and Russell352, as a development of Kant’s objection, claimed that existence is a second-
level predicate and property (a property of concepts, for Frege; and a property of 
propositional functions, for Russell): ‘exists’ is used to predicate a certain property 
(existence) of another property, no longer a property of an object (to figure this out, it 
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347 See Aristotle’s τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι: Metaphysics, Z, 4-5. See Locke’s “the very being of any thing, whereby 
it is, what it is.” Locke, J. (1975).  An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.  In P.H. Nidditch (ed.) 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, III, III, 15.  See also Lowe, E.J. (2008). “Two Notions of Being: Entity and 
Essence”. Royal Institute of Philosophy Institute Supplement, 62, 23-48.
348 Existence is something additional to essence. Existence is a separate property since it may not be part 
of an object’s nature, and therefore such object may be thought of as separate from its existence. See 
Aquinas, T.  (1968). On Being and Essence.  A. Maurer (Trans.). Toronoto: Pontifical Institute Medieval 
Studies.
349 Kant, I. (1929). Critique of Pure Reason. In N. Kemp-Smith (ed.). London: Macmillan.
350 Ibid. A600/B628.
351 Frege, G. (1884). Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik. English translation: J.L. Austin, The Foundations of 
Arithmetic, Oxford: Blackwell, second revised edition 1974; and (1892). “Über Sinn und Bedeutung,” 
Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik,  100: 25–50; translated by M. Black in P.T. Geach & 
M. Black (eds.), Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, Oxford: Blackwell, 1980, 
56–78.
352  Russell,  B.  (1903). Principles of Mathematics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; (1904), 
“Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions (I),” Mind 13: 204-19; and (1905a).  “On Denoting”. 
Mind 14: 479-93.
may be useful to note the difference in terms of syllogistic logic and subject-predicate 
sentences in Kant and the new developments of logic in Frege and Russell). In “Mars is 
red” the predicate ‘is red’ is first-level which is used to predicate the property of ‘being 
red’ to a certain object, Mars. By contrast, in ‘Mars exists’, ‘exists’ is used to predicate 
the property  of ‘having an instance of’ to the property  of ‘being Mars’. ‘Mars exists’ 
amounts to ‘The property of being Mars has the property of having an instance’: 
∃x(x=Mars). ‘x=Mars’ is the first-level property whilst ‘∃x...x’ is the second-level 
property. So a subject-predicate sentence as in Kant (and previously  in Aristotle) is just 
a sentence constructed out of two predicates of two different levels (so that it  is no 
longer a subject-predicate sentence).
 Regardless of Kant’s considerations, the truly persuasive argument for 
embracing such a second-order view of existence came from Russell353  who claimed 
that denying existence as a first-order property is the only way to avoid the extremely 
unwelcome consequence that there are non-existing things (also known as the problem 
of negative existentials354), as well as the distinction between being and existence. 
Russell articulated this thesis as a response to Alexius Meinong’s contention that there 
are things which do not exist.355 On Meinong’s view, existence is a genuine property of 
individuals, although not universally had. Take the presumably true sentence ‘Pegasus 
does not exist’; in order to be true, the subject, ‘Pegasus’ must designate an entity which 
does not exist or of which non-existence is truly predicated. This being so, there are 
things, those designated by some singular terms, that  do not exist. But this would fly in 
the face of Russell’s robust sense of reality, according to which everything exists (see 
also Quine in the following).356  Therefore, we should refrain from claiming that 
existence is a property of what subject terms designate in existential sentences.
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353  Russell, B. (1905b).  “Review of: A. Meinong, Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandtheorie und 
Psychologie”. Mind 14: 530-38; and (1907).  “Review of: A. Meinong, ‘Über die Stellung der 
Gegenstandstheorie im System der Wissenschaften’,” Mind 16: 436-39.
354  More on this in: Kneale, W. & Moore, G.E. (1936). “Is Existence a Predicate?”.  Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society. Supplementary Volumes. 15: 154-88; Geach, P. & Stoothoff, R.H. (1968). “What 
Actually Exists”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Supplementary Volumes. 42: 7-30; Griffiths, 
D.A. (1975). “D.F. Pears On ‘Is Existence a Predicate?”.  Mind 84, 431-5; Miller, B. (1975). “In Defence 
of the Predicate ‘Exists’”. Mind 84: 338-54; Mackie, J.L. & Bednarowski, W. (1976). “The Riddle of 
Existence”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Supplementary Volumes. 60: 247-65 & 267-89.
355  Meinong, A. (1960). “On Object Theory”. In R. Chisholm (ed.) Realism and the Background of 
Phenomenology. Glencoe: The Free Press. Translation of “Uber Gegenstandstheorie”, in Untersuchungen 
zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie, A. Meinong (ed.), Leipzig: Barth, 1904.
356  It also gives rise to contradictions such as the round-square (and something like the existent present 
king of France both existing and not existing). See Russell, B. (1905a). “On Denoting”. Mind 14: 479-93.
 As briefly advertised in (ii), one way to get around this unwanted conclusion 
would be to claim that ‘Pegasus’ is not a genuine singular term, and that all negative 
existentials are ascribable to a general form: they assert the non-instantiation of a 
property. Take the sentence ‘Some tame tigers exist’; the standard regimentation of the 
sentence in the language of the first-order quantificational logic is ∃x(Tix & Tax) where 
Ti is the translation for ‘is a tiger’ and Ta for ‘is tame’. General kind terms like ‘is a 
tiger’ do not designate individuals, they  instead designate properties so that a simple 
subject-predicate sentence like “Mars exists” is claimed to have a truer logical form like 
∃x(x=Mars) (or ∃xFx where F is the property of being identical to Mars). Suddenly, 
negative existentials become unproblematic: the sentence ‘Pegasus does not  exist’ 
becomes ¬∃x(x=Pegasus) (or ¬∃xFx where F is the property of being identical to 
Pegasus). If we take the most inclusive domain of what there is (all that exists), nothing 
(no matter what it is) in that realm of entities has the property  of ‘being Pegasus’. Thus, 
what this view comes down to is the idea that singular existentials as well as negative 
existentials are treated ultimatively as general existential claims.357
 To conclude, the view according to which ‘exists’ is a second-level predicate and 
thereby existence a second-level property, as laid down by  Russell, clearly depends 
upon two assumptions: firstly, in negative existentials, the negation takes wide scope; it 
never applies to the predicate alone. When we say that “Pegasus does not exist” what 
we really do is not to ascribe the predicate ‘is non-existent’ to the subject ‘Pegasus’, 
rather what we do is to place the phrase ‘It is not the case that’ on top of the sentence 
“Pegasus exists”. Secondly, ‘Pegasus’ is not a referring expression; and what the 
predicate ‘exists’ means is just ‘is instantiated’.358
 However convenient (to get around the problem of non-existing things) the 
position just highlighted may sound, a small minority still want to believe that existence 
truly  is not a second-level predicate. Take for instance the uncontentiously  true sentence 
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357 Proper names, according to Russell, are disguised definite descriptions which are not genuine referring 
terms. They are,  by contrast, quantificational expressions. The logical form of such expressions is 
quantificational in structure rather than subject-predicate. Therefore, supposing that the definite 
description associated with ‘Mars’  is ‘the red planet which minimum distance from the Earth is 54.6 
million kilometers’,  the standard regimentation of a sentence like ‘Mars is thus-and-so’ would be ‘There 
is a unique red planet which minimum distance from the Earth is 54.6 million kilometers such that thus-
and-so’. Individuals neither enter into the proposition expressed by the original sentence nor are part of 
the sentence’s truth conditions.
358 Clearly, Russell’s view is an instance of a descriptivist theory of reference which matter-of-factly faces 
a number of objections.  See Kripke’s Semantic Argument and Modal Objection in Kripke, S. (1972). 
Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell.
‘Some things do not exist’. Uncontentiously true since we do usually  take that some 
things like Pegasus, the Golden Mountain, Santa Claus, so on and so forth, do not exist. 
In the light of Frege and Russell’s account of existence as a second-level predicate, a 
sound regimentation, in formal language, of the sentence above would be ∃x¬∃y(x=y) 
which sounds something like ‘There is something, x, such that there is nothing, y, so 
that x and y are identical’. That something is identical with nothing is clearly 
contradictory, thus despite the original sentence ‘Some things do not exist’ is true for the 
reasons offered above, yet  its formal translation comes out self-contradictory. Therefore, 
if ‘Some things do not exist’ is really  true, then the translation that Frege and Russell 
offer cannot be the most suitable one. Thus, in addition to taking issue with some 
features (and their consequences) of existence as a second-level predicate, what this last 
remark tacitly  does call into question is a basic assumption of such a view (an 
assumption which is generally widely  shared as I pointed out early  on, see for example 
at the end of chapter 1.3.4), namely the belief that standard extensional logic carves 
reality  at its joints. If it  does, then seemingly in some cases as in ‘Some things do not 
exist’ it may  not carve reality  as deeply as it should (or conversely it may carve reality 
too deeply).
 At this point, what rests to be done is to look at how Quine managed to 
implement this view of existence and how the implementation could have bearings 
which turn out to be important for my overall argument.
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3.1 Quine on Existence
 So much for Frege and Russell. I shall now move on to looking at how Quine 
managed to perfect that notion of existence, and how the philosophical work that  he 
carried out could yield curious ontological consequences which could be interesting and 
useful for my purposes. In his 1948 ground-breaking work359, the ontological problem 
can be stated in three words: ‘What is there?’ Accordingly, it would take one word only 
to answer: ‘Everything’, and everyone would accept it as true. I am myself undecided 
whether Quine can have such an easy win on this, therefore I shall play the devil’s 
advocate and attempt to explain why there seems to be good reasons that not everyone 
would accept his answer as true.
 Let us begin by looking at some plausible evidence. Suppose we go out there 
and haphazardly ask folk ‘What is there?’. Suppose that they understand what I am 
asking, I am not so sure that they  would reply with a desertic ‘Everything’. Perhaps they 
will not. Presumably, they would say that there are things that exist (perhaps giving 
examples) and things that do not (again giving examples). The reason would be as 
simple as Quine’s ‘Everything’: almost anyone even without a robust philosophical 
appreciation of the ontological problem, somehow intuitively distinguish between 
existing and non-existing things. Answering ‘Everything’ fails to recognise such a 
feature of our talking and thinking about the world.
 Suppose instead, as it seems to me quite plausible (it is what I would answer), 
that they answer Quine’s simple question with this simple answer: ‘Everything that 
exists’. Would the two answers be equivalent? Clearly they would not, however on 
Quine’s view they would. Leaving aside for now the further question of ‘What are we 
asking when we ask ‘What is there?’’ - or the meta-ontological question, as in van 
Inwagen360 - I shall briefly touch upon a case where the equivalence is defended quite 
strenuously361. As bizarre as it gets, the author of an introductory piece about ontology 
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359 Quine, W.V.O. (1948).  “On What There Is” Review of Metaphysics 2: 21–38. Reprinted in his From a 
Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953.
360 van Inwagen, P. (1998). “Meta-Ontology”. Erkenntnis 48: 233-50.
361 See Lando, G. (2010). Ontologia. Un’introduzione. Roma: Carocci, 7-13.
as a discipline, endorsing a broad Quinean ontology, compares the ontological question 
“‘What is there?’ with a non-ontological one such as ‘What did you eat today?’. In the 
former case, as the author argues, Quine’s answer ‘Everything’ and my proposed 
amendment ‘Everything that exists’ would be synonymous, whereas in the latter they 
would not. Although I am inclined to agree with the author on the latter, at the same 
time I am inclined to disagree on the former: I cannot see a good reason why in the first 
case it should be the case whereas in the second it should not. Perhaps, a hint in that 
direction would be that what  we take to exist is what we include by  default within 
‘Everything’, so that it is never possible to draw a line somewhere within the domain of 
‘Everything’, restricting it to ‘Everything that exists’.
 As plausible as it sounds, this conclusion may actually  be a bit too quick. We do 
restrict ‘Everything’ to ‘Everything that exists’; we do this all the time and in various 
contexts (recall the examples given in the previous chapter about how allegedly 
presentists and eternalists would agree or disagree about what exists, and the related 
issue about  restricting the domain of quantification); but to simply reduce it  to a 
semantic or pragmatic pattern of behaviour would seem a lack of analysis.
 Therefore, drawing upon some examples employed in Part II of this thesis, let  us 
contrast Quine’s question on what there is (and the two answers offered early  on: 
‘Everything’ and ‘Everything that  exist’) with the question ‘Do dinosaurs or Mars 
outposts exist?’ Suppose we did not restrict the domain of quantification, how could an 
ontologist in Quine’s wake explain people’s bafflement and firm answer ‘No, they 
don’t’?362 If folk’s ‘No, they don’t’ sounds plausible then the negative answer flags the 
fact that there is something going on and thereby  the fact that it is not so trivial that 
‘Everything’ and ‘Everything that exists’ are equivalent. To claim that they are is a 
substantive philosophical thesis which requires a good deal of philosophical work in 
order to persuade.
 The issue advertised above ties intimately into a second one. At some point in 
On What There Is, Quine claims that  as soon as the univocality of existence is called 
into question then a separation with common sense is put into place; and although we 
are  aware of this peril, we anyway embark ourselves along a deceiving and dangerous 
path, to wit distinguishing between being and existence. If ‘Everything’ and ‘Everything 
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did, and possibly the latter will. In other words, dinosaurs once did but then they ceased to do so whereas 
Mars outposts have not yet come into existence.
that exists’ do not perfectly overlap then this seems to suggest the possibility for there 
being some things which do not exist but still are something (or are not nothing). 
Perhaps, although they do not exist, yet they have being. First of all, this issue has been 
lingering around for quite a long time, therefore the idea of coming up with something 
unbelievably original may not be forthcoming after all. However something interesting 
may still be brought up against Quine’s attitude, thereby venturing a revival of a 
traditional metaphysical view: Aristotle’s idea that ‘Being is said in many ways363. 
‘Existence’ is univocal and thus no room is left for subsistence or any other lesser kind 
of existence; whereas ‘being’ is equivocal: there is a ‘being’ of existence as in “Mars is, 
a ‘being’ of identity as in “Mars is Mars”, and a ‘being’ of predication as in “Mars is 
red”.
 In any  case, it is still quite telling to scrutinise why Quine believes that in giving 
up the univocality of existence we gave up  on common sense. As touched upon early 
on, it seems that both in ordinary life, language, and philosophy we customarily come 
across things which do not exist. As we know, the story goes then on saying that if 
statements like ‘Pegasus does not exist’ are true - and seemingly  they are - then we are 
talking about something which is clearly not part of the realm of what exists, and there 
is no way for it  to be amongst  the existents for it just does not exist. But since both 
Pegasus and Santa Claus are entities - even though non-existing entities - then they  must 
be included somewhere within ‘Everything’. Therefore, this seems to compel us to 
somehow distinguish between ‘Everything’ and ‘Everything that exists’, for example 
considering them as having being without having existence.
 Admittedly, this seems a perilous move also for those who think in terms of 
‘Being is said in many ways’, therefore we should be cautious before giving in. But 
suppose, for argument’s sake, that we embrace a view according to which ‘Everything’ 
and ‘Everything that exists’ are not synonyms: Pegasus and Santa Claus do not exist, in 
fact they are not included within ‘Everything that  exists’ (but it would be perfectly 
acceptable and meaningful to assert  that  ‘Pegasus is Pegasus’ and that ‘Pegasus is a 
winged horse’). However, following Quine’s argument, such a view would likely yield 
to a crucial drawback: as briefly advertised above, given the distinction between being 
and existence, we would then be forced into a corner, one filled with a large amount of 
non-existing beings, or possibilia, which offend the aesthetic sense of philosophers who 
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have a taste for ‘desert landscapes’. Quine’s examples of the ‘Possible fat man or the 
possible bald man in the doorway’364 are paramount: to wit whether they are the same 
possible man or two distinct men, and how we are to decide which one is which. In 
short, what is usually subsumed under the slogan ‘no entity  without identity’ (which 
will be looked at towards the end of the chapter).
 I shall not follow Quine down this slippery  slope since it  would somehow force 
me to embrace his peculiar view on existence, his interpretation of quantifiers, and his 
criterion of ontological commitment; all of which I am still unsure if I would be entirely 
comfortable with. (Quine’s apparatus may still turn out  useful for deliberating what 
entities different philosophical theories include in their ontologies, but it is double-
edged since it presupposes Quine’s deflationary stance on ontology.) What strikes me 
apart from the mere acknowledgement of odd possibilia is again Quine’s appeal to a 
univocal or single sense of existence365: the claim that as we fail to pin down the 
identity  of such possibilia then existence has to be univocal (so they would not get in 
the way): once more, no entity without identity. It seems to me a case in which the 
medicine is worse than the disease.
 Lastly, a further ingredient  to Quine’s concoction which seemingly follows from 
the single sense of existence is the belief that existence is suitably expressed by the 
existential quantifier of standard quantificational logic (in other words, there is nothing 
else to existence than what the existential quantifier expresses).366  Despite some 
thinkers offering good reasons against that thesis367, the equivalence between existence 
and the existential quantifier is a point taken.368 Suppose for argument’s sake that we 
agree with Quine that existence is suitably expressed by the existential quantifier. A 
further issue which we met briefly in chapter 1.3.4 regards the scope or range of such an 
existential quantifier: to wit what entities and in which contexts we are allowed to 
quantify over. Consider modal contexts: paramount is David Lewis’ modal realism 
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365 van Inwagen, P. (1998). “Meta-Ontology”. Erkenntnis 48: 233-50.
366  Quine, W.V.O. (1969). Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 91-112.
367  Orenstein, A. (1990) “Is Existence What Existential Quantification Expresses?”. In Philosophical 
Perspectives on Quine, Barrett & Gibson (eds), Oxford: Blackwell.
368 See for instance van Inwagen, P. (1998). “Meta-Ontology”. Erkenntnis 48: 237.
according to which possible worlds exist just as our actual world does369. Since they are 
all parts of reality, namely actual,370 there is no problem whatsoever when it comes to 
quantifying over them. Against Modal Realism, it has been argued that all that exists 
exists in this world, the actual one, the one we happen to live in.371 Another context  in 
which we register a shift in what philosophers take to exist is, as we saw in Part II, the 
temporal one. Recall presentists’ claim that only  presently  existing objects exist while 
eternalists say that past and future things exist as well, not now but they do exist  - being 
located - at other times.
 Another question, once more concerning the domain of quantification is whether 
Quine’s ‘Everything’ amounts to a completely unrestricted domain or whether a line has 
to be drawn somewhere; and consequently if such a notion of an absolutely unrestricted 
domain makes any sense at all.372  Suppose we have a vague idea of a complete 
unrestricted domain, something like an absolute totality  without  restriction, or the most 
inclusive domain of what there is, does this thought really  make sense? I must  admit I 
find myself in a predicament, likely  because I fail to have the relevant intuition. 
However, I am somehow inclined to say that an unrestricted domain makes little sense 
for it would look like an indeterminate slum, along the lines of Wyman’s breeding 
ground for disorderly elements373, perhaps infinitely  extensible. Arguably, a picture 
which clearly offends the aesthetic sense of those who have a taste for desert 
landscapes.
 Let us put Quine’s speculation to one side and go back to the evidence. The 
ordinary  meaning and use of the term ‘existence’ corresponds to what  Quine names 
‘Wyman’s restriction of existence to actuality’. Wyman’s effort though is ill-conceived: 
on one hand, he grants the non-existence of Pegasus, while on the other he insists that 
Pegasus somehow is. ‘Existence is one thing, he [Wyman] says, and subsistence is 
another.’ I have always struggled myself trying to grasp what subsistence is supposedly 
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371 Plantinga, A. (1976), “Actualism and Possible Worlds”. Theoria 42: 139-60.
372 See footnote 224.
373 Quine, W.V.O. (1948). “On What There Is” Review of Metaphysics 2: 23.
about - although a bunch of enthusiasts are willing to embrace it.374  As I pointed out 
above, I think we may easily have both, the truth of the sentence claiming that ‘Pegasus 
does not exist’ and the fact that Pegasus is not. What’s at stake here is another particular 
feature of quantification, which similarly  to existence is not as univocal as Quine’s ‘To 
be is to be the value of a bound variable’375 wants us to believe. The question concerns 
how quantifiers are interpreted.
 Two distinct interpretations of quantification have been put  forth, objectual 
versus substitutional376. The former has it that the truth-conditions of a sentence of the 
form ∃xFx are set out by a statement like the following: ‘∃xFx’ is true iff the domain of 
quantification over which the bound variable ‘x’ ranges includes at least one object that 
has the property of being F’. The latter instead claims that ‘’∃xFx’ is true iff there is 
some true substitution instance of ‘Fx’’. By the phrase ‘substitution instance of Fx’ is 
meant a sentence in which the bound variable ‘x’ is substituted with an individual 
constant, say a, in ‘Fx’. Thus, the statement ‘Pegasus exists’, logically amounts to ‘∃x 
(x=Pegasus)’, and it is true because “x=Pegasus” has a true substitution instance, e.g. 
Pegasus=Pegasus (reflexivity  of identity). According to Quine’s view, the substitutional 
interpretation commits us to the existence of Pegasus. However, if ‘Pegasus’ is 
considered simply  as an empty name (a name without any  referent), then Quine’s charge 
tends to water down. I believe that the lesson to be learned is that Quine’s univocal 
notion of existence supplemented with his criterion of ontological commitment are the 
two faces of the same coin: the single sense of existence and the tenability of the 
criterion depend entirely  on the objectual interpretation of quantifiers being the correct 
one, which may turn out not to be the case.377
 One more feature of Quine’s univocal view of existence which perhaps renders it 
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more suspicious and less univocal is that often in contemporary analytic philosophy we 
register a distinction distiction between existence simpliciter and existence at-a-time.378 
Recall what an eternalist world would look like: past and future things exist as present 
things do but not now, they  do at some other location in time. The last statement is 
supposed to pick out the very essence of the distinction. The issue that could be hard to 
be grasped is how something can exist simpliciter (which is a roundabout term for 
atemporally or timelessly) and at the same time exist at-some-time? There is a sense in 
which the former conveys the idea that something which exists simpliciter just does it 
no matter how, when or where. And this is what an eternalist, prima facie, claims. The 
further fact that a second ‘sense’ of existence, existence at-a-time, is introduced to 
explain why past and future things exist as present ones do but not now mirrors to some 
extent the distinction between existence and subsistence or between being and 
existence: in fact, the problem was to explain how non-existing things were something, 
say beings, without having to exist. By analogy, everything exists, past, present, and 
future instants, objects, or events. They  all do but not all of them now, therefore to 
prevent objections, the official version says that they do so at-a-time. I might have been 
misled but the whole thing sounds a bit unclear and suspicious.
 There is a sense though in which it all makes good sense: the eternalist needs a 
device to somehow explain away  the counter-intuitivity of some of the consequences of 
her own view; for instance, the fact that dinosaurs and Mars outposts do not exist. The 
eternalist says that they  do with a proviso, that is they  exist but are located at other 
times (in some cases far away in time), the reason why incorrectly we take them as non-
existing. Thus, the viability of Quine’s univocal notion of existence seems to rely 
heavily on a robust ontological view about time, called eternalism, which allows for 
many more entities than we ordinarily are inclined to include in our world (the number 
of the extra entities does not matter, what does matter is the fact that they  all exist in the 
same way  as those that we commonly take to exist). Further to this, in arguing for the 
distinction between existence simpliciter and at-a-time, Quine’s view of existence seems 
to be committed to the similarity thesis; a thesis which, as pointed out in chapter 2.1, 
seems to yield a specific view of time: eternalism.
 Lastly, it seems plausible to say that the existence of an entity we are acquainted 
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with is intimately related with its coming to be and ceasing to be however vague its 
existential boundaries could be. My grandmother was born in 1921 and unfortunately 
passed away in 2006. Suppose now in 2013 I am asked whether she exists or not 
(simpliciter). It seems to me a bit preposterous to answer that she certainly does, being 
located somewhere else in time. Instead, my best guess would be that she no longer 
exists since she passed away at the end of 2006. The same happens if I am asked if she 
existed before 1921. Again my reply would be that she did not since she came into 
existence only  in the late spring of 1921. Only  between such two such ends, is 
something said to exist; outside of such a span it is customarily said that something has 
yet to come to exist or it does not exist any longer.
 To make it easier, let us replace people with artefacts. Take a car engine, when 
all the parts making up a car engine are separately stored in a warehouse, it  seems quite 
plausible to me to say that there is no outstanding car engine. By  contrast, when they are 
properly  put together then it  seems plausible to claim that something which previously 
did not exist  now does, to wit a car engine. And similarly when all the parts of the car 
engine are successively taken apart, it is plausible enough to say that the car engine 
ceased to exist. In other words, this notion of existence parallels the concept of actuality. 
Despite many influential philosophers’ attempts to diminish the theoretical value of 
actuality379, by reducing experience to what logic expresses by the existential quantifier, 
or by lessening its scope claiming that everything exists all along and therefore actuality 
becomes redundant, I think it  would make sense to recognize, that in the ordinary  use of 
such terms (existence and actuality), their harmless conflation without reducing one to 
the other.
 To sum up: Quine’s univocal notion of existence is twisted by  several unstated 
premises which makes it contentious as shown above. Some of the strands that I 
attempted to unveil are, following van Inwagen380: (i) being is not an activity, (ii) being 
is the same as existence, (iii) existence is univocal, (iv) such a single sense is adequately 
captured by the existential quantifier, and (v) the adequate interpretation of 
quantification is the objectual one. A further assumption is that standard first-order logic 
carves reality at its joints. I shall not argue against (i) since I fail to grasp  what exactly 
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existentialism and phenomenology say about it, however I am suspicious about (ii), (iii), 
(iv), (v) and that the apparatus of logic adequately  grasps our world for a number of 
considerations that I raised above.
 To conclude the chapter, I would like to touch upon Quine’s slogans ‘To be is to 
be the value of a variable’ and ‘No entity  without identity’ both briefly advertised 
above. In the very same paper mentioned at the outset381 of this chapter, Quine sketches 
what is commonly known as the criterion of ontological commitment which the former 
of the two statements quoted above expresses at best. Apparently, with such a slogan 
Quine claims what it is for something to be or exists, assuming, as in (iv), that existence 
is suitably expressed by the existential quantifier. However, what he is really trying to 
get at is a suitable device to figure out what entities a theory takes to exist. To that end, 
such a theory must be formalised using the language of quantificational logic, secondly 
we have to pick out those sentences of the theory (given that a theory is a set of 
sentences considered true and useful from an explanatory point of view) which begin 
with at least one existential quantifier. This way, we end up determining which entities 
must be included in the domain of quantification (the set of entities over which the 
bound variables range) of such sentences if the theory is considered true. Following 
Quine’s criterion, although our theory T is committed to the existence of some entities, 
say a, b, and c; still there is something that  such criterion blatantly fails to say: what a,b 
and c are or could be.
 However, following from ‘To be is to be the value of a variable’, in ‘No entity 
without identity’ Quine warns us of the threat of postulating entities (those over which 
the bound variables range) for which we are not able to provide a suitable criterion of 
identity: that is, a principle which says what makes an entity  of a given kind the same as 
or different from another one of the same kind. He then carries on arguing that if and 
only if we know that are we then able to provide clear truth-conditions for those 
quantified sentences whose bound variables we take to range over that domain. In short: 
the criterion of ontological commitment merely  tells us how to find out what entities 
whatever theory  takes to exist without telling us what such entities are. In doing so, it 
relies on a further principle, the identity criterion, which warns us against postulating 
entities which do not possess clear identity  conditions if our theory aims to be a good 
candidate for truth. Thus, recall Quine’s examples of ‘The possible fat man or the 
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possible bold man in the doorway’382, according to both these criteria since we cannot 
say in principle if they  are the same or distinct  we should refrain from postulating them 
in our ontological theory if we want our theory  to be in good standing as a candidate for 
truth.
 I shall conclude this chapter on Quine’s take on existence with a remark that 
perhaps should be raised at the outset of a critical analysis of Quine’s interpretation of 
quantifiers rather than at the end. I am referring to how standard quantificational logic 
translates an existential statement into formal language. Take for example existential 
and negative existential sentences like ‘Mars exists’, ‘Tables and chairs exist’, ‘Pegasus 
does not exist’ and ‘Santa Claus does not exist’. They are all standardly translated into 
the symbolism of standard formal logic as follows: “∃x (x=Mars)”, “∃x (x is a table) & 
∃y (y is a chair)”, “¬∃x (x=Pegasus)” and “¬∃x (x= Santa Claus)”. But other sentences 
which are neither existential nor negative existential are translated in a similar way: for 
instance, the sentence ‘Some man is wise’ is translated into the language of standard 
logic as ‘∃x (x is a man & x is wise)’. Thus, as counterintuitive as it looks, the 
existential quantifier (more or less adequately) translates ‘Some’ and ‘Exist(s)’. But 
there is a sense in which ‘Mars exists’ is just  what it means without any additional 
meaning or hidden true structure like ‘For some x, x is identical with Mars’.
 In any case, most of contemporary philosophy endorses this kind of contentious 
view of existence. For example, recall how van Inwagen highlights the convenient 
conflation between ‘Some/at least one’ and ‘Exist(s)’: take the sentence ‘Dogs exist’ and 
its formal rendering ‘∃x (x is a dog)’, given his account of quantification, that sentence 
is just an abbreviation for a more complex one: ‘It is true of at least one thing that itx383 
is such as itx is a dog’. In turn, this sentence amounts to ‘It is true of at least one thing 
that it is such that it is a dog’. Again, this last sentence is equivalent to ‘It is true of at 
least one thing that it is a dog’ which amounts to saying that ‘At least  one thing is a 
dog’, and finally  that ‘There is at least one dog’ which is the same as ‘At least one dog 
exists’ and ‘At least one/some dog exists’. He then concludes that ‘The existential 
quantifier therefore expresses the sense of ‘there is’ in ordinary English. If the second 
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thesis384 is correct, ‘There is at least one dog’ is equivalent to ‘At least one dog exists’, 
and the existential quantifier expresses the sense of the ordinary ‘exists’ as well.’385. 
Thus, if I understand, van Inwagen’s argument is that since ‘At least one’ and ‘Some’ 
turn out equivalent, then the existential quantifier correctly expresses the logical form of 
statements like ‘Some man is wise’.
 So much for Quine’s view of existence. The aim of the previous two chapters 
was to broadly outline some themes of a view of existence which could tentatively fit 
with the outcome of Part I and II of this thesis.386 The endeavour was to find out, if any, 
an understanding of existence which could at best accommodate the ontological 
implications of a view of time the likes of eternalism (or the B-theory). Quine’s view 
looks like a suitable device for attaining that purpose. The next chapter will be 
dedicated to drawing some conclusions from what has been covered in chapter 3.0 and 
3.1 with a view of bolstering my claim that Quine’s view of existence seems to be a 
good candidate in accommodating the picture of time that eternalism (or the B-theory) 
conveys.
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3.2 Part III: Conclusions
 The aim of chapter 2.2 was to draw a picture of time which, in the light of 
Sider’s three respects in which space and time are alike and Lowe’s account of time as 
extended (and considered as a dimension in which reality is extended), could comply 
nicely with the core of intuitions and common sense considerations which moved the 
whole project  in the first  place: a core which seemingly lies in the background of the 
notion of temporal parts. Namely, the evidence that things seem to have parts in time as 
they  do in space (as well as the fact  that such evidence seems to encourage considering 
space and time as alike under some respects). Next was the thought  that such an initial 
core, if developed as in Part I and II of the thesis, could motivate a view of time the 
likes of eternalism.
 Further to this, given the intimacy between philosophy of time and ‘existence’ as 
argued early on in chapter 2.2, the next step in the argument was to see if that  specific 
combination of views of persistence and time could in turn suggest how ‘existence’ 
should be understood (basically the thought was to unpack further those remarks about 
existence briefly sketched in chapter 2.2). There is in fact a robust  sense in which 
connections between the two could easily  be singled out as I shall make clear in the 
following.
 Let us recall the outcome of Part II: according to the picture of time tentatively 
formulated in chapter 2.2 (as a result of the previous investigation of what lies in the 
background of the notion of temporal parts: the evidence that things have parts in time 
as they uncontentiously do in space), the view of time which seems to accommodate it, 
minimally in the sense of avoiding unnecessary  commitments, appears to be eternalism: 
a view of time which claims that past, present, and future moments, objects, or events 
exist. To this, eternalists often add that what exists or occurs at one time is similar to 
what exists or occurs at another place, space and time being similar under this respect 
(as well as others). It has been then argued that eternalism’s claim can be broken down 
into two theses: an ontological one, which claims that  all moments, objects, or events - 
past, present, and future - exist or occur in a four dimensional block of space-time; and 
a static one, which argues that the present moment does not move; which moment is the 
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present moment does not change. Interestingly then, according to eternalism, it seems 
that all sorts of things exist, past present and future instants, objects, or events (from, 
say, dinosaurs to future Mars outposts via the chair I am sitting on now while finishing 
off this chapter).
 Picking up  from this last claim, to wit the idea that ‘all sorts of things 
exist’ (past, present, and future instants, objects, or events), there is a sense in which 
that phrase appears to be nothing more than a roundabout way  to say that 
‘Everything’ (past, present, and future instants, objects, or events) exists; which as we 
have seen early on in this last  part of the thesis, incidentally corresponds to Quine’s 
answer to the ontological question ‘What is there?’. Therefore, there is prima facie 
evidence that if there is a view of existence which appears to be suggested or motivated 
by the Eternalism Ontological Thesis - that plenum of things all coexisting - then it 
looks like it should be one which can accommodate the most inclusive domain of 
coexisting entities; that  is ‘Everything’. Nothing could exist outside such a domain for it 
would not exist. All the entities coexist in space and time or space-time, some of them 
closer, some other further apart. To conclude, there seems to be compelling evidence 
that Quine’s view of existence can be motivated by the eternalism’s ontological 
commitments.
 In addition to the ontological thesis, eternalism consists of a second thesis, to wit 
the Eternalist Static Thesis: the idea that the present moment does not move, which 
moment is the present moment does not change. Therefore, a view of existence which is 
said to be motivated by eternalism must encompass the Eternalism Static Thesis too. If 
the present does not move along the time series lighting up instants, objects, or events, 
and if all there is is given in a nunc stans then this scenario does not seem to be able to 
accomodate a genuine turnover of things. By which I mean not just a change in the 
sheer number of existing (or coexisting) things but the denial of a more substantial kind 
of change387, namely new things coming into existence whilst others going out of 
existence. This being the case, then again the view of existence which seems to allow 
for this is Quine’s. In chapters 3.0 and 3.1 I looked at some themes regarding the idea 
that ‘exist’ is a second-order predicate and existence itself a second-order property, to 
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wit a property  of another property. Such a view of existence, as then developed by 
Quine, seems to have interesting ontological implications which could be useful for the 
purposes of my argument. If the answer to the ontological question is ‘Everything’, as 
Quine claims, then there is a sense in which if all there is consists of, say, past, present, 
and future instants, objects, or events, (which seems to be quite plausible) then they all 
exist too. In addition, by definition they  are all there is, thus any  change in such a 
domain of existents would presuppose something like a turnover of entities: for 
example, some entities going out of existence and some other coming into existence. 
Surely, all these entities popping in/out  of existence would fly in the face of Quine’s 
taste for desert landscapes and also likely to clash with his unsympathetic attitude 
towards possibilia. For something to come into existence seems plausible to be, at least, 
non-existent beforehand; for that  very  same entity to be, say, now non-existent but later 
on to come into existence would mean to be possible for it to come into existence (the 
same holds in the case of an existing entity  which goes out of existence).388 I am not 
sure how suspicious this would be deemed by Quine but we all know the fate of the 
possible fat/bold man in the doorway. Thus what Quine’s view seems to entail is, 
ontologically speaking, a domain of existents which is existentially closed, everything 
exists, and all there is lies within those boundaries. To allow for a change in that  domain 
would be for any entity which is not part of it  to become part of it; or similarly for any 
entity which is part of it to leave that domain. In both cases, something which does not 
exist will end up existing and conversely  something which exists will end up not-
existing.
 So much so, to see how the implications of Quine’s view can be motivated by 
the outcome of chapter 2.1 I shall quickly  recall few relevant points: the picture of time 
devised drawing upon Sider’s three respects in which space and time are alike and 
Lowe’s argument for time being extended (and a dimension in which reality  is 
extended) showed to comply quite nicely with the ontological implications of 
eternalism; first and foremost the Eternalism Ontological Thesis according to which all 
moments, objects, or events - past, present, and future - exist  or occur in a four 
dimensional block of space-time, and the Eternalism Static Thesis too, to wit the present 
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388  Perhaps some would disagree with this.  Perhaps a presentist might just assert that what exists is what 
exists, period. It just happens to be that this was different yesterday to today.  (This being the case, I 
suspect such a presentist would not think of time as a dimension but just in terms of existents, and which 
ones there are changing so that this never means there is anything other that what there is).
moment does not move since all the entities - them being instants, objects, or events - 
coexist, which implies that which moment is the present moment does not change.
 Thus, what seems to be required to accommodate the Eternalism Ontological 
Thesis and the Eternalism Static Thesis is a view of existence which ontological 
implications could guarantee a domain of existents whereby what there is is everything 
and that is all there is. The content  of such a domain being past, present, and future 
instants, objects, or events, all existing (or-co-existing) and being located at different 
distances in time (as they might be in space) Nothing lies outside of that domain. 
Nothing can come in or go out.389 That is, an existentially closed390 domain of existents, 
something which Quine’s view seems to be able to attain quite fittingly. Therefore, to 
conclude, it seems to me plausible to say that there is a sense in which if the initial core 
of intuitions and common sense considerations is developed as in Part I, and II, then the 
ontological implications of that core seems to suggest a view of existence a là Quine 
(even though, as advertised in chapter 3.0 and 3.1, we may not be particularly willing to 
endorse some of the contentious commitments of that very view of existence).
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389 I would be tempted to say a domain in which there is no gap in what exists. However, in conversation, 
Dr. Francis Pearson called my attention to the fact that it might be plausible to be a Quniean and still 
quantify over change at different times: quantification is unrestricted, making no reference to time, just a 
timeless ‘what exists’; but, as it happens, what is in this domain on one occasion of quantification might 
be different to what is in it on another. I must confess but I struggle with the idea of a domain (which in 
one go includes all the existents) and the idea which change suggests, namely a change in what exists. It 
might well be my own understanding of both ideas which is somehow flawed but if what there is is 
everything (unrestrictedly and atemporally) I cannot see in virtue of what a gap in what exists could be 
cashed out.
390 The idea of an existentially closed domain of existents or the principle of existential closure as named 
by Dr. Francis Pearson and myself shall be investigated in the context of the philosophy of emergence in 
the upcoming research project funded by the Emergence Project Fellowship Scheme run by the 
Philosophy Department at Durham University. In particular, what we shall be focussing on in the 
relationships between Emergence and existence since whatever definition of Emergence makes existential 
claims which so far have not been investigated thoroughly.
4.0 An Analysis of Persistence: Conclusions
 David Lewis claimed that ‘Something persists iff it exists at more than one 
time’. He then added that how things persist can be twofold: ‘something perdures iff it 
persists by having different temporal parts, or stages, at different times’ whereas ‘it 
endures iff it persists by being wholly  present at more than one time. The debate that 
followed has focussed mainly around the interplay between theories of persistence and 
time, overlooking the evidence that Lewis’ definitions embed philosophically 
ubiquitous and crucial notions like existence which deserve to be investigated too for a 
proper understanding of the topic at issue.
 Overall, the thesis was an exploration of persistence, time, and existence to 
make sense of whether and how one could motivate the others. Specifically, the 
investigation concerned how perdurance (a theory of persistence), motivates eternalism 
(a theory of time), and both a view of existence a là Quine. As claimed in the 
Introduction, the project was designed to address three main questions: one general and 
two more specific. The general one: whether and how some of the notions embedded in 
Lewis’ definition of persistence - persistence, time, and existence - motivate one 
another. Following from the general one, the first  specific question investigated the 
interplay  between perdurance and eternalism: in what ways, if any, a perdurantist 
account of persistence can motivate an eternalist account of time. It  has been argued in 
the literature that nothing seems to crucially prevent any theory of persistence 
combining with any  theory of time; however, upon careful analysis arguably there 
seems to be some constraints which favour some combinations whilst hindering others. 
From the first specific question, the second specific one explored, from a philosophical 
point of view, what time would be like if it were extended (so that things could take it 
up by  having parts in it); and examined how we could make sense of it. More 
specifically, perdurance as a theory of persistence, with its commitment to a four-
dimensional view of reality, seemed to imply  such an extended view of reality; a view 
which in turn seemed to suggest  the picture of reality which eternalism as a theory of 
time conveys.
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 The thesis contained in three parts which mirrored the three main topics above: 
persistence, time, and existence. The first part started off by  deploying the 
terminological commitments: perdurance stands for the doctrine of temporal parts 
(whether instantaneous or short-lived); whereas four-dimensionalism qualifies as a view 
according to which space and time are somehow alike (which is neutral regarding the 
question whether or not there are temporal parts).
 The investigation into the relationships between perdurance and its branching off 
into theories of time and existence began from the prima facie evidence that things 
change, and despite changing they still manage to continue to exist as the same. Change 
is then an undeniable datum of experience for which we have robust  intuitions and 
about which we can make common sense considerations. A case of a persisting object 
has been used to show that our common sense thinking and intuitions may harbour a 
predicament: we believe there is a fact of the matter whether an object is or is not one 
and the same although we may not be able pin down the reason why. Upon careful 
analysis, it has been argued that the evidence that things change seems to be adequately 
accounted for by both contenders, perdurance and endurance; so that  at this initial stage, 
with some adjustments the playing field seems to be somehow levelled. Following from 
this, focus has been redirected towards what discriminates between perdurance and 
endurance, namely the notion of temporal parts. Their centrality makes it  decisive to 
understand what they are and what they do.
 In chapter 1.3.1, a stalemate in defining the notion of temporal parts (from a 
perspective which could withstand philosophical scrutiny) has been assumed: for 
perdurance parthood is essentially  atemporal whereas for endurance it is crucially 
temporal. This impasse bears as a consequence the fact that what temporal parts are is 
all too often inadequately understood by  the opponents, with the result that there is a 
failure in the communication between the parties. It has been argued that the stalemate 
can be overcome by pointing out that the notion of temporal parts actually rests upon a 
robust basis of intuitions and common sense considerations which draw upon our 
ordinary  understanding of parts in space; and this has turned out sufficient to give a 
working grasp of them as well as the potential for a definition which stands scrutiny. 
Interestingly, this set of intuitions and common sense considerations has been revealed 
to be a suitable way to gather agreement from both parties in a way that  could then be 
communicated. Therefore, such evidence coming from intuitions and common sense 
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considerations is adequate as a starting point if a philosophy  is to be constructed. At 
least initially, both parties seemingly can know what the other is talking about, and each 
one could be suitably  understood by their respective opponents. For this reason, as 
mentioned above, perdurance’s failure to develop a definition of temporal parts that 
could be adequately grasped by the opponent might just be contingent; at rock bottom 
the idea of temporal parts would still be perfectly  understandable even without  an 
adequate regimentation of it.
 Temporal parts seem to be decisive in solving some puzzling situations. Chapter 
1.3.2 looked into what Lewis called ‘the principal and decisive objection against 
endurance’ (which in turn has always been considered a decisive argument for 
perdurance and temporal parts), namely the problem of temporary intrinsics. It has been 
argued that the problem is actually an instance of the long-standing philosophical 
problem of change. From such a perspective the discussion has been framed along two 
distinct, although intimately related, strands: an argument for perdurance which draws 
upon the problem of the instantiation of incompatible properties, and a second one 
which relies on Leibniz’s Law. In both cases, compelling evidence has been found 
which casts doubt on the established ways to conceive and account for the problem. 
Such a line of argument was then furthered and strengthened to the conclusion that 
Leibniz’s Law generates a metaphysical problem (which in turn requires metaphysical 
tools in order to be solved - as Lewis, Heller, and Sider claim) insofar as the principle 
itself is formulated and interpreted metaphysically to begin with. But that could mean 
overlooking the true essence of the principle which is first and foremost a principle of 
the logic of identity.
 This being the case, the myth of the problem of change is then debunked: the 
problem of change is not genuine, at least as set up in that paradigmatic way by 
perdurance. If there is no such problem then also Lewis’ ‘principal and decisive 
objection against endurance’ fades away. Lewis’ objection which in the first place 
boosted the doctrine of temporal parts turned out to rest on quite a flimsy philosophical 
ground: therefore, plausibly its status of a metaphysical problem has been downgraded 
to perhaps a semantic one.
 To conclude, clutching to how perdurance advocates have accounted for the 
theory  - defining temporal parts as in Sider, and finding support  for it in the problem of 
change - the scenario does not look particularly promising for perdurance: a case in 
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which it is not clear what temporal parts are but also a case in which the principal 
argument showing what sort of philosophical work they  carry out seems to vanish. In 
addition to the fact that it  is not clear what they are, similarly it is less clear what they 
do. It has been suggested that perdurance should acknowledge the import of intuitions 
and common sense considerations, at the same time rejecting Lewis’ dismissive attitude 
towards intuitions and common sense considerations, so that there are better, more 
intuitive ways, of motivating perdurance than generating a problem which fails to stand 
philosophical scrutiny.
 The intelligibility  and possibility  of temporal parts, and hence perdurantism, has 
been shown to rely on the thought that reality is four-dimensional, so that in addition to 
the three spatial dimensions in which reality uncontentiously extends, there is a fourth, 
time, along which similarly reality extends. The aim of Part II was to test the initial core 
of intuitions and common sense considerations which have been argued to sit in the 
background of the notion of temporal parts: the evidence that things seem to have parts 
in time as they do in space, with a view to seeing how it could affect the philosophy of 
time. Space and time share some decisive features so the thought was that investigating 
what philosophers have said about this similarity could clarify whether and how space 
and time could be so considered. It has been argued that there is a sense in which such 
an investigation leaves the space/time analogy wanting and therefore a tentative picture 
of time which could accommodate the similarity  thesis as well as a view of time as 
extended has been ventured. Such a picture of time drew upon Sider’s three respects in 
which space and time are alike as well as Lowe’s formulation of time as extended (and 
as a dimension in which reality is extended), and was so devised to accommodate that 
core of intuitions and common sense considerations spelt out above (chapter 2.2). The 
presumption was that such an initial core motivates a view of time like eternalism. 
Chapter 2.1 pursued the analysis of the similarity  thesis which the core of intuitions and 
common sense considerations above mentioned seem to convey. In chapter 2.3, a brief 
overview of the state of the play of the current debate in philosophy of time was 
afforded, ideally to indicate which view of the nature of time the picture devised in 
chapter 2.2 motivates. In the light of the conclusions of the previous chapters, there 
seemed to be a robust sense in which the ontological implications of the picture of time 
in question motivates a view of time like eternalism.
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 As mentioned above, chapter 2.2 looked at the question what time would be like 
if things were to take it up by having parts in it (as they  do in space) and concluded that: 
(i) it would have to be extended, somehow qualifying as a dimension; (ii) it  would be a 
continuum (although nothing crucial depends on it for the conclusion of my argument); 
(iii) all the instants, objects, or events past, present, and future must coexist; and lastly 
which follows from (iii), (iv) anytime in the series could be ‘now’ (from some 
perspective, as anywhere is here).
 Given this picture of time, it has then been asked what theory of time among 
those presented in chapter 2.3 would be able to be suggested by it. The answer was 
given in terms of the implications of the different theories: ontological on the one hand, 
and static/dynamic on the other. Since all the instants objects, or events past, present, 
and future must coexist as in (iii), then it  has been argued that this picture of time would 
be accommodated by the Eternalism Ontological Thesis.391  By analogy, it would not 
fulfil the conditions posited by the Presentism Ontological Thesis:392  it is true that the 
present moment, objects, or events exist however, they are not the only things to exist. 
Past and future instants, objects, or events exist as much as the present ones.
 If compliance with the Eternalism Ontological Thesis is plausible, then it must 
be decided which one between eternalism and the moving spotlight theory would be the 
best candidate since both endorse the Eternalism Ontological Thesis. The moving 
spotlight theory holds that in addition to what the Eternalism Ontological Thesis 
expresses, there is an objective property, presentness, which moves across the block 
universe lighting up different times, objects, or events. The same feature, that the 
present moves so that what moment is the present  moment changes, appeared to be 
shared by the growing block theory (according to which past and present moments, 
objects, or events exist but future ones do not) forcing the conclusion that it could not be 
suggested by picture of time drafted in chapter 2.2.
 For ontological considerations, the evidence suggested to dismiss both 
presentism and the growing block theory: all then seemed to come down to eternalism 
and the moving spotlight theory. Focussing on the static versus dynamic implications of 
211
391 The eternalism ontological thesis claims that all moments, objects, or events - past,  present, and future 
- exist or occur in a four dimensional block of space-time.
392 The presentism ontological thesis claims that only the present moment, objects, or events exist.
the theories, between the Eternalism Static Thesis393  and the Presentism Dynamic 
Thesis, the one which seemed to be suggested the picture of time ventured in chapter 
2.2 conveyed is eternalism: the present moment does not move, all the instants, objects, 
or events coexist (or each instant, object, or event belonging to the past or future is as 
real as the present ones), which moment is the present does not change. Whereas, what 
the Presentism Dynamic Thesis claims is that what is present changes over time; a 
different moment, set of objects or events take over as a new present moment moves 
along, whereas the previous moment, set of objects or events becomes past as soon as 
that moment ceases to be the present.394 Therefore, the conclusion is that between the 
two, eternalism and the moving spotlight theory, the one which is motivated by the 
picture of time elaborated in chapter 2.2 is the former rather than the latter.395
 In light of the distinction between the A- and the B-theory of time, together with 
what Sider claims to be the third respect in which space and time are alike (the relativity 
of here and now), and considering Sider’s comment that this latter element, together 
with eternalism yields the B-theory of time, it  seemed that the most appropriate theory 
of time to be able to be suggested by the picture drafted above is the B-theory.
 It has then been argued that granting Sider’s claim, there seemed to be a sense in 
which we could do away with committing that picture of time to the B-theory. Given 
that the Eternalism Ontological Thesis and the Eternalism Static Thesis is all there is to 
eternalism, then there seemed to be a sense in which the thesis of the relativity  of here 
and now as broadly put forth by Sider is somehow embedded in the couple Eternalism 
Ontological Thesis and the Eternalism Static Thesis. If all the instants, objects, and 
events (say past, present, and future) coexist (Eternalism Ontological Thesis), and the 
present moment does not move, change, or light up different times, objects, or events; 
then there might be a sense in which any point whatsoever in the series is here and any 
time is now. As there is no privileged point in space to be considered the ‘here’, so there 
is no privileged instant of time to be considered as the ‘now’.
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393 The eternalism static thesis claims that the present moment does not move since all the entities - them 
being instants, objects, or events - coexist, which implies that there is no turnover of entities. Which 
moment is the present moment does not change.
394 See footnote 347.
395 The reasons which motivate the rejection of the Moving Spotlight theory are elaborated in detail on p. 
159-61.
 To conclude, according to the picture of time tentatively  formulated in chapter 
2.2 (as a result of the previous investigation of what lies in the background of the notion 
of temporal parts, to wit  the evidence that things have parts in time as they 
uncontentiously  do in space) the view of time in the contemporary debate in philosophy 
of time which is suggested by it (avoiding unneeded commitments) is eternalism. If this 
is the case, then this is a counter-example to the claim that the relationship between 
views of time and persistence is relaxed so that any theory of time could fit with any 
theory  of persistence. Specifically, looking at the ontological implications of the 
theories in question, the combination of perdurance and, say, presentism is not 
available.
 Assuming the conclusion just stated above, it was interesting to see if this 
commitment to eternalism could result in a further commitment to a specific view of 
existence. As remarked in chapter 2.2, the dispute among different theories of time is a 
controversy  about what exists: they all attempt to unravel and establish the temporal as 
well as the ontic structure of the world. If this is the case, it is plausible to suppose that 
perhaps a view of time like the one elaborated above might motivate a specific view of 
existence. And this is what was unveiled in the third part of the thesis: the nexus 
between perdurance, eternalism, and the notion of existence Perdurance’s basic 
assumption that reality is four-dimensional which motivated an eternalist approach to 
time seems to suggest a view of existence a là Quine.
 The view in the contemporary debate in philosophy of time which seems to 
accommodate the picture of time drawn in chapter 2.1 appeared to be eternalism: a view 
of time which claims that past, present, and future moments, objects, or events exist. 
There is no property of presentness moving along the temporal series, past, present, and 
future moments, objects, or events are all real. However, eternalists often add that what 
exists or occurs at one time is similar to what exists or occurs at another place, space 
and time being similar under this respect. In chapter 2.2, it has been argued that 
eternalism’s claim can be broken down into two theses: an ontological one, which 
claims that all moments, objects, or events - past, present, and future - exist or occur in a 
four dimensional block of space-time; and a static one, which argues that the present 
moment does not move; which moment is the present moment does not change. 
Interestingly  then, according to eternalism, all sorts of things, past present and future 
instants, objects, or events (from, say, dinosaurs to future Mars outposts via the chair I 
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am sitting on now while I finish off this chapter) exist. They actually all coexist, in a 
four-dimensional block of space-time.
 Granting that definition of eternalism there seemed to be a sense in which it 
sounded like a roundabout way of saying that what exists (in terms of past, present, and 
future instants, objects, or events) is ‘Everything’. Incidentally, to claim that  what exists 
is ‘Everything’ corresponds to Quine’s answer to the ontological question ‘What is 
there?’ If this is the case, then there seems to be prima facie evidence that if there was a 
view of existence which is suggested by the Eternalism Ontological Thesis, that plenum 
of things all coexisting, it should be one which could accommodate the most inclusive 
domain of coexisting entities, that is ‘Everything’. Most inclusive since nothing could 
exist outside such a domain for it would not exist. All the entities coexist in space and 
time or space-time some of them closer, some other further apart. To conclude, there 
seems to be compelling evidence that Quine’s view of existence is suggested by 
eternalism’s ontological commitment.
 In addition to the ontological thesis, eternalism consisted of a second thesis, the 
Eternalism Static Thesis: the idea that the present moment does not move, which 
moment is the present moment does not change. Therefore, a view of existence which is 
claimed to fit with eternalism must encompass the Eternalism Static Thesis too. If the 
present moment does not move lighting up  different instants, objects, or events, if which 
moment is the present moment does not change, if there is no genuine turnover of 
instants, objects, or events which are present then again the view of existence which 
seemed to allow for this is Quine’s. Such a Quinean view of existence, as developed in 
chapter 3.1 and 3.2 appeared to have interesting ontological implications useful to link it 
to eternalism. If the answer to the ontological question is ‘Everything’ then there must 
be a sense in which all there is consists of past, present, and future instants, objects, or 
events. Since by definition they  are all there is, any change in such a domain of 
existents would presuppose something like a turnover of entities (instants, objects, or 
events): for example, for some entities to become or to cease to be present, or to come 
in or to go out of existence. But this would fly in the face of Quine’s aesthetic sense for 
desert landscapes. Thus what Quine’s view seemed to entail is, ontologically speaking, a 
domain of existents which is existentially closed: everything exists, and all there is lies 
within those boundaries. To allow for a change in that  domain would be for any entity 
which is not part of it to become part  of it; or similarly for any entity which is part of it 
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to leave that domain. In the former case, something which did not exist will end up 
existing (or something which was not present will be); in the latter case, something 
which exists will end up  not existing (or something which was present will no longer 
be).
 To see how the ontological implications of Quine’s view can accommodate the 
outcome of chapter 2.1 a few relevant points must be recalled. The picture of time 
devised drawing upon Sider’s three respects in which space and time are alike and 
Lowe’s argument for time as extended (and a dimension in which reality is extended) 
were shown to comply quite nicely  with the ontological implications of eternalism: the 
Eternalism Ontological Thesis according to which all moments, objects, or events - past, 
present, and future - exist or occur in a four dimensional block of space-time; and the 
Eternalism Static Thesis, to wit  the present moment does not move since all the entities 
- them being instants, objects, or events - coexist, which moment is the present moment 
does not change.
 What then seemed to be required to accommodate the Eternalism Ontological 
Thesis and the Eternalism Static Thesis is a view of existence whose ontological 
implications could guarantee a domain of existents whereby what there is is everything 
and that is all there is. The content  of such a domain being past, present, and future 
instants, objects, or events, all existing (or coexisting) and being located at  different 
distances in time (as they might be in space). Nothing lies outside of that domain. 
Nothing could come in or go out. That is, an existentially closed domain of existents, 
something which Quine’s view seems to be committed to.
 To conclude, it seems plausible to claim that there is a sense in which if the 
initial core of intuitions and common sense considerations picked out in Part  I (the 
metaphysical datum that things change, as well as the intuitions and common sense 
considerations regarding things taking up time as they do space by  having parts in it) is 
developed as in Part I, and II, then that core seems to fit in quite nicely with the 
ontological implications of a view of time like eternalism and a view of existence a là 
Quine. So that  as in Wasserman’s quote mentioned in the Introduction ‘One’s 
perspective on change is often determined by one’s position in the broader philosophical 
landscape.’ 
 If Wasserman’s quote is taken to the letter, then there seems to be a question 
which regards what the priority  of issues should be; that is, (i) should we get clear on 
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existence first (and perhaps identity), and then ask what theory of time and persistence 
are suggested by that, or (ii) vice versa? The way the thesis devoloped may appear to be 
closer to (ii), whilst, the intentions of the thesis - to look at those ubiquitous more 
general concepts like existence which are in the background of Lewis’ definition of 
persistence - might appear to be closer to (i). The truth is I think there is some sense to 
both directions. Quine moved in  direction (i), namely from his take on existence and 
modality  to a theory of time, and from there to persistence. However, nothing hinders 
one from moving the other way around as I showed in the thesis. The important point, is 
to note that both directions can fit the general methodological approach that  I want to 
take; one that enables us to consider the general and fundamental structure of reality, 
those elements invariant under different frames of reference. Wherever we decide to 
start from, if we look at the connections among theories of persistence, time and 
existence, a perdurantist account of persistence motivates an eternalist account of time, 
and both in turn suggest a take on existence a là Quine as well as a Quinean view of 
existence (and modality) implying an eternalist account of time, and both in turn 
motivativating a perdurantist view of persistence.
 Lastly, I shall conclude touching briefly upon an issue which characterised the 
thesis from the outset  and all along: the fact that our intuitions and common sense 
considerations seem to have a decisive role without supposing them to be inviolable. As 
mentioned above, the thesis started from the acknowledgement that we have strong 
intuitions and we can make common sense considerations about things changing. Later 
on, it has been pointed out that actually  in the background of the notion of temporal 
parts there lies a set of intuitions and common sense considerations that we seem to 
have regarding parts in time. This initial set of intuitions and common sense 
considerations which has been then developed through Part II and III turned out to 
branch into very specific views of time and existence which, as pointed out in passing, 
have implications which may be slightly less intuitive or common sense compared to 
the evidence we began with (for instance, the ontological implications of eternalism as 
well as Quine’s view of existence). Therefore, a further aspect which this thesis should 
like to point at is that although we may start off from evidence which appears to comply 
quite well with our intuitions and common sense considerations; for some reason further 
down the line ‘generally as the outcome of a rigorous philosophical investigation’, that 
initial evidence seems to make way for conclusions which are to a certain extent 
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counter-intuitive and in contrast with common sense. An instance of the methodology of 
philosophy I shall myself endorse as claimed in the Introduction; namely, the dialectic 
between descriptions and prescriptions, and the priority of the former over the latter.
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